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 Abstract 
Since the implementation of MiFID on November 1 2007 European financial markets have 
experienced fragmentation in displayed (lit) order books as well as an increase in the use of non-
displayed (dark) liquidity.  We empirically analyze the effects such events have on market quality.  
We find that increased competition for orders resulting from the fragmentation of the displayed 
liquidity market improves market quality in the form of tighter bid/ask spreads and lower 
transaction costs, with institutional investors realizing greater benefits than retail investors. 
Fragmentation between lit and dark order books has a negative impact on market quality as 
informative trades migrate from lit to dark order book markets leading to greater information 
asymmetry among market participants.  This results in wider bid/ask spreads and greater price 
impacts as investor confidence in advertised prices decreases and depth moves further from the 
midpoint of the best bid/ask spread.  Increased dark order book fragmentation negatively effects 
market quality in the form of wider quoted spreads, however the magnitude of the affect is minimal. 
We also find that while the number of dark trading venues increases over time, the number of 
unique order dark books, which take into consideration liquidity sharing, remains fairly constant. 
This indicates that markets can effectively regulate the number of viable dark trading venues. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In recent years investors have significantly changed the way they access liquidity.  Traditionally, in 
limit order markets, investors would rely on a single quote driven exchange in which they can 
observe the advertised prices for a particular stock as well as the quantity available for sale or 
purchase at each price level.  Today, however, investors are increasingly accessing multiple trading 
venues simultaneously through Smart Order Routing Technology (SORT) and utilizing liquidity that 
offers no pre-trade transparency, often referred to as non-displayed or ‘dark’ liquidity.  Dark liquidity 
is sourced from dedicated dark liquidity providers, often referred to as ‘dark pools’, and can also be 
found on ‘lit’ exchanges through the use of hidden orders.  This results in an increase in the number 
of orders that are systematically matched in a black box using liquidity that is hidden from investors. 
As of July 2013, 14.4% and 33% of total trading activity in the US and Europe, respectively, is taking 
place in the ‘dark’, whereas prior to 2000 the proportion remained negligible.1 
The shift in trading characteristics stems from recent regulatory changes, predominately the 
introduction of the Regulation National Market System (RegNMS) in the United States and the 
Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in Europe, whose policies encourage the formation 
of alternative trading venues such as Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) and Multilateral Trading 
Facilities (MTF) in the US and Europe, respectively.2    These changes have resulted in the formation 
of several alternative sources for both lit and dark liquidity and the fragmentation of the US and 
European equity markets. However, we find that the number of unique dark order books has 
remained fairly constant indicating that markets are adept at self-regulating the number of viable 
dark trading venues.   
We investigate these events as the majority of households are directly connected to the securities 
market.  According to Mary Jo White of the Consumer Federation of America over half of the USA’s 
residents report that they own a stock directly or through investment vehicles and this is 
representative of all developed economies. If financial markets are not fair and safe they will not 
attract investors and will fail to provide companies with the capital they require. 
Our study focuses on the market quality implications of fragmentation and consolidation within, as 
well as across, lit and dark order books.  Results on lit order book fragmentation are consistent with 
those of comparable studies by Degryse, de Jong, and Van Kervel (2011) and Gresse (2012) in that 
competition resulting from lit order book fragmentation has a largely positive effect on overall 
market quality in the form of tighter quoted spreads and lower realised and effective spreads as 
                                                          
1
 Values sourced from Rosenblatt Securities Inc. (http://rblt.com/news_details.aspx?id=226)(US) and the 
Financial Times (http://thomsonreuters.com/products/financial-risk/01_060/12-mth-dark-pools-and-bcs-
emsr-table-chart-to-july-2013.pdf)(Europe). 
2
 See Section 2.0 - ‘Background on MiFID’ for more information on how MiFID helped popularize dark liquidity. 
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venues compete for liquidity by offering discounts to liquidity suppliers.  However, effects are 
greater in the consolidated global order book compared to the primary exchange, as represented by 
the London Stock Exchange, implying that institutional investors are able to realise greater benefits 
than retail investors. 
The shift in trading towards dark liquidity providers, previously referred to as fragmentation across 
order books, is attracting the attention of regulators and policy-makers worldwide.  Proponents of 
dark trading argue that allowing trades to take place in the dark affords major investors the 
opportunity to avoid being ‘front run’ by sophisticated algorithms that can detect large orders.  
While it is still possible for this to happen in dark liquidity environments, many dark liquidity 
providers are proactively putting in place strict customer exclusivity policies as well as controlling the 
type of information that can be accessed in order to protect investors from predatory behaviour and 
maintain the quality of their pool.3  Opponents of dark liquidity argue that by removing visible 
liquidity from the market, dark liquidity providers hamper the price discovery process and reduces 
overall market quality. (Ye, 2010, and Forde and Putnins, 2012)   
Existing results on the effects of dark liquidity fragmentation on market quality, as measured by 
quoted spreads, are mixed.  Fong, Madhavan, and Swan (2004) find that increased off-exchange 
activity does not result in higher bid-ask spreads.  In a 2006 study, and later confirmed by the author 
in 2012, Gresse concludes that increased crossing network activity tightens spreads.  However, the 
majority of findings, including our own, support the idea that increased use of dark liquidity has a 
negative effect on spreads caused by informative trades leaving the market.  Degryse, de Jong, and 
van Kervel (2011) conclude that higher market shares for dark liquidity are associated with wider 
quoted spreads, which is consistent with the findings of Nimalendran and Ray (2012), Weaver 
(2011), Forde and Putnins (2012), and Foley, Malinova, and Park (2012).  
Evidence on the effect of increased use of dark liquidity on depth is also mixed. Foucault and 
Menkveld (2008) empirically test their model and find that increased use of dark liquidity leads to an 
increase in depth at the best price level.  These findings are also consistent with those of Buti, Rindi, 
and Werner (2011) and Gresse (2012).  In contrast, through empirical analysis, Degryse, de Jong, and 
van Kervel (2011) conclude that, much like in our study, depth is reduced in the lit market while 
Foley, Malinova, and Park (2012) argue that depth is unaffected. 
The extent of fragmentation in the dark order book market is difficult to measure. Figure 1 breaks 
down the market shares of known dark liquidity providers for July 2013, as reported by Thomson 
Reuters Market Share Reporter. 
                                                          
3
 For additional information see Mittal (2008) – ‘Are you playing in a toxic dark pool?’. 
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Figure (1) European dark pool market share 
The figure presents information on the market shares for various European dark pools for July 
2013.  Source:http://thomsonreuters.com/products/financial-risk/01_060/monthly-dark-pools-
bcs-emsr-table-chart-july-2013.pdf 
As indicated by the proportion of combined broker crossing system activity in Figure 1, 49% of all 
reported dark transactions cannot be assigned to a particular trading venue.  These trades appear 
under the Systematic Internalizer (SI) and Over-The-Counter (OTC) flags within the Markit BOAT 
consolidated trade reporting tape.  As a result, previous studies use the overall proportion (market 
share) of dark trading with respect to total trading volume, both lit and dark, as a proxy for dark 
trading and/or dark order book fragmentation.  Therefore, existing studies examine the market 
effects that result from the increased use of dark trading but not the level of fragmentation in the 
dark order book market.  Existing studies do not determine whether observed effects result from 
more dark trading, in terms of volume and market share, or the fact that dark trading is occurring 
across a wide variety of venues as opposed to a central location.  In order to explicitly test for the 
effects of dark order book fragmentation we assign each dark transaction to the dark liquidity 
providing venue that facilitated the trade and calculate a fragmentation measure similar to the one 
used for lit order book markets.  
The resulting findings indicate that dark order book fragmentation has a negative impact on market 
quality in the form of wider spreads and greater price impact. However, the effects are subtle and 
are more than overshadowed by the effect of lit order book fragmentation and order migration to 
dark order books. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of the financial 
environment including information on major MiFID directives.  Section 3 provides a description of 
dark pools.  Section 4 discusses existing literature regarding market fragmentation and the market 
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quality implications of the increased use of dark liquidity.  Section 5 discusses the motivation behind 
the study and the contributions that this study makes to the fields of market fragmentation and dark 
liquidity.  Section 6 outlines the hypotheses of the study.  Section 7 discusses the data used in the 
study while Section 8 details how the data will be used to test the hypotheses. Section 9 discusses 
the relevant findings of the study.  Finally, Section 10 provides a conclusion while Section 11 
discusses further areas of research that could benefit from our unique dark fragmentation measure 
as well as some of the limitations of the study. 
2.0 Background on MiFID 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), officially implemented in Europe in 
November 2007, 4 is the replacement to the 1993 Investment Services Directive (ISD).  The objective 
of MiFID is to improve the quality of the financial service industry across Europe by establishing a 
single regulatory framework for the European Economic Area that protects investors as well as 
creates a level playing field for competing trading venues, both lit and dark.  MiFID establishes three 
major directives in order to achieve this goal. 
The first directive is to foster competition by abolishing both the concentration and default rules. 
The concentration rule requires that retail orders are executed on the regulated market (i.e. 
traditional visible liquidity provider such as the London Stock Exchange), which limits the formation 
new markets and prevents the improvement of market conditions through competition.  The default 
rule requires financial intermediaries to execute orders on the primary exchange unless otherwise 
specified by the customer.  Eliminating these rules provides operators of the three newly classified 
trading venues with the opportunity to fairly compete for order flow.  The three new trading venue 
classifications are as follows: 
Regulated Markets(RM) are traditional exchanges that match buyers and sellers through a 
visible (lit) order book or through dealers.  Newly listed companies will continue to designate 
on which RM they would like to have primary listing.  Once listed, alternative trading venues 
can facilitate trades in these stocks. 
Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF) are similar to RMs in matching third party investors but 
have different regulatory requirements, one of which entails the levels of pre and post-trade 
transparency to which they must adhere.  Dark pools are a special class of MTF that are 
exempt from pre-trade transparency requirements. 
                                                          
4
 Many trading venues adapted to MiFID regulations prior to November 1 2007, however all venues were 
required to have transitioned to the new standards by this date. 
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Systematic Internalizers(SI) allow customers to trade against the inventory of the service 
provider or with other clients and are typically organized by investment banks. 
MiFID’s second directive focusses on transparency and aims to guarantee the flow of information in 
the market.  As markets become more fragmented it is vital that investors are provided with the 
information they need to make investment decisions.  Pre-trade transparency rules are established 
in order to require trading venues to maintain up to date information on their order books and make 
that information available to the public so that investors can make informed decisions regarding 
venue selection.  However, waivers do exist that allow certain classifications of MTFs, known as dark 
pools, to be exempt from providing pre-trade information such as quotes.  Post-trade transparency, 
which requires venues to post the results of all executed trades, is mandatory for all trading 
facilities, including dark liquidity providers.  Prior to MiFID, many over-the-counter (OTC) 
transactions would either go unreported or be reported to the primary exchange.  The 
establishment of post-trade transparency for all trading venues has resulted in the formation of 
dedicated trade reporting facilities such as Markit BOAT that provide information pertaining to 
consolidated crossing, OTC, and SI transactions. 
The third directive of MiFID is the introduction of the best-execution rule.  This predominantly 
applies to trading venues that do not operate displayed order books (e.g. dark liquidity providers).  
Venues that cross client trades must execute orders against the best available conditions with 
respect to price, liquidity and transaction costs, as well as the likelihood and speed of execution.  By 
doing so venues can attract customers as investors are confident that the transaction price reflects 
true market conditions. It is left up to the venue to decide whether to cross trades at the European 
Best Bid Offer(EBBO) or the Primary Best Bid Offer(PBBO) price.5,6 
An update to MiFID, known as MiFID II, gained parliamentary approval in April 2014.  Plans include 
the introduction of a new category of trading venue, Organized Trading Facilities (OTF), which will 
bring broker crossing networks (BCNs) under the scope of MiFID regulation. It will also include 
improvements to pre and post-trade transparency and transaction reporting as well as provide 
improvements to investor protection. 
3.0 What are Dark Pools? 
Dark pools are trading venues that, unlike traditional exchanges, do not post bid and ask quotes. 
Therefore, the resulting venues operate without pre-trade transparency.  As they are exempt from 
pre-trade transparency rules, the status of their order books are unknown at any given time.  Trades 
                                                          
5
 See Section 3.4.2 for more information on crossing prices. 
6
 See Davies (2008) – ‘MiFID and the changing competitive landscape’ for more information on MiFID policies. 
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are automatically crossed at pre-determined points in time by a system that maintains complete 
trader anonymity and at a price determined externally by either the primary exchange or 
consolidated market. 7  Trades are required to be reported to a designated trade reporting facility 
within a window of execution, 30 seconds, but are not required to identify the venue from which the 
trade originated.  As a result, a large portion of dark transaction data, roughly 49%,8 is consolidated, 
making it difficult to determine trading volumes for some trading venues.  
Dark pools are designed to allow investors to transact large orders without affecting the price in the 
market.  The traditional dark pool customer is a passive investment fund that needs to adjust its 
position. However, in recent years the majority of transactions are small and likely originate from an 
algorithmic trading system (Nimalendran and Ray, 2012). 
3.1 Types of Dark Pools 
Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts (2009) identify three distinguishing features of dark pools.  The first 
is their market model and refers to the way in which orders are executed, including the frequency at 
which they are crossed (continuous vs. periodic)9 and the way in which orders are matched (blind vs. 
advertisement based matching which contains minimum pre-trade transparency in the form of 
notices of the existence of a counter-party to the trade).  The second and third distinguishing 
features are the ownership structure and clientele base, respectively.   
It is argued, through both theoretical and empirical studies, that the diversity in trading structure 
amongst venues exists to serve the various trading requirements of heterogeneous clientele (Fong, 
Madhavan, and Swan, 2004, and Gresse, 2006) including preferences in trading speed, order sizes, 
anonymity, and likelihood of execution.  While trading systems exist to serve the needs of 
heterogeneous clientele, it is believed that systems with similar offerings will eventually consolidate 
as customers gravitate to what they believe to be the better venue (Pagano, 1989). 
Mittal (2008) uses the aforementioned features and classified dark pools into the following five 
categories:10 
3.1.1 Public Crossing Network 
Public crossing networks are the most traditional of all dark pools.  They are the pools to which most 
buy-side firms connect and typically form when agency-only brokerage firms seek alternative 
sources of revenues, such as commissions. A key feature of public crossing networks is that client 
                                                          
7
 See Section 7.5.2 for more information on the consolidated market and how it differs from the primary 
market. 
8
 According to the Thomson Reuters Market Share Reporter 
(http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/financial_products/a-z/market_share_reports/). 
9
 See Section 3.4.1 – ‘Matching Frequency’ for more information. 
10
 For additional information see Mittal (2008) – ‘Are you playing in a toxic dark pool?’. 
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orders do not interact with those of the dark pool operator.  Public crossing networks rely on their 
ability to offer liquidity through a unique model, which can be difficult, and as a result have seen few 
entrants over recent years.   
Public crossing networks generally match orders on a continuous basis (i.e. as orders arrive) without 
conveying an investor’s buy or sell intentions to anyone.  However there does exist a subset of firms 
that match orders based on advertisements. In these advertisement-based pools an alert goes out to 
the traders informing them of a potential match.  Systems vary in the way alerts are sent.  In some 
cases both sides receive an alert for the potential match and neither party is committed to the 
order.  In other cases one side will be committed while the party who receives the alert has the 
option of whether or not to execute the trade. 
Major public crossing networks include POSIT, Instinet, and Liquidnet, which are some of the first 
entrants into market.11 
3.1.2 Internalization Pools 
Internalization pools are designed to internalize an operator’s trade flow.  Their purpose is to save 
the trading venue money by allowing orders to be crossed internally rather than sent outside to 
external trading venues and incurring transaction fees.  Internalization pools are also operated by 
buy-side firms as a means of generating additional commissions.  The primary difference between 
internalization pools and public crossing networks is that internalization pools allow for client orders, 
from both retail and institutional clients, to interact with the proprietary order flow of the operator.   
Major internalization pools include Credit Suisse’s Crossfinder and Goldman Sachs’ Sigma X. 
3.1.3 Ping Destinations 
Ping destinations are, in some ways, the complete opposite of public crossing networks. Client 
orders interact exclusively with the owner’s propriety order flow as opposed to with each other, 
making the Ping Destination a new form of market maker.  They are also quite unique in the sense 
that they only accept Immediate or Cancel(IOC) orders, which require interaction with venue owned 
shares. If only client trades were crossed then the probability of execution would be extremely low 
due to the unlikelihood of two opposing orders entering the pool at the exact same time.   
Ping destinations rely on quantitative models operating in a black box to make decisions as to 
whether or not to accept an IOC order.  The majority of their customers are sell-side firms that use 
dark pool aggregators or Smart Order Routing Technology (SORT) to locate sources of liquidity. 
                                                          
11
 This supports the previous statement that there have been few new entrants classified as Public Crossing 
Networks. 
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3.1.4 Exchange Based Pools 
Two sources of dark liquidity are combined in this category as they share many defining 
characteristics.  The first are dark pools that are registered as MTFs by the operating exchange and 
include Turquoise Dark and Xetra Midpoint.  The second are implicitly created pools formed as the 
result of the introduction of hidden order types on the operating exchange.  Hidden orders differ 
from iceberg or reserve orders in that not even a portion of the order is made visible on the lit 
exchange, thus preventing any changes to displayed quotes.   
3.1.5 Consortium Pools 
Consortium pools differ from the aforementioned venue classifications in that they are established 
by a group of partnering brokers.  They are similar to public crossing networks except they are not 
typically run by agency-only firms.  They also resemble internalization pools except they are 
established as separate organization, and as such fall under regulatory guidelines that require for 
increased transparency in their activities.   
3.2 Are They New? 
While the dark pool as a distinct venue may be a new phenomenon the concept of ‘dark’ or ‘hidden’ 
liquidity is not new.  Reserve/Iceberg orders predate dark pools and allow investors to submit large 
volume orders to the market in increments while publicly displaying only a specified portion of the 
total order size.  Reserve/Iceberg orders, however, are not entirely hidden because a portion of the 
order is still made public. Hidden order types are also a historical transaction type that allow for dark 
liquidity within a lit order book.  Other forms of dark liquidity include floor broker orders and 
specialist capital on floor-based exchanges, working orders handled by agency brokers or broker-
dealers, dealer capital and stand-alone as well as broker and exchange/ECN operated crossing 
networks (Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 2011). 
Dark pools as a separate entity are also a decades old phenomenon. However, it is only recently that 
they have been absorbing a significant market share of order flow, thus gaining attention on a global 
scale (Degryse, van Achter, and Wuyts, 2009).  Crossing networks originate from the early 1970s and 
consist of phone based networks between buy-side traders.  Though we must note that the liquidity 
being provided is not completely dark as the broker requires knowledge of the transaction in order 
to find a counter-party.  Nevertheless, since the intentions of the parties are not made public until 
after the trade is completed, they, like upstairs market transactions, are still considered a source of 
dark liquidity.    In the 1980s electronic networks such as Instinet and POSIT were introduced which 
eliminated the need for human interactions and thus improved the anonymity of crossing network 
transactions.   
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There are currently over 40 dark pools operating separately in both the US and in Europe with 
consolidated market shares of 14.4% and 33%, respectively.12  Their recent growth is attributed to 
the introduction of new regulations, such as RegNMS in the US and MiFID in Europe, that result in an 
environment that is more conducive to the formation and expansion of alternative trading venues.   
Growth in the popularity of dark liquidity is also attributed to improvements in technology, such as 
algorithmic order routing, which directs order flow to various trading venues while protecting 
investors’ interests by taking into account prices, liquidity, and market impact, among other 
variables. (Degryse, van Achter, and Wuyts, 2009) 
3.3 Vs. The Upstairs Market  
The upstairs market refers to when trading occurs within a broker-dealer firm as opposed to a 
traditional exchange.  Upstairs market trades, like those originating from dark pools, are protected 
under regulatory policy and subject to the best-execution rule.  This rule stipulates that prices given 
to customers must not be less favourable than those offered to investors by visible order book 
operators.  As a result, the best-execution rule states that prices must fall within best bid and ask 
spread of the primary or consolidated market. 13 
The main difference between the two trading venues is that dark pools operate using an electronic 
trading system which requires no broker or dealer involvement, resulting in complete pre-trade 
transparency.  Since dealers in the upstairs market contact other dealers in order to source liquidity 
there is potential for some information leakage.   In his paper ‘Do Dark Pools Harm Price Discovery?’ 
Zhu (2012) acknowledged that although this type of liquidity is not usually classified as dark, it is still 
a source of non-displayed liquidity.  Another difference between dark pools and the upstairs market 
is said to be the trading cost, which is theoretically lower in dark pools (Lefebvre, 2010).14  
3.4 How are Transactions Executed? 
The following illustrates the steps involved in completing a transaction within a dark pool: 15 
 
i. The trader who would like to buy/sell the security calls his broker or places an order 
over the electronic system of the broker. 
ii. The broker internalizes the order and looks for suitable matches within his network. This 
work is sometimes done by computer algorithms which can break the order up into 
several pieces and locate the most appropriate venues for executing the transactions. 
                                                          
12
 Values sourced from Rosenblatt Securities Inc.( http://rblt.com/news_details.aspx?id=217 )(US) and the 
Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f1142a76-322a-11e2-b891-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2L7xhct7b)(Europe). 
13
 See Section 7.5.1 for more information on the distinction between primary and consolidated markets. 
14
 See Section 4.1 – ‘General Market Fragmentation Literature’. 
15
 Steps sourced from Achuthakumar(2009) - ‘Dark pools of liquidity’. 
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iii. The transaction details are forwarded to clearing and settlement houses.  
iv. The confirmation of the trade and trade details are then provided to the two parties. 
3.4.1 Matching Frequency 
Dark pool orders can be matched in the following ways: 
Continuous cross: Orders are matched as they enter the system. 
 
Periodic cross: Orders are processed in batches at pre-determined times throughout the day.  
These are among the first types of dark pools.  Over time companies began offering more 
frequent crossing opportunities until they finally began offering continuous crossing.  Posit 
Match is an example of an existing periodic crossing pool.   
Advertisement based: Alerts are provided to one or both parties of the transaction.  Systems 
vary in the way alerts are sent.  In some cases both sides receive an alert for the potential 
match and neither party is committed to the order.  In other cases one side will be 
committed and the party who receives the alert has the option of whether or not to execute 
the trade. 
3.4.2 Price Determination 
Regulatory policy, specifically the best-execution rule, dictates that transactions in a dark pool 
environment cannot be executed at a price that is less favourable than that offered to customers of 
traditional exchanges.  As such, transactions are executed at a price referencing one of the following: 
National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO)(US)  - The best bid and ask prices as determined by the 
consolidated national market. 
 
Primary Best Bid and Offer (PBBO) - The best bid and ask prices as determined by the 
exchange of primary listing. 
 
European Best Bid and Offer (EBBO) – The best bid and ask prices as determined by the 
consolidated European market. 
While the NBBO is the standard in the US, European dark pool operators have the option of 
referencing either the PBBO or EBBO.  Originally most operators referenced the PBBO however 
recent trends have shown that there has been a preference to switch to the EBBO.16 
                                                          
16
 See ‘Instinet first to float EBBO’ (http://www.thetradenews.com/newsarticle.aspx?id=8293). 
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Though all pools allow for trades to be executed at the midpoint, some venues also allow 
transactions at the best bid or best ask.  The benefit from executing at the best bid/ask is increased 
probability of execution by moving towards a price for which an outstanding limit order may exist 
(e.g. There are no orders at the midpoint but plenty of limit orders exist to sell to you at the higher 
ask price/buy from you at the lower bid).  In order to further cater towards the heterogeneous 
needs of investors some pools have also allowed for more specific transaction pricing.  For example, 
a trader who wishes to purchase stock but does not place significant value on immediacy can specify 
‘midpoint-1 cent’.  On the other hand, a trader who values immediacy can place an order at 
‘midpoint+1 cent’ and increase the probability and speed of finding a match.  In most cases investors 
can also specify a limit price in order increase the probability of execution (Ray, 2010).  
Prices are generally decided upon after a match has been made.  An order enters a dark pool and 
either immediately or after some time finds a counter-party to the trade.  At that point the 
electronic system references the designated BBO and decides upon a price for the transaction.  
There are some instances in which prices are determined before the match has been made.  Instinet, 
for example, operates a closing cross that matches orders at the closing price.  However, in order to 
prevent predatory trading, it closes crosses for any company that makes an announcement after 
markets have already closed (Ye, 2010).  
3.4.3 Types of Orders 
Dark pools allow for the use of the following order types: 
 
Market order – The order is filled in reference to the prevailing BBO. 
 
Limit order – The order is filled at a price no worse than the customer specified limit in 
reference to the prevailing BBO. 
 
Immediate or Cancel (IOC): The order is either filled in its entirety, in reference to the 
prevailing BBO, or removed from the liquidity pool.  Many dark pools no longer allow this 
feature as it can be used for gaming purposes to try and detect available liquidity. 
3.4.4 Order Attributes 
The following is a list of key trade attributes that modify the order type:  
 
Mid-Point: The order is pegged to the prevailing mid-price of the NBBO/EBBO/PBBO quote.  
 
Pegged order: The order is pegged to any point inside the spread (e.g. bid, ask). 
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Minimum Quantity: The order cannot interact with orders smaller than this quantity for the 
first fill. 
 
Persistent minimum quantity: The minimum quantity is forced throughout the life of the 
order and not just for the first fill. 
 
Limit Price: Do not execute the order at a price inferior than the limit price. 
 
Do not interact with: Exclude various counter parties including other dark pools or liquidity 
partners. 
 
Send/Do not send IOI: Refrain from sending Indication of Interest messages to other dark 
pools or liquidity partners.  These messages are used to find available liquidity from external 
sources.  They do not often include information about the size of the order or whether the 
party is a buyer or seller.  Many dark pools no longer allow this feature as it can be used for 
gaming purposes to try and fish out available liquidity. 
3.4.5 How is Liquidity Accessed?  
Orders sent to a dark pool first interact with the resident dark order book.  If the necessary liquidity 
is not available they are then sent to either the proprietary lit order book, in the case of exchange 
based pools, or to the dark order books of partnering companies.  In order to increase the 
probability of execution17  for their clients many dark pool operators have developed liquidity 
sharing agreements with their competitors. The result is a mutually beneficial relationship which 
satisfies clients’ needs for liquidity while maintaining a steady customer base that would otherwise 
be lost in the face of high rates of non-execution.  Finally if the order is still not filled the remainder 
is sent to the primary exchange.  This type of strategy does require the client to have access to some 
Smart Order Routing Technology (SORT). 18  As such this is often feasible for institutional investors 
but not so for retail clients who could not financially justify the investment. 
In order to maintain an acceptable likelihood of execution some dark pools have developed liquidity 
partnerships with competing trading venues, as mentioned above. 19  The result is that if an order 
cannot be completed on the proprietary dark order book it is immediately sent to the partnering 
                                                          
17
 Probability of execution is found to be lower in a crossing network and has been noted as being one of the 
largest costs associated with dark liquidity trading (Ye, 2011). 
18
 The increase in use of SORT technology(Hendershott and Riordan, 2009) in aggregating dark liquidity has 
resulted in participation rates of 15-25% (Altunata, Rakhlin, and Waelbroeck, 2010). 
19 See article ‘Instinet Europe joins TQLens’ 
(http://www.tradeturquoise.com/press/instinet_europe_joins_tq_lens.pdf).  
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order book.  A key benefit of this is improved probability of execution for retail clients who do not 
have access to SORT. It has been estimated that up to 99% of a crossing network’s transactions are 
crossed against clients’ transactions from an external dark pool (Nimalendran and Ray, 2012). 
It should be noted, however, that investors often have the option to refrain from sending their 
orders to particular venues, including primary lit exchanges.  The main reason for this is that some 
investors may want to refrain from transacting in what are known as ‘toxic’ pools.20  Toxic pools are 
those that do not restrict the type of activity that occurs in the pool and, as a result, subject clients 
to predatory behaviour.   
3.4.6 Trade Reporting 
In accordance with the post-trade transparency regulations of MiFID, trades must be reported within 
30 seconds to a designated trade reporting facility (TRF), such as Markit BOAT, once the transaction 
has been finalised (Nimalendran and Ray, 2012). Dark pools have the option of allowing their 
identity to be known when reporting the transaction.  If a pool chooses to refrain from reporting 
their identity the transaction will be flagged as either OTC or SI in the TRF’s consolidated tape.   
If a large order is executed in pieces the individual trades must be reported as they occur.  Providing 
a minimum quantity with the order will therefore help prevent those interested in gaming from 
identifying that there may be a large order in the market as they are not likely to place large orders 
during ‘fishing’ expeditions.21 
Prior to MiFID, trades originating from dark pools would either be reported to a primary exchange, 
such as the London Stock Exchange, 22 or would not be reported publically at all.  One of MiFID’s key 
directives is to increase the level of transparency in the market and make sure that all trades are 
reported, though the identities of the reporting firm can continue to remain secret.   
Unfortunately, allowing trade reporting firms to refrain from having their firm specified as the 
source of the transaction has introduced a degree of difficulty into academic research on dark pools.  
This inability to locate the source of the transaction has made it difficult to measure just how 
fragmented the market has become since the rise in the popularity of dark liquidity.  While total dark 
volume can be measured it cannot be done on a trading venue by trading venue basis.  According to 
Thomson Reuters Market Share Reporter, roughly 49% of the total dark trading activity in Europe 
cannot be traced to an originating venue.23  
                                                          
20
 For additional information see Mittal(2008) – ‘Are you playing in a toxic dark pool?’. 
21
 See Section 3.6 – ‘Drawbacks of Dark Pools’ for more information on gaming. 
22
 See ‘Liquidnet Europe signs up with Markit BOAT’ 
(http://www.securitiestechnologymonitor.com/issues/19_61/22379-1.html). 
23
 See link for more details (http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/financial_products/a-
z/market_share_reports/). 
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3.5 Benefits of Dark Pools 
The option to avoid displaying an order to a continuous limit order book offers several advantages.  
One of the key advantages is the ability to prevent your order from being imitated by those in the 
market.  If others were to gain knowledge of your intentions and put forth similar trades they can 
reduce the alpha of your investment strategy.  Displayed orders also leave themselves open to being 
front-run.  Front-running occurs when another investor manages to place an order with higher 
priority on the same exchange and, as a result, moves the price in an unfavourable direction. This 
increases the cost of your transaction and lowers your future returns (Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 
2011). 
Orders are also only reported if a transaction is successful, thereby maintaining your intentions 
private and allowing you to make another attempt at transacting without informing other investors.   
This proves to be particularly helpful for transactions in low volume (turnover) and small-cap stocks 
as the intention to transact can hold more informative value for these stocks compared to high 
volume and high-cap stocks. 
Another, more obvious, reason for the use of dark pools is that participants no longer pay the bid-
ask spread to transact.  Each party is responsible for half the spread as orders are often executed at 
the midpoint; an exception is made for orders transacted at the best bid or ask but those are likely 
done for more strategic reasons such as improving the probability of execution while maintaining 
anonymity.  While executing a trade at the midpoint can be replicated in the lit market by posting a 
quote at the midpoint, doing so causes you lose the benefits of anonymity.   
Investors who place orders with a traditional broker are subject to significant commission fees.  Dark 
pools are often associated with lower transaction fees.24 
Dark pool trades also allow for minimal price impact. 25 Large orders executed in a visible order book 
can exhaust several levels of bid or ask prices and can, therefore, widen the spread significantly, 
depending on the depth of the order book and the volume being traded. 
Unfortunately some argue that almost all the potential savings gained from accessing dark liquidity 
are lost to adverse selection (Altunata, Rahklin, and Waelbroeck, 2010). 
3.6 Drawback of Dark Pools 
There are two main disadvantages to the use of dark pools.  Firstly, there is a potential lack of 
immediate executions, due to insufficient liquidity, as there is no guarantee that there is an opposing 
order sitting within the liquidity pool.  As a result, some orders sit in a dark pool for a significant 
                                                          
24
 As noted in the Pricewaterhouse Coopers report by Caplan et. al. – ‘Dark pools of Liquidity’ 
(http://www.pwc.com/us/en/alternative-investment/assets/NY-10-0105-PwC-alt-Caplan.pdf). 
25
 See Section 4.1 – ‘General Market Fragmentation Literature’. 
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amount of time, during which prices move unfavourably, resulting in increased transaction costs. 
This is even more evident in periodic crossing pools as orders may not be processed for several 
minutes after submission, thereby increasing the wait time needed to verify the status of the 
transaction.   Lack of liquidity in the pool resulting in partial execution is also a problem as the 
reporting of partial order execution can reveal your intentions to the market, thereby potentially 
negating further benefits from anonymity.  Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2003) and Ready (2013) ask 
why dark pools, with all of their benefits, are not more popular and conclude that it is largely due to 
the low probability of execution. 
 
Secondly, there is a potential for gaming in dark pools.  As information about orders is not posted 
until after the transaction has been executed it is important to ensure there are no information 
leakages with regards to the size and direction of a particular order.  If information is leaked, 
competing investors have the opportunity to enter the regular market and trade in the same 
direction as the pending dark order, thus moving the price in an unfavourable direction.  This type of 
information leakage is accomplished through what is known as fishing – sending a series of small 
orders in order to try and detect whether a large order exists in the dark pool.  Regulators are 
concerned that this type of activity, in addition to the use of advertisement based pools, can result in 
information asymmetry in the market whereby some investors have key information that is not 
available to the general market.  The result is likely to be inhibited growth a crossing network’s 
activity (Ray, 2010). 
 
Many pools, however, attempt to limit the prospect of gaming by imposing rules such as minimum 
order sizes and minimum resting periods for orders (i.e. orders cannot be cancelled within a certain 
amount of time), as well as not allowing IOC order types or the sending of IOIs.26  They also attempt 
to restrict access to their pool.  For example, some dark pools do not allow high frequency traders in 
order to maintain a certain quality of trades. 
4.0 Literature on Market Fragmentation and Dark Liquidity 
This section focuses on the relevant literature on market fragmentation in both lit and dark 
environments. 
4.1 General Market Fragmentation Literature 
Theoretical and empirical work on the benefits of market consolidation and fragmentation results in 
mixed findings.  The following outlines they key points to both sides of the argument. 
                                                          
26
 See Section 3.4.3 for information on types of dark orders 
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4.1.1 Benefits of Consolidation 
Mendelson (1987) argues that finding a counterparty is easier when markets consist of more 
investors willing to trade. Therefore, a market becomes more attractive as the number of traders 
increases.  In similar fashion, Pagano (1989) concludes that in the light of two similar market choices, 
investors concentrate in the market where the number of traders is foreseen to be greater.  The 
reason behind both authors’ conclusions is that either investors are attracted to the idea of 
increased probability of execution resulting from a larger pool of investors or that the costs of 
transacting in the more consolidated market is decreased due to its ability to utilize economies of 
scale in minimizing the fixed cost per trade paid by market participants. 
Increases to the number of markets listing assets can lead to an increase in adverse selection costs 
(Chowdry and Nanda, 1991, and Forde and Putnins, 2012).  It also provides dealers and market 
makers with the opportunity to cream-skim profitable orders which negatively effects liquidity in the 
form of wider bid-ask spreads and results in increased volatility (Madhavan, 1995, Easley, Kiefer, and 
O’Hara, 1996, Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997, and Zhu, 2012).   
Bennet and Wei(2006) study the market quality implications of migrating a primary listing from a 
fragmented market (NASDAQ) to a consolidated market (NYSE). The NASDAQ is classified as 
fragmented as it is a dealer market where trades are executed by a large number of trading venues 
such as Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), dealers, and regional exchanges.  On the other 
hand, the NYSE is a more traditional exchange with order flow directed to a single trading venue.  
They examine 39 stocks that transfer listing from 2002 to 2003 and find that switching results in an 
improvement in liquidity provisions and price efficiency.  They also observe additional improvements 
in market quality in the form of reduced volatility as well as quoted, effective, and realised spreads, 
which is confirmed in a later study by Gajewski and Gresse (2007). 
Foucault and Menkveld (2008) investigate the effects of the launch of EuroSets, operated by the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE), into the Dutch stock market alongside the already established 
EuroNext exchange.  They question whether the introduction of a new market improves liquidity and 
whether protection against violation in price priority for limit orders is necessary.  They conclude 
that the consolidated, or global, limit order book is deepened after the introduction of EuroSets. 
However, higher trade-through rates in the entrant market imply that protecting lit orders against 
trade throughs would be important in preserving the quality of transactions.  
In contrast with the findings from Foucault and Menkveld (2008),  Riordan, Storkenmaier, and 
Wagener (2010) find that investors execute trades at the best price level in spite of a lack of price 
protection.  They investigate the fragmentation of lit exchange markets on UK stocks resulting from 
the introduction of three new lit MTFs: Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise.  The authors find that price 
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protection was not necessary as investors made it a priority to stay informed and protect themselves 
by monitoring multiple markets; price competition was obviously important to them.  However, as 
not all investors can afford such monitoring techniques, some investors will still be subjected to 
increased trade-through rates and will require some sort of investor protection. 
4.1.2 Benefits of Fragmentation 
Proponents of market fragmentation argue that it has positive market effects and increases investor 
welfare when introduced.  Monopolistic trading environments often result in non-competitive 
behaviour and the introduction of a competitor aids in improving trading costs in the form of tighter 
bid-ask spreads as increased competition forces liquidity suppliers to improve their prices. (Fong, 
Madhavan, and Swan, 2004, and Foucault and Menkveld, 2008).  Hendershott and Mendelson 
(2002) and Gresse (2006) find that markets fragment to serve the different types of trading 
requirements of different classes of investors.    They also confirm that the ability to serve different 
classes of clientele is a clear benefit of fragmentation. 
However, some authors believe that fragmentation is beneficial to the market only up to a certain 
point. Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2011) find that visible fragmentation has an inverted U-
Shape showing that the marginal benefit of fragmentation decreases over time, resulting in an ideal 
level of fragmentation of 32% as measured by 1- the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.27 They find that 
fragmentation improves liquidity about the midpoint but has a lesser effect deeper in the visible 
order book.  The authors also argue that the nature of fragmentation is an important factor, with 
visible fragmentation having a positive effect on global liquidity while the effect resulting from dark 
order fragmentation is negative. 
4.2 Dark Liquidity and Price Discovery 
Dark pools have come under scrutiny with regards to the role they place in the price discovery 
process.  In May 2009, James Brigagliano of the Securities Exchange Commission(SEC) said that dark 
pool could impair the price discovery process by drawing valuable order flow away from the public 
quoting market.  He also added that anything that significantly detracts from the incentive to display 
liquidity in the public market could decrease that liquidity and in turn harm price discovery and lead 
to increased short term volatility.28  The remainder of this section focuses on the theoretical and 
empirical studies on the effect that dark liquidity has on the price discovery process. 
4.2.1 Theoretical  
Theoretical work on the effect of dark liquidity on the price discovery process shows that academics 
have significantly differing opinions.  A 2002 study by Hendershott and Mendelson analyses the 
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 See Section 8.2.1 for more information on the index as it is incorporated in our study. 
28
 See ’SEC’s Brogagliano on the need for Market Structure’ 
(http://mutualfunddirectorsforum.blogspot.com.au/2009/05/secs-brigagliano-on-need-for-market.html). 
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interaction between dealer networks and a relatively new form of trading venue, passive crossing 
networks.  The study finds that investors who use the dealer market as a last resort can induce 
dealers to widen spreads.  Traders who only use crossing networks, however, can provide a 
counterbalancing effect by reducing adverse selection by attracting new liquidity and providing an 
alternative to the dealer market for informed investors.   
Ye (2010) develops a theoretical model determining the market outcome when informed traders 
have the option of sending their trades to either a displayed limit order book, operated by a 
traditional exchange, or a crossing network, a particular type of dark pool. The result is that routing 
orders to a crossing network reduces price discovery, with the impact being higher for stocks with 
higher fundamental value uncertainty.  Ye also concludes that the use of a crossing network harms 
price discovery if informed traders are able to trade in the crossing network.  The intuition behind 
this model is that investors move their trades between crossing networks and stock exchanges until 
they are indifferent between non-execution probability in the crossing networks and price impact in 
the traditional exchange (Ye, 2011). 
Zhu (2012) develops a similar model but, unlike Ye (2010) who assumes exogenous choices of 
trading venues by liquidity traders, Zhu assumes endogenous venue choices by liquidity traders, 
which is critical to the resulting findings.  The study improves on other models that exogenously fix 
the strategies of informed traders. Hendershott and Mendelson (2002) do not consider the role 
asymmetric information plays regarding to the value of the asset (Degryse, Van Achter, and Wuyts, 
2009, and Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 2010).  The result is that informed investors cluster on the heavy 
side of the market, thereby facing low execution probability in the dark pool, relative to uninformed 
traders, as there orders are positively correlated with the value of the asset, and therefore each 
other.   This results in traditional exchanges being more attractive to informed investors, improving 
the price discovery process by concentrating price-relevant information on the exchange.  It also 
results dark pools being more attractive to uninformed investors as liquidity orders are less likely to 
correlate with each other, thereby maintaining a higher probability of execution.   
4.2.2 Empirical 
Forde and Putnins (2012) conduct an empirical analysis regarding the impact of trading without pre-
trade transparency on price discovery.  They use Australian data from the ASX All Ordinaries index 
from February 1 2008 to 30 October 2011.  Their results are in line with Ye (2010) and reveal that 
aggregate price discovery is impeded and prices become less efficient as order flow migrates from lit 
to dark trading venues.  The result is a decrease in the incentive to engage in costly information 
acquisition which causes a further reduction in the informational efficiency of prices.  They do not, 
however, find any evidence that large block trades that occur in the dark impede price discovery.   
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Nimalendran and Ray (2012) use proprietary crossing network transaction data from June 1 2008 to 
December 31 2009 to examine the information linkages between dark and lit trading venues.  By 
using transaction level crossing data from an actual crossing network they are able to gain insight 
into the exact nature of dark pool trades.  This, however, also introduces a limitation to the results 
as they are drawn from a single source.  They conclude that, in addition to lit exchanges, crossing 
networks provide a venue for informed traders to trade strategically and, as a result, facilitate the 
price discovery process.  The extent to which the price discovery process is supported, however, 
depends on the nature of the trade.  While trades in less liquid stocks against members of the 
crossing networks transmit significant information to the lit exchange, trades in liquid stocks, trades 
by the crossing network’s brokerage desk, and large blocks in negotiated crosses transmit less 
information.  
In contrast to the work by Forde and Putnins (2012) and more in line with the theoretical conclusion 
of Zhu (2010) and the empirical work of Nimalendran and Ray (2012), Brandes and Domowitz (2010), 
who study dark pool trading in Europe, find that increased dark trading is beneficial to price 
discovery.   Using 2009 data from US trade reporting facilities, O’Hara and Ye (2011) also find that 
increased market fragmentation through the use of dark liquidity sources leads  to more efficient 
prices. 
4.3 Dark Liquidity and Market Quality 
The following sections focus on the various theoretically and empirically driven studies of the 
relationship between dark liquidity and market quality. 
4.3.1 Theoretical 
Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2010) develop a theoretical model in which traders can submit their order 
to either limit order book or a dark pool.  They extend the previously available literature by building 
a model of dynamic limit order markets, whereas previous work is comprised of static models.  They 
conclude that when a dark pool is introduced alongside a limit order book, total welfare, as well as 
institutional traders’ welfare, increases, however only for liquid stocks. The improvements to 
institutional investors’ welfare are consistent with the findings of previous studies such as Conrad, 
Johnson, and Wahal (2003).  Retail traders’ welfare, however, is found to always decrease.  The 
authors find that, for liquid stocks, both limit and market orders migrate to the dark pool, resulting 
in tighter spreads.  However, competition for illiquid stocks lowers the probability of execution of 
limit orders and results in a widening of spreads.  
The effect on bid-ask spreads is found to be ambiguous in a study by Hendershott and Mendelson 
(2002).  The authors find that even though the new market may attract new liquidity dealers and 
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result in lower spreads, the potential for the dealer markets to be used as a market of last resort 
causes spreads to increase. 
In contrast, Zhu (2012) argues that informed traders have low execution probability in dark pools as 
they often trade on the same side of the transaction.  Therefore, they move to traditional markets 
and, as a result, adversely affect liquidity in that market in the form of wider bid-ask spreads and 
higher price impact.  This is consistent with concept of cream-skimming. 
4.3.2 Empirical 
In their 2004 study, Fong, Madhavan, and Swan examine the market quality impact of block trades 
across three trading environments listed in decreasing order of transparency: a visible limit order 
book, the upstairs market and a crossing network.  They find no evidence that competition from the 
upstairs market and crossing network has a negative effect on the traditional exchange, represented 
by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). 29  Order migration to the upstairs market does not cause 
increases in information asymmetry, represented by higher bid-ask spread and price impact, in the 
downstairs market. This makes the upstairs market valuable to investors during times with such 
market conditions.   After controlling for market conditions and trade difficulty the authors find that 
the price impact of the upstairs market is lower than that of the consolidated limit order book.   
O’Hara and Ye (2011) study the effect of US market fragmentation on overall market quality.  They 
use January to June 2006 data on 2754 stocks and find that fragmentation does not harm market 
quality. This is supported by both the theoretical and empirical studies of Buti, Rindi, and Werner 
(2010) and Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011), respectively.  However, the findings are also contested by 
Weaver (2011) who concludes that off-exchange activity has a negative impact on market quality 
through wider bid-ask spreads and increased volatility.  Unfortunately, as they use consolidated data 
from trade reporting facilities that did not allow them to distinguish between lit and dark off-
exchange activity, their study is more of an analysis as to the effect of increased off-exchange 
activity on market quality. 
A recent study by Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2011) investigates the impact of both lit and 
dark fragmentation on market quality in both global and local order books.  Using data on 52 large 
and mid-cap AEX listed Dutch stocks from January 2006 to 2009 they perform a multivariate panel 
regression and conclude that overall market quality is reduced when the market share of dark 
liquidity increases.  They improve upon previous studies into market fragmentation, such as O’Hara 
and Ye (2011), by separately measuring the effects that dark and lit order fragmentation have on 
market quality.  They also focus on the effects resulting from the introduction of multiple trading 
venues.  The authors conclude that while global liquidity does improve overall as a result of lit and 
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 This is later supported amongst the findings of Gresse (2006). 
21 
 
dark order fragmentation, local liquidity is worse off by 10%.  Therefore, retail investors who do not 
have access to SORT or other liquidity aggregating software are worse off.   
Ye (2011) examines the non-execution probability and market share of crossing networks.  The 
author extends the literature of cross-sectional variation of transaction costs (Stoll, 2006) to include 
non-execution in crossing networks.   The findings are consistent with the author’s theoretical 
prediction30 that non-execution probability in crossing networks follows a similar pattern as price 
impacts in the lit exchange.   The author also finds that non-execution probability is positively 
correlated with price impact, decreases in trading volume, and increases in volatility, which could 
help provide an explanation for Ray (2010) and Ready (2013). 
Gresse (2012) uses a collection of one and two-stage multivariate panel regressions and time series 
analyses to determine the effects of lit and dark order fragmentation on quoted spreads and depths 
in both global and local order books.  The study improves on previous work by using a more 
geographically diverse data set, as stocks were compiled from the FTSE100, CAC40, and SBF120 
indices.  The author concludes that increased dark trading does not have a substantial negative 
effect on liquidity.  While some stocks may experience negative effects in regards to spreads, the 
effect may be offset by increased depth in these stocks.   
Foley, Malinova, and Park (2012) take a slightly different approach to the previous studies and focus 
on market quality implications of the introduction of hidden orders into a lit exchange.31 Dark orders 
were introduced onto the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) in April 2011.  The introduction resulted in a 
widening of quoted spreads and an increase in trading costs, measured by the effective spread, 
leaving depth, volume and volatility unaffected. 
Unfortunately all previous studies, with the exception of Foley, Malinova, and Park (2012) are 
limited by the quality of their measure of dark order fragmentation.  Due to the inability to assign 
dark orders to the reporting firm, dark market fragmentation has only been measured by the degree 
of dark trading or the proportion of dark trades with the respect to total market activity.  In the 
cases where dark fragmentation is measured explicitly, the studies are performed on a subset of 
available dark liquidity providers 
Results on the effects of dark liquidity fragmentation on market quality, as measure by quoted 
spreads, are mixed. However, the majority of findings support the idea that increased use of dark 
liquidity has a negative effect.  Fong, Madhavan, and Swan (2004) find that increased off-exchange 
activity does not result in wider bid-ask spreads.  Gresse (2006) finds a more significant effect and 
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 See Ye (2010) – ‘A Glimpse in the Dark’. 
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 As mentioned in Section 3.1.4 – ‘Exchange Based Pools’,  hidden orders fall under Exchange Based Pools as 
they are subject to complete pre-trade transparency since they are involved no third party interaction as in the 
upstairs markets. 
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concludes that increased crossing network activity tightens spreads; the results are confirmed in a 
2012 study by the author (Gresse, 2012).   
Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2011) conclude that higher market share of dark trading is 
associated with wider quoted spreads, which is consistent with the findings of Nimalendran and Ray 
(2012) , Weaver (2011), Forde and Putnins (2012), and Foley, Malinova, and Park( 2012). 
Evidence on the effect of increased use of dark liquidity on depth follows a similar pattern to the 
evidence on spreads. However, whereas before the majority of evidence concludes that dark 
liquidity has a negative effect on the particular measure of market quality, evidence now favours the 
use of dark liquidity.   Once again, Gresse (2012) concludes that the effect is positive and depth 
increases in the lit market, noting, however, that depth may be reduced for smaller stocks.  These 
findings are consistent with those of Buti, Rinder, and Werner (2011).  Foucault and Menkveld 
(2008) also find that the findings resulting from their theoretical model are supported and that 
increased use of dark liquidity leads to an increase in depth. 
In contrast Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2011) propose that depth is reduced in the lit market 
while Foley, Malinova, and Park (2012) conclude that depth is unaffected. 
Current data suggests that in the best case scenario, increased use of dark liquidity leaves volatilities 
unaffected (Foley, Malinova, and Park, 2012).  However, Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) and Weaver 
(2011) find more substantial evidence that fragmentation leads to an increase in short term 
volatility.   
While, as expected, evidence on the effect of dark liquidity on price impact and transaction costs is 
mixed, it does tend to argue that an increase in the use of dark liquidity results in increased price 
impact and transaction costs.  Fong, Madhavan, and Swan (2004), Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel 
(2011), Weaver (2011), Nimalendran and Ray (2011),  and Forde and Putnins (2012)  find that an 
increase in dark trading market share leads to an increase in price impacts.  This supports the 
theoretical findings of Zhu (2012). 
In contrast, Ye(2011) finds that crossing networks have a lower price impact on trades which is in 
line with the findings of the author’s theoretical model (Ye, 2010). 
Studies by O’Hara and Ye (2009), and Buti, Rindi, and Werner( 2011)  conclude that dark liquidity 
fragmentation results in lower transaction costs while Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2003) deduce 
that the result is lower realised execution costs. 
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4.4 Client Composition 
The type of clientele allowed access to a dark pool is proven to have a significant effect on the 
quality of the transactions resulting from that pool.  This section identifies the role that exclusivity 
plays in in determining the quality of a dark pool. 
Results inferred from the theoretical model created by Ye (2010) indicate that the inclusion of 
informed traders on a crossing network negatively effects the price discovery process in the lit 
exchange. 
Zhu (2010) also investigates the role that informed investors play in crossing networks and finds that 
informed traders are likely to cluster on the heavy side of the market and, therefore, face lower 
execution probability in the crossing network relative to uniformed investors.  This occurs because 
informed investors often lead to the same conclusions when developing trading strategies as their 
actions are positively correlated with the value of the assets and, therefore, each other.  As a result 
lit exchanges become more attractive to informed investors while crossing networks become more 
attractive to uninformed investors. As their lack of correlation in trading habits causes their trades to 
be more evenly spread across both sides of the market, the use of crossing networks by uninformed 
investors allows for improved probability of execution.   
Boni, Brown, and Leach (2012) examine empirically the role participation constraints play in large 
trade execution.  They hypothesise that more exclusive trading venues should exhibit smaller 
magnitudes of serial correlation in returns around large trades, less volume and volatility increases 
prior to large trades, and higher follow-on volume in large trades.  They test their hypotheses 
empirically using 62 days of TAQ data, from January 3 2011 to March 31 2011, from NASDAQ and 
NYSE listed stocks with a minimum transaction size of 50,000 shares.  They find that dark pools 
targeting buy-side customers experience less serial correlation in returns, less front-running in 
volume and volatility, and more trade clustering across days.  These results can help drive future 
regulatory discussions as the authors have shown that discrimination based on trade size need not 
negate any potential benefits from the use of dark pools. 32  
4.5 Determinants of Volume 
This section outlines the various findings in determining the factors that affect the level of volume in 
trading venues offering dark liquidity.  They key indicators that affect volume are execution 
probability, volatility, spread, and lit market volume.  
                                                          
32
 Findings by Nimalderan and Ray(2012) suggest that traders mostly deal in large lots as the majority of dark 
liquidity volume results from a few large crosses.  However, the vast majority of trades consist of small, likely 
computer generated, orders. 
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4.5.1 Volatility, Spread, and Volume (Lit) 
Ray (2010) models the decision of whether to use a crossing network or traditional quoting 
exchange to execute transactions in order to derive a list of factors that affect the decision.  The 
author tests the hypotheses empirically and, in accordance with the theoretical findings, concludes 
that crossing network activity increases and then decreases in the wake of increasing bid-ask spreads 
and other market liquidity measures.  The author also finds that crossing network activity tends to 
increase when savings on transaction costs outweigh concerns regarding execution uncertainty.   
Ready (2013) investigates the determinants of trading volume for NASDAQ listed stocks in the two 
largest dark pools catering to institutions investors: Liquidnet and POSIT.  Consistent with the 
prediction resulting from the theoretical model developed by Zhu (2012), and consequently 
inconsistent with Ye (2010), Ready finds that dark pool activity is lower for stocks with higher levels 
of adverse selection and higher volatility.  In addition, dark pool activity tended to be lower for 
stocks with lower spreads.  The results, however, are not monotonic.  Ready (2013) finds that dark 
pool market share initially increases with lit market volume but later decreases while Ray (2010) 
finds a similar relationship between dark pool market share and relative bid-ask spreads. 
Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) perform a similar study to Ready (2013) but improve on it by covering 
more dark pools as well as including more recent and daily volume share data. 33  They use daily 
stock volume data from 11 dark pools, provided by SIFMA, and perform a Fama-Macbeth cross 
sectional regression.  They determine that dark pools activity is concentrated on liquid stocks and 
that activity is higher on days with higher depth, lower spreads, and lower volatility. This is 
consistent with the empirical findings of Ye(2010). These results could be improved upon if they 
were to cover more than 11 dark pools who voluntarily submitted data to SIFMA as the situation 
does not allow for independent validation.  Also, there is no way of knowing whether these dark 
pools represent the same fraction of total dark trading over time.   
4.5.2 Execution Probability 
Resulting from theoretical modelling, Ye (2010) concludes that an increase in fundamental 
uncertainty in the value of an asset increases price impact in the lit exchange and lowers probability 
of execution in the crossing network.  While one assumes that this would lower volume in the 
crossing network, it actually has the opposite effect.  The author argues that the event creates a 
comparative advantage for crossing networks and results in an increase in market share.  As always, 
in contrast to the theoretical findings of Ye (2010) are the theoretical findings of Zhu (2012) who 
finds that higher order imbalances, resulting in lower execution probability, lead to lower trading 
volume on the crossing network. 
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 Even though Ready’s current version is 2013 there was a working copy available when Buti, Rindi, and 
Werner developed their study. 
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In line with the findings of Zhu (2012), Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) used SIFMA data from 11 
anonymous dark pools to conclude that higher order imbalance resulting in lower probability of 
execution are negatively related to dark pool market share. 
4.6 Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection refers to the situation in which an investor executes a trade only to have the price 
move in the same direction shortly after, resulting in the trade executing at a less favourable price 
had the investor waited.  It also refers to situations in which low participation rates prevent the 
investor from completing a transaction prior to an adverse price change.  It is a topic of recent 
interest in dark pools as the costs associated with adverse selection are argued to be material (Kratz 
and Schoneborn, 2010).  Some authors argue that the benefits gained from executing trades in a 
crossing networks are immediately lost to adverse selection (Altunata, Rakhlin, and Waelbroeck, 
2010, and Naes and Odegaard, 2006). 
Unfortunately, adverse selection in a dark pool environment is no longer easy to detect.  Buy-side 
traders accessing multiple dark pools through liquidity sourcing technology find it difficult to break 
down results by pool as trades are often split into a series of smaller transactions.  Adverse selection 
is also observed to occur over a shorter time frame, second and minutes as opposed to hours, 
making it more difficult to detect visually (Saraiya and Mittal, 2009). 
In a 2009 paper, Saraiya and Mittal educate buy-side dark pool participants on the negative effects 
adverse selection can have on returns.  They find that adverse selection occurs systematically across 
all dark pools.  They also find that increased high-frequency trading activity results in greater levels 
of adverse selection across all examined dark pools.  Dark pools that previously excluded high-
frequency trading activity, only to allow it later, experience a growth in volume.  Unfortunately, 
incidents of adverse selection are also proportional to trading volume in dark pools and, as a result, 
the quality of trades in dark pools suffers.  The authors advise investors to investigate the quality of 
the dark pools they use and rank them in order to access liquidity from pools on an increasing scale 
of toxicity.34 
In their paper titled ‘Adverse Selection vs. Opportunistic Savings in Dark Aggregators’, Altunata, 
Rakhin, and Waelbroeck (2010) educate the audience regarding when to use dark aggregators as 
opposed to other opportunistic savings strategies.  Using employer capital they conduct a series of 
trades and analyse the results.  They conclude that opportunistic algorithms have lower shortfalls 
than structured models, especially when markets are volatile. However, this increases the investors’ 
exposure to problems arising from adverse selection.  They advise investors employing dark 
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 For more information on how to judge the quality of a pool see Mittal (2008) “Are you playing in a toxic dark 
pool?”. 
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aggregators to do so tactically and with limited exposure times in order to minimize costs associated 
with adverse selection. 
Zhu (2012) argues, in a theoretical context, that while an increase in informative orders leads to 
better price discovery it occurs at the expense of an increase in adverse selection.  Empirically, Forde 
and Putnins (2012) find that an overall increase in dark trading activity increases adverse selection. 
5.0 Motivation Behind Study 
If financial markets are not fair and safe, they will not attract investors and will fail to provide 
companies with the capital they seek.  Over half of the USA’s residents report that they own stock 
directly or through investment vehicles and, according to Mary Jo White of the Consumer Federation 
of America, this is representative of all developed economies. This implies that the majority of 
households in developed economies are directly connected to the securities market. Without retail 
investor participation, financial markets will no longer be able to accurately price stocks as they will be 
deprived of price improving information contained in retail investor trades.  As a result, financial 
markets will collapse because investors will not be willing to trade based on prices they believe to be 
inaccurate and corporations themselves will close due to the high cost of, now scarce, investment 
capital.  The result will be a collapse of the financial markets.  Therefore, comprehensive regulatory 
policies must be adopted in order maintain investor confidence and support our financial markets. 
Current literature could benefit from explicitly measuring extent of fragmentation in the dark order 
book market. As previously mentioned, Figure 1 breaks down the market shares of known dark 
liquidity providers, as reported by Thomson Reuters Market Share Reporter.  As indicated by the 
proportion of combined broker crossing system activity, 49% of the total reported dark transactions 
cannot be assigned to a particular trading venue.  These trades appear under the Systematic 
Internalizer (SI) and Over-The-Counter (OTC) flags within the Markit BOAT consolidated tape.  As a 
result, previous studies resort use the overall proportion (market share) of dark trading with respect 
to total trading volume, both lit and dark, as a proxy for dark trading and/or dark order book 
fragmentation.  Therefore, previous studies examine the market effects resulting from increased 
amounts of dark trading but not the level of fragmentation in the dark order book market.  They do 
not determine whether the effects are due to more dark trading as a whole or to the fact that dark 
trading is occurring across a wide variety of venues as opposed to a central location.  We assign 
owners to the trades and calculate a fragmentation measure similar to the one used for lit order 
book markets where each trade can be assigned to a trading venue. 35  
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 See Section 8.2.1 for information on how we calculate the fragmentation measure. 
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Our study also takes into consideration implicit consolidation resulting from 2 venues sharing access 
to their order books. This results in a more accurate dark fragmentation measure which better 
reflects the state of fragmentation in the dark order book market.36 
We also provide more accurate measurements for variables whose values are derived from the limit 
order book.  Previous studies such as Foucault and Menkveld (2008) and Degryse, de Jong, and van 
Kervel (2011) use 5 or 1 minute snapshots of the limit order book, respectively, when determining 
values for spread, depth, and price impact.  However, the Thomson Reuters Tick History Database 
provides millisecond snapshots of limit order books that display information on the top 25 bid and 
ask prices.  Therefore our study more accurately calculates time sensitive measurements, such as 
price impact and realised spread, by referencing midpoints that are exactly 1 second from the time 
of the actual trade, accurate to the millisecond.  The 1 second interval is chosen as it is found by 
Henker and Wang (2006) to be an improvement to the widely accepted ‘5-second rule’ used for 
matching quotes with transactions.   We also use the more frequent order book information to 
determine the average spreads and depths resulting in more accurate measurements; as opposed to 
averaging 1 minute snapshots, where the effects can be lost over such a long time-frame, we 
average 1-second snapshots. 
6.0 Hypotheses 
We test the effect of fragmentation of order books.  Fragmentation can take three major forms: 
1. Fragmentation within the lit order book. 
2. Fragmentation between lit and dark order books (i.e. the migration of trades from 
the visible to the non-displayed liquidity market). 
3. Fragmentation within the dark order book. 
 
Our resulting hypotheses are as follows: 
 
Lit market: 
Hypothesis 1. Increased competition among visible order book  exchanges resulting from increasing 
lit market fragmentation leads to a decrease in quoted depths, quoted spreads, realised spreads, 
and effective spreads. 
The introduction of MiFID leads to the formation of new markets, known as multilateral 
trading facilities (MTFs), which offer lower transaction costs over traditional exchange as 
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 See Section 7.4 – ‘Fragmentation Data’ for more information on the fragmentation and consolidation 
process. 
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well as rebates for market makers.37  Competition effects lead to discounts and competitive 
pricing as exchanges compete for order flow. (Fong, Madhavan, and Swan, 2004, and Foucalt 
and Menkveld, 2008).    As a result of the increased competition, 38 traditional exchanges, 
such as the London Stock Exchange (LSE), lower transaction costs as well as introduce their 
own rebate policies;39,40 however they still cannot match the cost savings offered by their 
newly formed competitors such as BATS Europe, CHI-X Europe, and Turquoise.  Local order 
book spreads tighten as the primary exchange’s (LSE) rebates lower the cost of a round-trip 
transaction for market makers; however depth would decrease as not all participants can 
benefit from the rebate.41 Global order books spreads tighten as MTFs compete with each 
other, as well as with the primary exchange, by lowering fees for liquidity takers42 and 
offering rebates for liquidity makers.43  As some venues offer higher rebates than others, thus 
further lowering transaction costs for market makers, not all market makers, especially those 
in more expensive venues, will be able to tighten their spreads to the same extent.  
Therefore, best bid/ask spreads will be tighter for the least expensive venues resulting in 
lower depth at the best rates.  As a result of the reduction in quoted spreads, realised spread 
and effective spreads decrease, signifying a decrease in the cost of a round trip transaction, 
with the effects being greater for global order books compared to local order books for the 
same reasons as we outline for quoted spreads.  
Dark Market: 
Hypothesis 2. An increase in dark market share, resulting from the migration of trades from the lit to 
dark order book, leads to wider spreads and greater price impact, with the effect being greater for 
smaller firms. 
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 As noted in the Pricewaterhouse Coopers report by Caplan et. al. – ‘Dark pools of Liquidity’ 
(http://www.pwc.com/us/en/alternative-investment/assets/NY-10-0105-PwC-alt-Caplan.pdf). 
38
 Competition for market makers exists because they can operate across multiple venues as well as switch 
venues.  This is made possible because becoming a market maker is the result of an application process, rather 
than by appointment, in all lit trading venues in this study. 
39 
LSE adopts market maker rebate to boost liquidity 
(http://www.thetradenews.com/newsarticle.aspx?id=1750). 
40
 The phenomenon of lowering prices to attract liquidity was also noted by Foucault and Menkveld(2008). 
41
 The LSE is partially a quote driven market meaning it allows both market makers and individual traders to 
post quotes.  As retail investors cannot meet the volume requirements and are usually liquidity takers they can 
seldom benefit from these discounts.  
42
 BATS Europe lowers liquidity taker fees to attract customers 
(http://www.thetradenews.com/news/Asset_Classes/Equities/BATS_Europe_ups_price_war_with_new_taker
_fee.aspx). 
43
 Turquoise raises rebates to help improve liquidity 
(http://www.thetradenews.com/news/Asset_Classes/Equities/Turquoise_hikes_maker_rebates_to_reverse_d
ownturn.aspx). 
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Dark orders are found to contain information (Forde and Putnins, 2012, Nimalderan and Ray, 
2012), especially those of smaller firms (Nimalderan and Ray, 2012).  This results in 
asymmetric information among market participants which leads to a reduction in their 
confidence in advertised prices.  Lack of confidence in advertised prices is conveyed by a 
widening of quoted spreads and an increase in price impact.  This effect will be greater for 
lower index firms44 as they are less liquid and, as a result, their trades contain more 
information (Nimalderan and Ray, 2012).   
Hypothesis 3. Increased fragmentation of the dark order book market leads to tighter quoted 
spreads in visible order books. 
As dark order books fragment, the result is a reduction the probability of execution as 
matching dark orders are less likely to reside in the same pool as the original 
transaction(Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 2010, and Zhu, 2012); more dark venues results in more 
places for matching transactions to go making them less likely to be found in your pool. As a 
result, dark trades that contain information (Forde and Putnins, 2012, Nimalderan and Ray, 
2012) are relegated to the visible order market to execute.  Therefore, in fragmented dark 
order book markets, more informative trades reach the visible order book and convey their 
information to the public, resulting in greater confidence in the advertised price represented 
by tighter quoted spreads 
7.0 Data 
The following sections outline the data and variables that are used in the study.  Information on 
trades as well as the status of limit order books is gathered from the Thomson Reuters Tick History 
database via SIRCA. We conclude the section by summarising trading activity throughout the study 
period. 
7.1 Sample of Stocks 
As a result of the introduction of MiFID, UK stocks have fragmented across both lit and dark liquidity 
venues, while maintaining significant daily trading volumes across multiple venues, making them a 
perfect choice for this study. We focus on a sample of large-cap UK stocks, limiting our sample to the 
constituents of the FTSE-100 index.  Table 1 contains information on the possible candidates for the 
study. We exclude companies that are not continuously part of the index throughout the entire 
observation period.  We also remove companies that qualify as financial stocks according to Global 
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 In our study lower index firms refer to constituents of the FTSE-100 index with a market capitalisation less 
than £10 billion while upper index firms are those with a market capitalisation greater than £10 billion (see 
Section 7.0) 
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Industry Classification Standards (GICS).45  The final sample includes 51 companies In order to 
observe whether the size of the firm affects the findings we split the FTSE-100 firms into 2 groups.  
Companies with an average market capitalisation during the study of at least £10billion are hereby 
classified as upper index firms while the remainder are classified as lower index firms.  The result is 
24 upper index firms and 29 lower index firms, as indicated in Table A1 of Appendix A.   
7.2 Time Frame 
The time frame for the study is November 1 2005 to October 31 2011.  This time frame is ideal as it 
consists of three very distinct periods of fragmentation and consolidation within the European 
equity market:   
1. Pre MiFID (November 1 2005 to October 31 2007) – Very few fragmentation or 
consolidation events during this period. 
 
2. Intro to MiFID (November 1 2007 to October 31 2009) - Multiple events of 
fragmentation in both the lit and dark liquidity markets 
 
3. Post MiFID (Maturity) – November 1 2009 – October 31 2011 – Multiple 
fragmentation events across lit and dark liquidity markets as well as multiple 
consolidation events for dark liquidity markets.46 
The aforementioned study period contains examples of all three fragmentation events that we are 
testing, as indicated within our hypotheses, which makes it an ideal sample period for this 
fragmentation study. 
We include only those transactions that occur between the times of 800 and 1630, standard UK 
exchange trading hours. 
7.3 Transaction Data 
In order to determine daily transaction levels for the various stocks included in the study we source 
transaction level data for our study period from the Thomson Reuters Tick History Database via 
Sirca.  The following variables are required for each transaction in order to complete our study: 
1. Stock Traded – An identifier that indicates the firm whose stock is traded 
2. Date – The date of the transaction 
3. Time – The time of the transaction (accurate to the nearest millisecond) 
4. Exchange - The venue from which the transaction originates 
                                                          
45
 Financial stocks are reported to have very specific factors that drive their liquidity and volatility and, 
therefore, do not follow the same behavioural pattern as non-financial stocks (Gresse, 2012). 
46
 See Section 7.4 for information about the specific events and how they are incorporated into the study. 
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5. Price – The price per share  
6. Quantity –The number of stocks in the transaction 
7. Qualifier – An identifier that supplies some additional information about the 
transaction (e.g. originates from dark pool, uncrossing trade etc.) 
Transaction data is gathered for each stock indicated in Table A1 and consists of transactions from 
the dark and lit liquidity providers indicated in Table 1 below. 
The list of dark venues, however, is not exhaustive, and only contains the dark venues for whom we 
can explicitly observe transactions. 47 
In addition to the exchange codes, qualifiers, such as those found in Table A2 of Appendix A, are 
used to help classify transactions as dark or lit when they do not necessarily originate from an 
exclusively dark venue or to identify transactions that should be excluded from the study.  For 
example, the Chi-X is listed as both a lit and dark liquidity provider.  In order to classify Chi-X trades 
as those that consume dark liquidity we look for Chi-X transactions that contain one of the 
acceptable qualifiers from Table A2.   
In certain cases a suffix is applied to the RIC for a stock to indicate that trades that include this suffix 
originate from dark liquidity.  For example, British Petroleum (RIC = BP) may use BP as the firm 
identifier to indicate a transaction using visible liquidity and BPp to indicate a transaction using dark 
liquidity.  
Some qualifiers are used to identify transactions that we ignore.  Qualifiers of ‘4’ and ‘RCK’ indicate 
cancelled transactions. Qualifiers of ‘U’ indicate uncrossing transactions used by market makers to 
close their positions at the end of the trading day, and as such do not contain any information about 
investors.  
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 See Section 8.2.1 – ‘Regressors’ for information on how we incorporate the trades whose venue of origin 
cannot be identified. 
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Table (1) Trading Venues 
The table identifies the lit and dark liquidity providers that explicitly report transaction 
information and their unique Reuters Instrument Code (RIC).  When a provider explicitly reports 
transactions it means that the venue from which the transaction originates is identified.  The list 
of dark venues does not contain venues that report transactions to the consolidated tape as we 
handle that separately (See Sections 7.4 and 8.2.1).  Some exchanges, such as the London Stock 
Exchange, are found in both lists and this occurs when a visible liquidity providers also offers dark 
liquidity and identifies such transactions through the aid of a qualifier. 
 
7.4 Fragmentation Data 
In order to construct the measure of fragmentation in the dark order books market, as described in 
Section 8.2.1, we begin by constructing a timeline of the various consolidation and fragmentation 
events, found in Table A3 of Appendix A.  These events and their contributions to the study are 
defined as follows: 
Fragmentation events occur when new dark trading venues are introduced into the market. 
The result is an increase in the total number of dark trading venues. For example, there are 
four distinct dark trading venues and then Turquoise launches its TQDark dark pool.  There 
are now five distinct dark trading venues.  These events are required in order to identify and 
approximate the number of firms reporting to the consolidated tape.  Fragmentation events 
do not need to be identified for explicitly reporting dark venues as the date in which the 
Lit Dark
Exchange Name RIC Exchange Name RIC
London Stock Exchange L London Stock Exchange L
BATS BS Berlin SE BE
Chi-X CHI Blink BLNK
Equiduct ED BlockMatch BLOX
NYSE ARCA HFT BATS Dark BS
Instinet INS CHI-X Dark CHI
NASDAQ OMX NQX RWB D
Plus Markets PZ Xetra DE
Quote MTF QMF Frankfurt F
Turquoise TQ Hamburg H
Instinet INS
Liquidnet LIQU
Munich MU
NASDAQ OMX NQX
NYSE Euronext NXEU
NYFX Millenium NYFX
Paris PA
Plus Markets PZ
Stuttgart SG
Sigma-X SIG
Turqiouise TQ
Virt-X VX
Posit XPOS
XUBS XUBS
Exchange List
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trading venue began operating can be defined from the transaction data itself and does not 
need to be approximated.   
Figure 2 contains information on the number of trading venues operating both displayed and 
non-displayed order books during our study period.  Increases in lit, consolidated and 
unconsolidated measures indicate the introduction of new trading venues.  In some cases 
we see an immediate inclusion of more than one dark trading venue.  This either occurs 
when Markit BOAT fails to announce an individual trading venue’s inclusion in the 
consolidated tape, and their inclusion is only discovered during a later announcement, or 
when there is a cancellation in the liquidity partnership between multiple firms. An example 
of the former event occurs in June 29 2010 and can be observed in Figure 2.  Firms do not 
always provide press releases when joining the consolidated tape.  As a result, when a report 
is finally made, there are sometimes multiple other trading venues that need to be included 
in the consolidated tape, which results in a greater increase to the number of reporting 
firms. This is a limitation to the measure and results from imperfect reporting by the trading 
venues or trade reporting firms.   
An example of the latter fragmentation event can be found on November 30 2009.  The Euro 
Million dark pool was responsible for facilitating the consolidation of multiple venues’ order 
books.  While in operation several venues operated a single order book if liquidity sharing 
due to consolidation was considered.  When the Euro Million dark pool closed the liquidity 
partnership was cancelled as well.  As a result, the 6 firms that were part of this liquidity 
sharing partnership went back to operating their own order books and the number of 
unique order books increased significantly.   
Consolidation events occur when dark trading venues decide to share their order books. 
These events are recorded for both explicitly reporting dark trading venues as well as those 
that report to the consolidated tape as both are able to participate in liquidity sharing 
schemes with other venues.  For example, there are five distinct dark trading venues and 
Smartpool (XSMP) and TQDark (TQD) decide to share their dark order books.  As a result 
XSMP clients have access to liquidity on the TQD order book, and vice versa.  Since the two 
order books have consolidated the result is one unique order book as clients of both dark 
pools have access to the shared liquidity.  This results in a decrease in the number of distinct 
liquidity providers from five to four and can be identified in Figure 2 by a decrease in the 
number reporting firms under the consolidated (dark) measure.   
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Figure (2) Number of trading venues  
The figure shows the number of trading venues from which investors can source both lit (displayed) and 
dark (non-displayed) liquidity. The number of dark liquidity venues is conveyed using two measures: the 
unconsolidated measure which reports the explicit number of dark trading venues, and the consolidated 
measure which takes into consideration implicit consolidation through liquidity partnerships.  As venues 
begin to share liquidity they implicitly consolidate and their transactions are attributed to the new 
consolidated pool as opposed to the individual firms themselves.  The data is collected from the 
introduction of MiFID on November 1 2007 until the final date in our study, October 31 2011. 
But we must also consider the situation where, for example, XSMP decides to share its 
liquidity with TQD customers as well as Instinet BlockMatch (BLOX) customers, but TQD and 
BLOX do not share liquidity with each other.  This results in three trading venues becoming 
two unique trading venues as one venue contains the interaction of trades between XSMP 
and TQD and the other contains the interactions of trades between XSMP and BLOX.  As a 
result, half of the XSMP liquidity will be consolidated with TQD while the other half will be 
consolidated with BLOX. 
We use the timeline in Table A3 of Appendix A to consolidate daily market shares for firms whose 
order books have been implicitly merged (i.e. as a result of liquidity sharing).   
7.5 Quote Data 
In order to calculate the various market quality measures described in Section 8.1 we first gather the 
necessary data from Thomson Reuters Tick History via Sirca.  Luckily, Thomson Reuters provides 
snapshots of the order book as part of its Market Depth data series, accurate to the nearest 
millisecond.  As a result we are able to retreive information on the status of multiple venues’ limit 
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order books, including the price and quantity of shares offered at various depth levels within the 
order book, without having to reconstruct the order books manually.  
For our study we gather quote data for the 52 firms48 where the quotes originate from the lit (quote-
based) venues identified in Table 1. We use information pertaining to the top 25 levels of the order 
book in order to perform analysis on the availability of shares deeper within the order book, as 
opposed to simply at the best price level.  The following variables are collected for each order book: 
1. Stock - An identifier that indicated the firm to whom the quote pertain  
2. Date – The date of the current snapshot 
3. Time – The time of the current snapshot 
4. Exchange – The exchange that advertises the quotes 
5. Bid Price – The price at which investors can sell shares 
6. Bid Quantity – The number of shares available at the current bid price 
7. Bid Number of Investors – the number of investors at the current bid price 
8. Ask Price – The price at which investors can purchase shares 
9. Ask Quantity – The number of shares available at the current ask price 
10. Ask Number of Investors – The number of investors at the current ask price49 
7.1.1 Limit Order Books (Global vs. Local) 
We follow the approach of Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2011) and Gresse (2012) and 
distinguish between global and local order books.  The local order book refers to the primary 
exchange while the global order book is comprised of quotes from all available lit exchanges.  The 
distinction is made in order to take into consideration the fact that some customers, predominantly 
retail investors, cannot afford access to algorithms that simultaneously source liquidity across 
multiple venues.  As a result, they will not have access to the consolidate order book that 
institutional investors have access to.  Therefore, it is important to examine both local and global 
order books in order to determine how retail and institutional investors, respectively, will be 
affected by market fragmentation and dark liquidity. 
Local order book information is gathered by referencing the status of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) order book, as provided by Thomson Reuters, at a given point in time.  The global order book, 
however, is constructed by merging the snapshots of all available lit exchanges. That is, if the LSE is 
posting a best bid of £110.5, with a quantity of 150 shares, while Turquoise is posting a best bid of 
£110.5, with a quantity of 100 shares, the global limit order book will display a best bid price of 
£110.5, with a quantity of 250 shares. However, any exchanges that do not post an update to their 
                                                          
48
 53 firms if we include the two classes of Royal Dutch Shell shares (A and B). 
49
 All bid and ask measures were gathered for each of the 25 levels of the order book. 
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order book at least every 30 seconds will be removed from the consolidated order book.  This is 
done to ensure that we do not use out of date prices for stocks as this can lead to negative spreads 
when combining multiple order books. 
7.6 Trading Activity 
An analysis of the transaction data indicates that dark trading has grown slowly since the 
introduction of MiFID on November 1 2007.  From Figure 3 we observe an immediate increase in 
dark trading amongst the constituents of the FTSE-100 index following the introduction of MiFID.  
The spike in dark trading can not only be attributed to the launch of several dark liquidity providers, 
but to new MiFID trade reporting regulations which require that all off exchange transactions be 
reported either directly by the exchange or submitted for reporting to the primary exchange (e.g. 
LSE) or trade reporting facility (e.g. Markit BOAT).  Prior to November 1 2007 the measures are 
subdued due to the lack of emphasis on trade reporting by regulatory bodies; a situation that was 
corrected by the second MiFID directive.   
 
Figure (3) Proportion of lit and dark trading volume in FTSE-100 stocks 
The figure shows the proportion of total daily trading volume, as measured by the total value of 
stocks traded in British Pounds Sterling (£), in lit order book markets compared to dark order book 
markets for all constituents of the FTSE-100 index. 
 
Table 2 presents transaction activity data across both lit and dark markets throughout the study 
period. In Table 2 we see that from the pre-MiFID period of November 1 2005 to October 31 2007 
until the end of the introduction of MiFID period of November 1 2007 to October 31 2009 there is a 
significant contraction in the visible order market, as indicated by a decrease in the average daily lit 
trading volume per firm from £80.47 to £64 million. However, the average daily trading volume, dark 
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and lit, in British Pounds Sterling (£) per firm remains fairly constant, moving from £86.47 million to 
£87.53 million.  The average daily number of lit transactions more than doubles over the two 
periods, from  2.61 thousand to 7.23 thousand while the average lit transaction size in British Pounds 
Sterling (£) falls by nearly three quarters, from £25.43 thousand to £7.68 thousand. Over the same 
two periods we observe, in Table 2, a significant increase in daily dark trading in terms of the 
number of transactions and trading volume from 90 to 520 transactions and from £6 thousand to 
£25.53 thousand, respectively. A 60% decrease in average transaction sizes over the period from 
£188.56 thousand to £76.15 thousand, while not as large as that experienced by lit markets, is still 
significant. 
Following a drop in proportion of dark trading during the initial months of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), as indicated by Figure 3, the proportion of dark trading activity has seen steady growth.  This 
is supported by the findings in Table 2 that indicate an increase in the proportion of dark activity 
from 28.89% to 29.4% over the final two study periods after which MiFID has been introduced.  The 
rise in the proportion of dark liquidity used is more dramatic in the first two study periods, 
increasing from 8.14% to 25.89%.  However, as mentioned previously, we must use caution with the 
pre-MiFID dark trading figures as reporting standards did not require all dark transactions to be 
reported.   
During the two post-MiFID periods, overall trading volume in British Pounds Sterling (£) contracts 
slightly in lit markets, reducing from £64 million to £62.09 million, while dark market trading volume 
increases from £25.53 million to £26.37 million.  This is coupled with further decreases to the 
average trade size and increases to the number of transactions across both dark and lit trading 
venues, most notably a decrease in the average dark transaction size from £76.16 thousand to 
£25.33 thousand.  Upon further inspection of Table 2 we see that all aforementioned patterns are 
replicated for both upper and lower index firms. 
To further investigate the issue of decreasing dark transaction sizes we turn to Figures 4 and 5. From 
Figure 4 we can see that the majority of volume in British Pounds Sterling (£) in dark order book 
markets results from large transactions of £100,000 or greater. However, the proportion of trading 
volume in British Pounds Sterling (£) resulting from transactions of £100,000 or greater is on the 
decline, with the dark market being increasingly used to execute transactions of less than £100,000.  
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Table (2) Average daily trading activity across lit and dark trading venues 
The table shows the average daily number of transactions and trading volume, measured in British Pounds Sterling (£), for FTSE-100 constituents in both lit and dark trading venues, 
as well as across the consolidated lit and dark markets.  Results are displayed separately for high and low market capitalisation FTSE-100 companies as well as for the index as a 
whole.  The data is divided into the 3 distinct periods representing the stages of adoption of MiFID policies: Pre-MiFID (November 2005 – October 2007), Introduction of MiFID 
(November 2007 – October 2009) and Post/Maturity of MiFID (November 2009 – October 2011). 
Number of 
Transactions % of Total
Volume 
(GBP) % of Total
Average Trade 
Size (GBP)
Number of 
Transactions % of Total
Volume 
(GBP) % of Total
Average Trade 
Size (GBP)
Number of 
Transactions % of Total
Volume 
(GBP) % of Total
Average Trade 
Size (GBP)
(thousands) (millions) (thousands) (thousands) (millions) (thousands) (thousands) (millions) (thousands)
Lit Lit Lit
Nov2005-
Oct2007 2.61                95.48% £80.47 91.86% £25.43
Nov2005-
Oct2007 3.59                98.35% £136.15 94.71% £34.10
Nov2005-
Oct2007 1.89               93.39% £40.02 89.79% £19.12
(0.01)                          (0.74)               (0.16)                              (0.02)                         (1.49)                 (0.23)                             (0.01)                        (0.46)               (0.21)                               
Nov2007-
Oct2009 7.23                91.84% £64.00 74.11% £7.68
Nov2007-
Oct2009 10.54             94.65% £113.34 76.65% £10.43
Nov2007-
Oct2009 4.91               89.87% £29.35 72.32% £5.75
(0.04)                          (0.50)               (0.03)                              (0.07)                         (0.99)                 (0.06)                             (0.03)                        (0.18)               (0.03)                               
Nov2009-
Oct2011 10.11              87.37% £62.09 70.60% £5.17
Nov2009-
Oct2011 15.54             90.15% £109.58 72.89% £6.55
Nov2009-
Oct2011 6.28               85.41% £28.60 68.98% £4.19
(0.06)                          (0.49)               (0.01)                              (0.12)                         (0.97)                 (0.02)                             (0.03)                        (0.18)               (0.01)                               
Total 6.35                92.72% £64.18 77.60% £12.51 Total 9.84                94.43% £119.59 81.59% £17.10 Total 4.36               89.56% £32.64 77.01% £9.67
(0.09)                          (0.53)               (0.24)                              (0.05)                         (0.68)                 (0.11)                             (0.02)                        (0.18)               (0.08)                               
Dark Dark Dark
Nov2005-
Oct2007 0.09                4.52% £6.00 8.14% £188.56
Nov2005-
Oct2007 0.06                1.65% £8.67 5.29% £209.12
Nov2005-
Oct2007 0.11               6.61% £4.06 10.21% £173.63
(0.00)                          (0.10)               (4.16)                              (0.00)                         (0.20)                 (6.52)                             (0.00)                        (0.10)               (5.40)                               
Nov2007-
Oct2009 0.52                8.16% £23.53 25.89% £76.16
Nov2007-
Oct2009 0.61                5.35% £39.16 23.35% £94.03
Nov2007-
Oct2009 0.46               10.13% £12.55 27.68% £63.61
(0.01)                          (0.24)               (2.59)                              (0.01)                         (0.49)                 (5.86)                             (0.01)                        (0.15)               (1.60)                               
Nov2009-
Oct2011 1.26                12.63% £26.37 29.40% £25.33
Nov2009-
Oct2011 1.70                9.85% £44.28 27.11% £30.76
Nov2009-
Oct2011 0.95               14.59% £13.75 31.02% £21.49
(0.01)                          (0.25)               (0.23)                              (0.03)                         (0.51)                 (0.33)                             (0.01)                        (0.14)               (0.30)                               
Total 0.63                7.28% £18.73 22.40% £97.14 Total 0.78                5.57% £30.36 18.41% £111.51 Total 0.51               10.44% £10.13 22.99% £86.13
(0.02)                          (0.34)               (2.82)                              (0.01)                         (0.26)                 (2.95)                             (0.01)                        (0.08)               (1.90)                               
Lit + Dark Lit + Dark Lit + Dark
Nov2005-
Oct2007 2.70                £86.47 £27.21
Nov2005-
Oct2007 3.65                £144.82 £35.64
Nov2005-
Oct2007 2.00               £44.08 £21.08
(0.01)                          (0.78)               (0.17)                              (0.02)                         (1.56)                 (0.24)                             (0.01)                        (0.46)               (0.21)                               
Nov2007-
Oct2009 7.76                £87.53 £10.18
Nov2007-
Oct2009 11.15             £152.50 £13.47
Nov2007-
Oct2009 5.37               £41.90 £7.87
(0.04)                          (0.67)               (0.05)                              (0.08)                         (1.34)                 (0.08)                             (0.03)                        (0.28)               (0.04)                               
Nov2009-
Oct2011 11.37              £88.46 £6.95
Nov2009-
Oct2011 17.25             £153.86 £8.58
Nov2009-
Oct2011 7.23               £42.34 £5.80
(0.06)                          (0.66)               (0.03)                              (0.13)                         (1.30)                 (0.06)                             (0.03)                        (0.27)               (0.03)                               
Total 6.99                £82.92 £14.48 Total 10.62             £149.95 £19.29 Total 4.87               £42.77 £11.57
(0.11)                          (0.59)               (0.24)                              (0.06)                         (0.81)                 (0.11)                             (0.02)                        (0.20)               (0.08)                               
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The pattern can also be observed for average transaction sizes and number of transactions in Table 2 
and Figure 5 respectively.  From Table 3 we can see that, relative to dark orders of other sizes, dark 
orders below £10,000, including those below £200, are growing in terms of both the number of 
transactions and the daily volume in British Pounds Sterling (£) with increases of 11% and 6% 
amongst dark orders, respectively.  Large dark transactions of over £100,000 is the only category 
that is not only shrinking in terms of number of transactions but in average daily volume in British 
Pounds Sterling (£) as well, following an initial spike in both measures following the introduction of 
MiFID.  This indicates that while the dark market is intended to provide a safer executing 
environment for large market moving orders, participants are choosing to segment their orders into 
smaller portions in order to either guarantee transaction execution or further conceal their large 
orders using series of smaller orders and liquidity sourcing technology.  Prior to the introduction of 
MiFID the dark order book market was dominated primarily by medium and large sized order of at 
least £10,000, in terms of both volume in British Pounds Sterling (£) and the number of transactions. 
 
Figure (4) Proportion of dark volume originating from transactions of varied size for FTSE-
100 stocks 
 
The figure shows the average daily proportion of dark volume per firm, measured in British Pounds Sterling (£), 
originating from transactions of varied size for FTSE-100 stocks.  Transactions are split into 4 groups.  Micro 
transactions are those of 200 British Pounds Sterling (£) or less and represent automated trades.  Small 
transactions are those greater than 200 British Pounds Sterling (£) up to 10,000 British Pounds Sterling (£) and 
represent retail investor activity.  Medium size transactions are those greater than 10,000 British Pounds 
Sterling (£) and up to 100,000 British Pounds Sterling (£) and represent a mix of larger retail investor and 
smaller institutional investor trades.  Large transactions are those over 100,000 British Pounds Sterling (£) and 
represent institutional investor trades.   
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Figure 5 and Table 3 also indicate the rise in micro transactions; transactions below £200.  These 
transactions are the result of automated trades as investors would not waste time and money on 
such small transactions.  Unfortunately we cannot guarantee whether the micro transactions are 
detecting large order in the market or simply interacting with each other.  However, it is unlikely that 
transactions of such small size are detecting liquidity in large orders. Through the use of minimum 
trade size parameters, investors attempting to conceal a large transactions by splitting an order into 
a series of small transactions would not want to execute in such small blocks.  Such small minimum 
trade sizes are not only inconvenient but also expose investors to predatory algorithms that use 
small transactions to try and detect large standing orders. 
 
Figure (5) Proportion dark trades originating from transactions of varied size for FTSE-
100 stocks 
The figure shows the average daily proportion of dark trades per firm, measured by the number of 
transactions, originating from transactions of varied size for FTSE-100 stocks.  Transactions are split 
into 4 groups.  Micro transactions are those of 200 British Pounds Sterling (£) or less and represent 
automated trades.  Small transactions are those greater than 200 British Pounds Sterling (£) up to 
10,000 British Pounds Sterling (£) and represent retail investor activity.  Medium size transactions 
are those greater than 10,000 British Pounds Sterling (£) and up to 100,000 British Pounds Sterling 
(£) and represent a mix of larger retail investor and smaller institutional investor trades.  Large 
transactions are those over 100,000 British Pounds Sterling (£) and represent institutional investor 
trades.   
Further investigation is necessary to determine why overall transaction sizes are on the decline in 
both lit and dark liquidity markets while the number of transactions is increasing.  However, it is our 
understanding that this phenomenon can be largely attributed to the advent of automated trading, 
predominately the adoption of Smart Order Routing Technology (SORT).   
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Table (3) Average daily activity in lit and dark trading venues for transactions of varied size for FTSE-100 stocks 
The table shows the average daily number of transactions and trading volume (with corresponding standard errors in brackets below each figure), measured in British Pounds 
Sterling (£), for transactions of varied size for FTSE-100 constituents in both lit and dark trading venues, as well as across the market as a whole.  The data is divided into the 3 distinct 
periods representing the stages of adoption of MiFID policies: Pre-MiFID (November 2005 – October 2007), Introduction of MiFID (November 2007 – October 2009) and 
Post/Maturity of MiFID (November 2009 – October 2011).   
 
 Number of 
Transactions % of Total
% of 
Lit/Dark
Volume 
(GBP) % of Total
% of 
Lit/Dark
 Number of 
Transactions % of Total
% of 
Lit/Dark
Volume 
(GBP)
% of 
Total
% of 
Lit/Dark
 Number of 
Transactions 
% of 
Total
% of 
Lit/Dark
Volume 
(GBP)
% of 
Total
% of 
Lit/Dark
 Number of 
Transactions % of Total
% of 
Lit/Dark
Volume 
(GBP)
% of 
Total
% of 
Lit/Dark
(thousands) (millions) (thousands) (millions) (thousands) (millions) (thousands) (millions)
Lit
Nov2005-
Oct2007 0.05               1.87% 2.04% £0.00 0.01% 0.01% 1.26               50.42% 51.07% £5.48 11.49% 12.10% 1.20               40.58% 41.15% £34.79 45.07% 47.52% 0.10                 2.61% 2.67% £40.19 35.29% 37.15%
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.00)                       (0.02)              (0.01)                       (0.23)              (0.00)                         (0.57)              
Nov2007-
Oct2009 0.20               2.91% 3.43% £0.02 0.04% 0.06% 5.23               68.89% 72.64% £21.39 35.07% 45.73% 1.78               19.80% 20.80% £37.30 35.69% 46.67% 0.03                 0.25% 0.26% £5.29 3.31% 4.34%
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.03)                       (0.12)              (0.02)                       (0.35)              (0.00)                         (0.10)              
Nov2009-
Oct2011 0.33               3.49% 4.45% £0.03 0.06% 0.08% 8.27               72.98% 79.80% £31.39 41.90% 56.56% 1.51               10.84% 11.82% £28.38 27.02% 36.64% 0.01                 0.06% 0.07% £2.28 1.61% 2.23%
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.05)                       (0.20)              (0.01)                       (0.27)              (0.00)                         (0.04)              
Total 0.19               2.43% 2.83% £0.02 0.02% 0.03% 4.74               62.17% 67.61% £18.45 22.43% 31.51% 1.38               26.78% 28.34% £30.81 37.12% 48.24% 0.04                 1.35% 1.40% £14.91 18.03% 20.22%
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.08)                       (0.31)              (0.01)                       (0.28)              (0.00)                         (0.47)              
Dark
Nov2005-
Oct2007 0.00               0.15% 4.08% £0.00 0.00% 0.10% 0.06               2.92% 66.59% £0.22 0.69% 17.19% 0.02               1.31% 17.67% £0.59 1.68% 20.17% 0.00                 0.13% 10.96% £5.19 5.77% 61.85%
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.00)                       (0.01)              (0.00)                       (0.02)              (0.00)                         (0.09)              
Nov2007-
Oct2009 0.03               0.48% 5.17% £0.00 0.01% 0.02% 0.39               6.27% 69.63% £1.35 3.45% 11.49% 0.09               1.15% 17.97% £1.99 3.23% 15.04% 0.02                 0.26% 7.21% £20.19 19.20% 73.44%
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.01)                       (0.02)              (0.00)                       (0.03)              (0.00)                         (0.22)              
Nov2009-
Oct2011 0.07               0.79% 5.09% £0.01 0.02% 0.04% 0.98               10.10% 76.69% £3.31 6.11% 19.59% 0.20               1.57% 16.16% £4.04 4.82% 19.76% 0.02                 0.16% 2.05% £19.02 18.46% 60.59%
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.01)                       (0.04)              (0.00)                       (0.05)              (0.00)                         (0.20)              
Total 0.03               0.38% 4.94% £0.00 0.00% 0.01% 0.49               5.50% 73.61% £1.65 2.01% 7.74% 0.10               1.21% 18.29% £2.14 2.61% 10.99% 0.01                 0.19% 3.15% £14.95 17.77% 81.26%
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.01)                       (0.04)              (0.00)                       (0.05)              (0.00)                         (0.28)              
Lit + Dark £0.00
Nov2005-
Oct2007 0.05               £0.00 1.32               £5.70 1.23               £35.38 0.10                 £45.38
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.00)                       (0.02)              (0.01)                       (0.23)              (0.00)                         (0.60)              
Nov2007-
Oct2009 0.23               £0.02 5.62               £22.74 1.86               £39.28 0.04                 £25.48
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.03)                       (0.12)              (0.02)                       (0.36)              (0.00)                         (0.28)              
Nov2009-
Oct2011 0.39               £0.04 9.25               £34.70 1.70               £32.42 0.03                 £21.30
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.05)                       (0.22)              (0.01)                       (0.29)              (0.00)                         (0.22)              
Total 0.22               £0.02 5.22               £20.09 1.48               £32.95 0.05                 £29.86
(0.00)                       (0.00)              (0.09)                       (0.34)              (0.01)                       (0.27)              (0.00)                         (0.40)              
< 200 GBP < 10,000 GBP < 100,000 GBP > 100,000 GBP
42 
 
In lit markets SORT is used to break up large orders into smaller pieces in order to allow for 
execution at the best possible price level across several venues.  Breaking up large orders also has 
the advantage of concealing your intentions from the market in order to prevent front-running or 
other gaming activities that can result in higher transaction costs.  Therefore, on the lit market it is 
understandable that average transaction sizes should decrease while the number of transactions 
increase. 
The dark order market, however, is intended to be used by investors wishing to maintain the 
anonymity of their trading intentions by concealing from the market the existence of a large buy or 
sell order.  Therefore, large orders do not necessarily need to be broken up for the purposes of 
concealment as this is the primary purpose of executing trades in the dark.  In fact, if participants in 
dark trading venues allow their orders to be broken up into very small pieces they open themselves 
up to predatory algorithms who are more likely to detect the existence of large orders when they 
allow for small partial trade executions; algorithms are unlikely to risk placing large orders solely for 
detection purposes.  
Average dark transaction sizes could, however, be decreasing due to decreasing probability of 
execution of large orders resulting from increased dark order market fragmentation.  With investors 
spread across multiple dark trading venues the probability of finding a counterparty to a trade 
decreases.   
8.0 Methodology 
The following section contains information on the variables used in the study as well as how the 
variables were applied in order to test our hypotheses. 
8.1 Dependent Variables 
In line with previous research on the market quality implications of the increased use of dark 
liquidity (Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 2011, Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel, 2011, and Gresse, 2012) 
we measure the impact of dark fragmentation on market quality by investigating the following 
dependent variables:  
1. Depth-X(Depth(X)) 
2. Price Impact (PrI) 
3. Effective Spread (EfS) 
4. Realised Spread (RlZ) 
5. Quoted Spread (QS)  
6. Quoted Depth (QD) 
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Depth(X), quoted depth, and quoted spread measures will be calculated every second of the trading 
day compared previous studies where it is calculated every minute (Degryse, de Jong, and  van 
Kervel , 2011). Forward looking transaction measures such as price impact and realised spread will 
compare the quoted spread midpoint immediately before the transaction with the midpoint one 
second after the transaction has been executed.  The 1-second time span is used as recommended 
by Henker and Wang (2006) who argue that even a 5-second window is too large, which raises 
concerns over the validity of the 1 and 5-minute windows used in previous studies (Degryse, de Jong, 
and  Van Kervel , 2011, Gresse 2012). 
Specifications on how the measures are calculated are as follows: 
1. Depth(X)i,t –
50 The average daily (t) value of the shares offered by a company  (i) within a 
fixed interval, X, around the midpoint, measured in British Pound Sterling (£).  It is used to 
determine how deep into the order book the hypothesised effects are felt.  It is calculated as 
follows: 
 
i. DepthAsk(X)i,t,s = ∑      
            
               
                   (1) 
Where  i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
 s is the second/time of day t. 
      
    is the number of shares available at a particular ask price, 
       
    is the ask price, 
       is the midpoint of the best bid/ask spread, 
   is the number of basis points around the midpoint. 
 
ii. DepthBid(X) i,t,s = ∑      
            
               
                   (2) 
Where  i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
s is the second/time of day t. 
         
    is the number of shares available at a particular bid price, 
       
    is the bid price. 
      is the midpoint of the best bid/ask spread, 
   is the number of basis points around the midpoint. 
 
                                                          
50
 Depth(X) was first introduced by Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2011). 
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iii. Depth(X)i,t,s = DepthBid(X)i,t,s + DepthAsk(X)i,t,s     (3) 
 
Using a simple average we then calculate the average daily depth for each company, 
Depth(X)i,t.  
 
We use this measure to test the effects on depth deep within the order book as 
changes observed solely at the best price level are not always indicative of effects 
throughout the order book.  It is used to test all three of our hypotheses. 
 
2. Price Impacti,t (PrI)  - Price impact used to test the information content of trades. It is based 
on executed transactions and is calculated as follows: 
 
i.            
                
      
       (4) 
Where  i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
z is a transaction identifier, 
       is the midpoint of the best bid/ask spread for company i on day t 
immediately before transaction z. 
          is the midpoint of the best bid/ask spread for company i on day t X 
seconds after the execution of transaction z. 
For each day we use a weighted average to determine the average price impact of a 
transaction.  Each price impact measure is weighted by the size, in British Pound 
Sterling (£), of the transaction so that larger transaction are more influential than 
smaller ones. 
We use this measure to test part of hypotheses 2 and 3 regarding the information 
content of trades. 
3. Effective Spreadi,t (EfS) - The effective spread captures the cost of a round-trip order by 
including both price movement (dealers coming in to execute orders at a better price than 
previously quoted) and market impact (spread widening due to the size of the order itself).  
It is based on executed transactions and is calculated as follows: 
 
i.            
                   
      
       (5) 
Where i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
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z is a transaction identifier, 
       is the price at which the transaction z occurred for company i on day t. 
       is the midpoint of the best bid/ask spread for company i on day t 
immediately before transaction z. 
For each day we use a weighted average to determine the average effective spread 
of a transaction.  Each effective spread measure is weighted by the size, in British 
Pound Sterling (£), of the transaction so that larger transaction are more influential 
than smaller ones. 
We use this measure to test the part of hypothesis 1 that pertains to transaction 
costs. 
 
4. Realised Spreadi,t (RlZ) - The realised spread measures the extent to which a market centre 
provides liquidity in a volatile or fast moving market and also measures the extent of 
informed order flow. Informed orders are those submitted by persons with better 
information than is generally available in the market, which presents more of a risk to the 
liquidity provider on the other side of the trade. It is based on executed transactions and is 
calculated as follows: 
 
i.            
                       
       
       (6) 
Where  i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
z is a transaction identifier, 
  is the price at which the transaction z occurred for company i on day t, 
       is the midpoint of the best bid/ask spread for company i on day t 
immediately before transaction z. 
          is the midpoint of the best bid/ask spread for company i on day t X 
seconds after the execution of transaction z. 
For each day we use a weighted average to determine the average realised spread 
of a transaction.  Each realised spread measure is weighted by the size, in British 
Pound Sterling (£), of the transaction so that larger transaction are more influential 
than smaller ones. 
We use this measure to test the part of hypothesis 1 that pertains to transaction 
costs. 
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5. Quoted Spread (QS)i,t  - The quoted spread measures the difference between the best bid 
and best ask with respect to the midpoint.  It is calculated as follows: 
 
i.          
      
              
       
      
       (7) 
Where i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
s is the second/time of day t. 
      
        is the best available ask price, 
       
        is the best available bid price. 
For each day we use a weighted average to determine the average quoted spread of 
throughout the day.  Each quoted spread measure is weighted by the quoted depth, 
in British Pound Sterling (£), so that spreads with a large number of stocks available 
at the bed bid/ask are more influential than those than may only contains a few 
shares. 
We use this measure to test a portion of all 3 hypothesis as spreads are a standard 
market quality measure. 
 
6. Quoted Depth (QD)i,t  - The quoted depth measures the value of stocks within the best bid 
and ask quotes, in British Pound Sterling (£).  It is calculated as follows: 
 
i.                
              
              
              
          (8) 
Where i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
s is the second/time of day t, 
      
        is the best available ask price, 
       
        is the best available bid price, 
      
        is the number of stocks available at the best ask price, 
        is the number of stocks available as the best bid price. 
 
Using a simple average we then calculate the average daily quoted depth for each 
company, QDi,t.  
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We use this measure to test the effects on depth at the best price level.  It is 
primarily used to test our first hypothesis but we refer to quoted depth throughout 
the study. 
All transactions and quotes residing outside of the UK will be converted into British Pound Sterling 
(£) at the closing exchange rate for the day in question. 
8.2 Independent variables 
This following section lists the series of independent variables used in the study, some of which are 
regressors while the remainder are control variables.   
The aforementioned dependent measures are regressed against the following independent 
variables:  
1. Lit Fragmentation (LF) 
2. Dark fragmentation (DF) 
3. Dark Volume (DV) 
4. Dark Proportion [Market Share] (DP) 
5. Market Capitalisation (MC) 
6. Price (PR) 
7. Volatility (σ) 
8. Total volume (Vol). 
8.2.1 Regressors 
The independent regressors are calculated as follows: 
1. Lit Fragmentation (LF) i,t – This is the extent of fragmentation in the lit market and it is 
measured by 1-Herfindhal-Hirschman Index(HHI).  This variable will be used to test 
hypothesis 1.  It is calculated as follows: 
 
i.                    ∑        
  
        (9) 
Where  i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
 v represents a particular visible liquidity venue, 
   
  is the squared market share of lit trading venue v, measured by the 
number of stocks traded in venue v when compared to the lit market as a 
whole. 
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1- HHI is used in order to more easily visualize a relationship between lit order book 
fragmentation and the pre-defined liquidity measures. A positive coefficient would 
indicate that increased fragmentation, as conveyed by an increase in LF, leads to an 
increase in the dependent measures.   
 
2. Dark Volume (DV) i,t – This variable indicates the popularity of dark trading and is measured 
by the proportion of trades/dark liquidity market share, in British Pound Sterling (£), that 
results from transactions in a dark order book market.  This variable is used to test 
hypothesis 2.   
 
3. Dark Proportion (DP)i,t – This is the market share of the dark order book market.  It is 
calculated as follows: 
 
i. DPi,t = DVi,t /Voli,t        (10) 
Where i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
DV i,t is the daily transaction volume, in British Pound Sterling (£), of the dark 
order book market, 
Vol i,t is the total daily volume for the firm, in British Pound Sterling (£). This 
variable is used to compliment the dark volume measure as it will inform us 
whether the increased volume in the dark market is a result of increased 
total volume51 or trade migrations from the lit to the dark market.52 
 
4. Dark Fragmentation (DF) i,t – This is the extent of fragmentation in the dark market and it is 
measured as 1 – HHI where HHI is the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index. It is calculated as 
follows: 
 
ii.                    ∑        
  
        (11) 
Where  i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
 v represents a particular dark liquidity venue, 
   
  is the squared market share of dark trading venue v, measured by the 
number of stocks traded in venue v when compared to the dark market as a 
whole. 
                                                          
51
 The increase in dark volume could be a direct result of an increase in total trading activity for the day. 
52
 As an increase in dark volume coupled with an increase in the proportion of dark trading implies that 
subsequent effects are as a result of trades favouring execution in the dark market over the lit market. 
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1- HHI is used in order to more easily visualize a relationship between dark order 
book fragmentation and the pre-defined liquidity measures. A positive coefficient 
would indicate that increased fragmentation, as conveyed by an increase in LF, leads 
to an increase in the dependent measures.   
This variable will be used to test hypothesis 3.   
8.2.1.1 Dark Fragmentation 
Dark fragmentation takes into consideration the fragmentation timeline introduced in Section 7.4.  
As order books consolidate we merge the results of their market share into a single figure, thereby 
effectively reducing the total number of distinct dark trading venues.   
Unlike previous studies we construct a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for dark trading venues in 
order to determine the level of fragmentation in the dark market, as opposed to solely relying on 
dark volume or dark market share.  As indicated by Figure 1, approximately 51% of dark liquidity 
transactions can be explicitly attributed to a trading venue, while the remaining 49% are attributed 
to a pool of 30+ dark liquidity providers.   
For the venues whose trades we cannot explicitly identify, we group the liquidity providers into one 
of two categories, major and minor contributors.  Major contributors will be assigned twice the 
market share of minor contributors and will consist of the founding nine members of BOAT, a trade 
reporting facility later acquired by Markit.  
For example, if the pool of attributable trades is comprised of ten dark liquidity providers, of which 
five were major contributors and five were minor contributors, for the purpose of our index 
calculation major contributors are given a market share of 2/15 while minor contributors are given a 
market share of 1/15.  This method, while far from exact, is an improvement over discarding dark 
venue level data because half of the transactions volume cannot be attributed to a particular 
liquidity provider.  
The founding nine BOAT members are chosen as major contributors as they consist of established 
banks, investments funds, and crossing networks whose annual activities far exceed, in terms of 
revenues, those of the remaining members. 
We initially use two separate measures of dark fragmentation, one that includes the effect of 
implicit consolidation and one that does not, in order to test hypothesis 3.  This is done as the two 
measures reveal different information about the status of the dark order book market; the measure 
that does not include implicit consolidation better reflects that stated status of fragmentation in the 
dark order book as is observed through reporting data while the measure that includes implicit 
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consolidation is more reflective of the true state of fragmentation in the dark order book market as 
it considers the effects of liquidity sharing amongst dark liquidity providers.  
Before running regressions using our dark fragmentation we first check to see whether it is 
necessary to run regressions on each measure individually.  In other words we test to see whether 
the unconsolidated and consolidated measures contain unique information within themselves.  
Table 4 displays correlation information among the independent regressors.  We observe that 
unconsolidated and consolidate dark fragmentation have a correlation coefficient of 0.995.  This 
indicates that, while the measures are different as indicated in Figure 6, they effectively explain the 
same factor, dark fragmentation. 
Table (4) Independent Variable Correlations 
 The table shows the correlation coefficients among between independent variables used in the 
study.  The variables can be segregated into two groups: Independent regressors (Lit 
Fragmentation, Dark Fragmentation, Dark Fragmentation [unconsolidated], Dark Volume, and 
Dark Proportion/Market Share) and control variables (Market Capitalisation, Price, Volatility 
[standard deviation], and Total Volume) 
  
LIT_FRAGM
ENTATION 
DARK_FRA
GMENTATI
ON 
DARK_FR
AGMENT
ATION_U
NC 
LN_DARK
_VOLUME 
PROPO
RTION_
DARK 
LN_M
ARKE
TCAP 
LN_P
RICE LN_SD 
LN_TO
TAL_V
OLUM
E 
LIT_FRAGMENTATION 1                 
DARK_FRAGMENTATION .627
**
 1               
DARK_FRAGMENTATION_UNC .640
**
 .995
**
 1             
LN_DARK_VOLUME .474
**
 .490
**
 .508
**
 1           
PROPORTION_DARK .492
**
 .530
**
 .558
**
 .730
**
 1         
LN_MARKETCAP .020
**
 .009
*
 .007 .373
**
 .008
*
 1       
LN_PRICE .012
**
 -.084
**
 -0.085 .102
**
 -.077
**
 .480
**
 1     
LN_SD .249
**
 .206
**
 .208
**
 .194
**
 .112
**
 -.007 .032
**
 1   
LN_TOTAL_VOLUME .025
**
 .075
**
 .082
**
 .580
**
 .170
**
 .432
**
 .319
**
 .140
**
 1 
 
As the two measures of consolidation are very similar, statistically, we will use the consolidated form 
on dark fragmentation, the measure that takes into considering liquidity sharing, in all future 
regressions as it is a truer representation of the state of fragmentation in the market in that it takes 
more factor (e.g. liquidity sharing) into consideration. 
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Figure (6) Market Fragmentation in Lit and Dark Liquidity Markets for all FTSE-100 
stocks 
The figure shows that average daily level of fragmentation per company in both lit and dark 
liquidity markets as measured by the (1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index).  The figure presents levels 
of fragmentation both with and without the effects of implicit consolidation through liquidity 
sharing for dark order markets.  Values close to 0 indicate that the market is highly concentrated 
while values close to 1 indicate that the market is highly fragmented, with 0 indicating  perfect 
consolidations while 1 indicating perfect fragmentation. The labels in the legend appear vertically 
in the same order as the lines in the graph.  That is, lit order book fragmentation is the bottom 
line while unconsolidated dark order book fragmentation is the top line.  
 
8.2.2 Control variables 
The following is a list of the control variables used in the study: 
1. Volatility (σ)i,t - The volatility of a stock will be measured by the standard deviation of stock 
returns over the course of a trading day.  It is calculated as follows: 
 
i.            
       
         
        (12) 
 
Where i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
s is the second/time of day t, 
      is the logarithmic return between 1 second snapshots, 
               is the current midpoint of the best bid-ask spread, 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Dark (Consolidated) Lit
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         is the midpoint of the best bid/ask spread from the previous 
second. 
 
ii.     ̅̅̅̅   
∑       
 
   
 
         (13) 
 
Where i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
s is the second/time of day t, 
      is the logarithmic return between 1 second snapshots, 
    ̅̅̅̅  is the average return over the course of the trading day, 
  is the number of seconds over the course of the trading day. 
 
iii.      √
∑               ̅̅ ̅̅  
  
   
   
 53       (14) 
Where  i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
s is the second/time of day t, 
      is the logarithmic return between 1 second snapshots, 
    ̅̅̅̅  is the average return over the course of the trading day, 
  is the number of seconds over the course of the trading day. 
 
 
2. Price (Pr)I,t – Price is the daily value weighted average price, measured in British Pound 
Sterling(£).  
 
3. Market Capitalisation (MC)I,t - Market capitalisation is the size of the company and is 
calculated as follows: 
 
i. MCi,t = Pri,t * NumShi,t        (15) 
Where NumShi,t is the total number of shares outstanding.
54 
4. Total Volume (Vol)i,t – Total volume is the total trading volume of stock over the course of a 
single trading day, measured in British Pound Sterling(£). 55 
                                                          
53
 We are using T-1 as this is a sample measure because it is not possible to have all possible outcomes. 
54
 To determine how many shares a company has outstanding at any given point in time we used the figures as 
presented in quarterly reports. 
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8.3 Panel Regression 
We utilize a panel regression to analyse our data.  This type of regression is appropriate as the data 
consists of multiple entities (stocks) that are observed over more than two points in time.  A time 
series analysis would not be appropriate here as the data consists of multiple entities (stocks).  Also, 
a cross sectional regression would not be appropriate as the data consists of observations over 
multiple time periods.   
The base for the regression formula is: 
                                                                          
                           (16) 
The regression model is extended to include the entity and time fixed effects as outlined in the 
following sections, Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2, respectively.  The extended model is:  
                                                                             
                         (17) 
Time and entity fixed effects are included in the model in order to reduce the effects of omitted 
variable bias.  This occurs when the omitted variable is either correlated with a regressor used in the 
model or when it is a determinant of the dependent variables, the liquidity measure.  If these effects 
are not included our model will attribute a higher effect of the regressors to the dependent variable 
than actually exists, resulting in a model that does not measure the true effect of the regressors on 
the dependent variable. 
To determine the effectiveness of our regressors we perform an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression on the data and assess the significance of the regressors.  
8.3.1 Entity Fixed Effects 
It is important that the model controls for omitted variables in the panel data when the omitted 
variables vary across entities but do not change over time.  These include factors such as the 
industry in which the company operates as well as its organisational structure.  To account for this 
effect we add to the model a set of binary dummy variables,       ..    , where     is a fixed effect 
binary dummy variable for stock i that does not change over time.  This results in the following 
regression model: 
                                                                            
                                             (18) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
55
 For control variables 2-4 we will use the LN() of the original value.  Logarithms convert changes in variables 
into percentage changes and this figure will provide a more descriptive result as it will scale down the changes 
amongst stocks. 
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where       ..     are the fixed effect binary dummy variables for stock i which are set to 1 when 
the data pertains to stock i, and 0 otherwise.  The resulting model will consist of n intercepts, 1 for 
each observed entity (stock). This is formula that will be used in the regression; however, it can be 
summarized by the following model: 
                                                                         
                               (19) 
Where    is the unobserved variable which varies from stock to stock but remains fixed over time.  
This can be simplified to: 
                                                                         
                           (20) 
where              
The former models, 18 and 19, define the change in the y-intercept with respect to the intercept of 
the first stock in the study56, stock 1, while the latter models, 19 and 20, reorganize the inputs and 
define a unique intercept for each stock. 
8.3.2 Time Fixed Effects 
Just as entity fixed effects control for variables that are constant over time but differ across entities, 
time fixed effects control for variables that are constant across entities but change over time.  This is 
particularly important over the observed period as effects resulting from events such as the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) are difficult to measure but, nonetheless, must be accounted for. To account 
for this effect we add to the model a set of binary dummy variables,       ..    , where     is a 
quarterly fixed effect binary dummy variable for time t that remains constant across entities but 
changes over time.  This results in the following regression model: 
                                                                              
                                                                       (21) 
where       ..    are the fixed effect binary dummy variable for time t which are set to 1 when the 
data pertains to time period t, and 0 otherwise.  This model (21) is the starting point for our 
regression; however, it can be summarized by equation 1757 where     is the unobserved variable 
which varies over time but remains fixed for each stock.   
                                                          
56
 Note that there is no    but only   ..   
57
 Note that there is no    but only    —   . 
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8.3.3 Regression Assumptions 
In order to draw valid conclusions from the results of the fixed effects panel regression the data 
must fulfil the following four assumptions: normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and 
multicollinearity. 
8.3.3.1 Normality 
Linear regression assumes that the variables have normal distributions.  Non-normally distributed 
data can distort relationships and significance tests.  We run normality tests on both the individual 
variables as well as the resulting model itself. 
 
Figure (7) Distribution of Dependent Variables 
The figure shows the distribution of the dependent variables local quoted depth and local 
quoted spread. Observed and transformed local quoted depth measures are found in Panels A 
and C, respectively. Observed and transformed local quoted spread measures are found in 
Panels B and D, respectively. 
We begin by graphing observations for each independent and dependent variable and checking to 
see whether a normal distribution is present.  We perform the test on all independent and 
dependent variables.  Panels A and B of Figure 7 shows the distribution of the local quoted depth 
and local quoted spread measures, respectively; the remaining dependent variables were excluded 
due to the redundancy in the presented results.  We clearly see that the dependent variables are 
heavily skewed to the right.  In order to compensate for this we decide to transform all dependent 
PANEL A PANEL B
PANEL C PANEL D
QUOTED_DEPTH QUOTED_SPREAD
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variables using the LN() function.  The resulting distributions are displayed in Figure 7b and are 
clearly more normal.  Similar results are found for all independent measures, with the exception of 
the fragmentation, LF and DF, and market share, DP, and as a result we transform all independent 
variables, excluding the aforementioned three variables, using the LN() function. Note that the three 
non-adjusted independent variables are all measured on scales from 0 to 1. 
After performing the above transformations, and using local quoted depth as an example, we see 
the normal probability plot go from the bowed s-shaped curve in Panel A of Figure 8 to a roughly 
straight line in Panel B of Figure 8.  Again this is consistent for all dependent measures and graphs 
have been excluded due to redundancy. 
The tests outlined in this section indicate that our model meets the required normality assumption.
 
Figure (8) Normal Probability Plots 
The figure shows the normal probability plots resulting from regression on local quoted depth.  
Panel A shows the plot prior to transforming independent and dependent variables while Panel B 
shows the plot after data transformations have been completed. 
Panel A
Panel B
QUOTED_DEPTH
LN_QUOTED_DEPTH
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8.3.3.2 Linearity 
When performing a linear regression we must also check to see that there is a linear relationship 
between independent and dependent variables.  If this relationship does not exist then we are 
incorrectly using a linear model to describe a non-linear relationship and, as a result, do not have 
meaningful coefficients.  We check for linearity by observing the relationship between the predicted 
value and standardised residuals and look for any signs of a non-horizontal distribution around the x 
axis. 
Panels A and B of Figure 9 contain the standardised residual versus predicted value plots for both 
local quoted depth and local quote spread, respectively.  Both plots indicate that the residuals are 
evenly distributed about the x-axis and that no curvilinear pattern can be seen amongst the 
residuals.  As both plots adhere to the requirement of linearity we can be confident in our use of a 
linear model to explain the relationship between our independent and dependent variables.  
 
Figure (9) Standardised Residuals versus Predicted Values 
This figure contains information on the relationship between standardised residuals and predicted 
values.  Panel A contains information on local quoted depths while Panel B contains information 
on local quoted spreads. 
Panel A
Panel B
LN_QUOTED_DEPTH
LN_QUOTED_SPREAD
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8.3.3.3 Homoskedasticity 
An error term is homoskedastic if the variance of the conditional distribution of the error term given 
the value of the dependent variable, var(    |   = x), is constant for i = 1…n, meaning it does not 
depend on x, or the predicted value resulting from the model.  If a pattern can be found in the 
standardised residual versus predicted value plots the term is heteroskedastic, indicating that 
variance changes as we adjust our predicted value.  We return to Panels A and B of Figure 9 to 
identify whether our model suffers from homoscedasticity.  From both Panels A and B in Figure 9 we 
can see that the variance is constant regardless of the predicted value; it does not increase or 
decrease with increases in the predicted value nor does it display a bow-tie or diamond shape. As a 
result we can be confident in assuming that the model does not suffer from heteroskedasticity.  
8.3.3.4 Multicollinearity 
The final assumption is a test of for multicollinearity among the independent measures. We perform 
multiple tests to check for this condition.  
We begin by inspecting the correlations among the independent variables to make sure none of our 
measures are redundant. Table 4 contains the correlation measures between all of our independent 
measures.  We notice that to dark volume measure (LN_Dark_Volume) and the dark market share 
measure (Proportion_Dark) are highly correlated with each other, with a correlation coefficient of 
0.73.  This indicates that using both measures would be redundant and result in untrustworthy 
coefficients.  We exclude dark volume from future regressions as the dark market share measure is 
much more revealing in terms of its information content.  Due to its positive correlation with dark 
volume we know that dark market share increases with increases in the dark volume.  But by 
keeping that market share measure we gain additional insight on the effects of trades migrating 
from the lit to the dark order book.  Further inspection of Table 4 shows no other signs of significant 
multicollinearity.  Oddly, this also pertains to the control variables of market capitalisation and price.  
It would be expected that these two variables would display high multicollinearity as the market cap 
measure utilizes the price in its calculations.  But since there is no indicator of high multicollinearity 
here we do not need to be concerned with removing any of these measures.  Also, as they are 
control variables and are not used in the interpretation side of our analysis their removal is also not 
critical. 
When observing correlation coefficients between variables, however, we may not notice the effects 
of increased multicollinearity resulting from the use of a combination of variables.  To test for this 
condition we perform a regression on our data where we regress one independent measure against 
the remaining independent measures and repeat this step until all independent variables have been 
used as the dependent value. In this test we look out for any noticeably large variance inflation 
factors (VIF) with values over 3 indicating some multicollinearity, values over 5 indicating significant 
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multicollinearity issues, and values over 10 indicating extremely high multicollinearity.  Our main 
concern is the interaction among the 3 remaining key regressors: lit fragmentation, dark 
fragmentation, and dark proportion.   
In Table 5, Panels A – D, we see the results of the aforementioned regressions.  We only display the 
regression results that contain all 3 key regressors as independent variables as it is their interactions 
that we are most concerned with.  In each table we notice that that VIF values are all below 3 which 
indicates low multicollinearity among our independent measures. 
Table (5) Variance Inflation Factors Among Independent Variables 
Table 5 contains information on the variance inflation factors among independent variables.  
Panels A – D display the values resulting from the removal of a different control variable (Market 
Capitalisation, Price, Volatility, and Total Volume) from the analysis.  The control variable that was 
removed from the current iteration can be found below each panel. 
 
  
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF
LN_PRICE .864 1.157 LN_SD .885 1.130
LN_SD .914 1.094 LN_TOTAL_VOLUME .408 2.453
LN_TOTAL_VOLUME .834 1.200 PROPORTION_DARK .631 1.586
PROPORTION_DARK .646 1.549 HHI_DARK_CONSOLIDATED .539 1.856
HHI_DARK_CONSOLI
DATED
.533 1.876 HHI_LIT_UNCONSOLIDATED .542 1.845
HHI_LIT_UNCONSOLI
DATED
.543 1.840 LN_MARKETCAP .430 2.323
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF
LN_TOTAL_VOLUME .430 2.328 PROPORTION_DARK .673 1.486
PROPORTION_DARK .634 1.578 HHI_DARK_CONSOLIDATED .533 1.876
HHI_DARK_CONSOLI
DATED
.536 1.866 HHI_LIT_UNCONSOLIDATED .552 1.811
HHI_LIT_UNCONSOLI
DATED
.558 1.793 LN_MARKETCAP .765 1.306
LN_MARKETCAP .387 2.582 LN_PRICE .751 1.331
LN_PRICE .753 1.328 LN_SD .931 1.075
1
a. Dependent Variable: LN_SD a. Dependent Variable: LN_TOTAL_VOLUME
Panel C Panel D
Model
Collinearity Statistics
Model
Collinearity Statistics
Panel B
Model
Collinearity Statistics
1 1
a. Dependent Variable: LN_MARKETCAP a. Dependent Variable: LN_PRICE
Panel A
Model
Collinearity Statistics
1
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Since we have proven that there is no multicollinearity among our remaining independent measures 
we must also check to see that his is true for the model itself once dummy variables have been 
applied.  Table 6, Panel A, displays a truncated table containing the results of our regression on local 
quoted depth; a truncated table is used due to the number of dummy variables in the model.  While 
the dummy variables have high VIF values this does not cause concern as we will not be interpreting 
the coefficients for the dummy variables themselves; they are merely used as control variables.  
Market capitalisation and price, have high VIF values, 244 and 143, respectively, that reduce to 2.67 
and 1.62, respectively, when the dummy variables are removed.  Such high VIF values indicate that 
both market cap and price do a great job at explaining difference in results due to firm specific 
factors as they were uncorrelated with other independent variables, as indicated in Tables 4 and 5. 
Removing the firm specific fixed effects and keeping the market capitalisation measures, and vice 
versa, has little effect on the coefficients of our explanatory variables and only slightly reduces the R2 
of the model.  Since the effect of using firm fixed effects versus market capitalisation and price 
versus both is minimal, combined with the fact that we would be interested in interpreting the 
control variables we decide to drop the firm specific fixed effects in favour of having control 
variables with interpretable coefficients. 
The most critical indicator in Table 6 Panel A is the VIF value of 30.7 for lit fragmentation.  Such a 
large value for the explanatory variable is troublesome as it prevents us from making any meaningful 
interpretation of this variable’s coefficients.  However, in our previous multicollinearity tests we find 
that lit fragmentation is not correlated with any of our other independent measures.  As a result we 
decide to remove all time fixed effects from the model and find that VIF reduces to 1.857 according 
to Panel B of Table 6.  This indicates that our lit fragmentation measure does a great job a capturing 
time fixed effects and the use of quarterly dummy variables would be redundant.   
Table 6 Panel B contains the results of a regression on local quoted depth, as in Table 4 Panel A, 
however all fixed effects have been removed.  The resulting model has not changed significantly in 
terms of the coefficients for our 3 key independent variables.  While the magnitudes of the 
coefficients have increased slightly after removing the fixed effects the signs are all the same, 
meaning that we have not significantly affected the model by removing the dummy variables but 
have increased the interpretative capability of independent coefficients.  The size of the coefficient 
for lit fragmentation, however, did increase noticeably in magnitude from -0.144 to -0.952 due to 
improvements in multicollinearity.  
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Table (6) Variance Inflation Factors for ‘The Model’ 
Table 6 shows information on variance inflation factors resulting from running a regression on one 
of our dependent measures (Local Quoted Depth).  Panel A contains the results from the original 
model before adjustments are made to handle multicollinearity.  Note that some firm specific and 
time specific dummy variables have been hidden to help with the presentation of Panel A.  Panel B 
contains the results of the same regression after we accommodate for multicollinearity. 
  
  
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 6.390 .155 41.098 0.000
AntoFagasta_DUMMY .196 .017 .035 11.545 .000 .365 2.743
AssocBrFoods_DUMMY .397 .019 .072 20.381 .000 .269 3.724
AstraZeneca_DUMMY .615 .015 .109 40.060 0.000 .457 2.188
InterconHotelG_DUMMY .508 .034 .093 15.136 .000 .090 11.162
NationalGrid_DUMMY 1.077 .023 .195 46.122 0.000 .189 5.288
Next_DUMMY .382 .041 .070 9.296 .000 .060 16.654
Pearson_DUMMY .727 .019 .133 38.380 0.000 .282 3.543
RDutchShellB_DUMMY .607 .035 .108 17.462 .000 .088 11.410
SevernTrent_DUMMY .582 .039 .106 14.923 .000 .066 15.069
Shire_DUMMY .645 .024 .117 26.691 .000 .174 5.735
SmithNephew_DUMMY .767 .019 .140 41.116 0.000 .291 3.442
SmithsGroup_DUMMY .512 .028 .093 18.306 .000 .129 7.728
Tesco_DUMMY .454 .041 .082 11.208 .000 .064 15.722
W olseley_DUMMY .575 .042 .105 13.552 .000 .056 17.807
@2005_Q2 -.134 .010 -.034 -13.270 .000 .520 1.922
@2008_Q2 -1.266 .017 -.323 -74.983 0.000 .182 5.499
@2008_Q3 -1.148 .019 -.288 -60.981 0.000 .151 6.610
@2008_Q4 -1.183 .020 -.298 -58.251 0.000 .129 7.760
@2009_Q1 -1.045 .021 -.262 -50.064 0.000 .123 8.104
@2009_Q2 -.859 .021 -.218 -40.142 0.000 .114 8.736
@2009_Q3 -1.038 .021 -.258 -48.948 0.000 .122 8.230
@2009_Q4 -.990 .021 -.249 -46.164 0.000 .116 8.609
@2010_Q1 -.920 .022 -.230 -42.248 0.000 .114 8.788
@2010_Q2 -.996 .022 -.240 -45.719 0.000 .122 8.178
@2010_Q3 -1.073 .022 -.266 -49.585 0.000 .117 8.542
@2010_Q4 -1.421 .022 -.355 -64.627 0.000 .112 8.955
LN_MARKETCAP .148 .021 .202 7.202 .000 .004 234.324
LN_PRICE .149 .021 .154 6.979 .000 .007 143.915
LN_SD -.094 .002 -.135 -51.167 0.000 .487 2.054
LN_TOTAL_VOLUME .147 .003 .178 44.274 0.000 .209 4.791
LN_DARK_VOLUME .022 .002 .058 13.817 .000 .190 5.258
PROPORTION_DARK -.300 .018 -.034 -9.829 .000 .274 3.656
DARK_FRAGMENTATION -.280 .008 .019 5.553 .000 .276 3.627
LIT_FRAGMENTATION -.144 .029 -.050 -4.960 .000 .033 30.700
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 5.234 .050 105.560 0.000
LN_MARKETCAP .228 .003 .312 73.871 0.000 .374 2.674
LN_PRICE -.084 .003 -.086 -29.025 .000 .751 1.332
LN_SD -.131 .002 -.188 -68.370 0.000 .882 1.133
LN_TOTAL_VOLUME .216 .003 .261 64.579 0.000 .407 2.455
PROPORTION_DARK -.420 .016 -.084 -25.865 .000 .629 1.591
DARK_FRAGMENTATION -.333 .008 -.140 -39.593 0.000 .533 1.877
LIT_FRAGMENTATION -.952 .010 -.333 -94.791 0.000 .538 1.857
1
a. Dependent Variable: LN_QUOTEDDEPTH
P ANE L B
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
1
a. Dependent Variable: LN_QUOTEDDEPTH
P ANE L A
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
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8.4 The Model 
We use the following model for our analyses once we’ve corrected for all the deviations from the 
assumptions found in Section 8.3.3: 
                                                                               (22) 
Where DF is the consolidated dark fragmentation measure.58 
9.0 Results 
According to our findings lit and dark order book fragmentation have opposing effects on market 
quality.  Lit order book fragmentation is found to improve market quality while order migration from 
lit to dark order books and dark order book fragmentation predominantly have negative effects.  
According to the standardised coefficients for global and local order books, found in Panels A and B 
of Table 7, respectively, lit fragmentation has a large positive impact on market quality, increased 
dark market share has a large negative impact on market quality and dark fragmentation has a minor 
negative impact on market quality.  Standardised coefficients are used in this situation as they are 
scaled against the remaining independent variables.  As a result the size of the coefficient also tells 
us which variables have the greatest impact on the dependent measure and leads us to conclude 
that lit fragmentation has the greatest impact on market quality, with its effects being largely 
positive, while dark market share (proportion) has the greatest negative impact. 
The remainder of this section contains information on the market quality implications of changes in 
our three forms of fragmentation: lit order book fragmentation, fragmentation between lit and ark 
order books, and dark order book fragmentation. 
 
 
  
                                                          
58
 The motivation behind selecting this consolidated form of the dark fragmentation measure can be found in 
Section 8.2.2.1. 
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Table (7) Global and Local Standardised Regression Results 
The table contains information on the results of our regression analysis.  Panel A contains Global 
order book data while Panel B contains local order book data.  Quoted depth is measured as the 
value of stocks (£) at the best price level at the primary exchange (London Stock Exchange).  Depth(X) 
is the value of stocks (£) at various distances, in basis points, from the local quoted depth.  All depths 
were transformed with the Ln function due to the skewness of the data. Quoted spread, price impact, 
realised spread, and effective spread were measured in basis points prior to the Ln transformation 
required due to the skewness of the data. Market Cap, Price, SD, and Total Volume are the control 
variables.  Dark volume is a measure of the total daily value (£) of dark order transactions.  Proportion 
dark is the percentage of total orders executed in the dark.  HHI Lit is the measure of lit order book 
fragmentation as measured by 1- ‘Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’.  HHI Dark (Consolidated) is the 
measure of dark order book fragmentation as measured by 1- ‘Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’ when 
implicit order book consolidation through liquidity sharing is considered, while HHI Dark 
(Unconsolidated) does not consider implicit consolidation.  Coefficients are presented first with the 
corresponding T-stats presented in parenthesis below.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1,5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Global Order Book 
 
LN Quoted 
Depth
LN 
Depth10
LN 
Depth20
LN 
Depth30
LN 
Depth40
LN 
Depth50
LN 
Quoted 
Spread
LN Price 
Impact
LN Realised 
Spread
LN Effective 
Spread
All Companies
Ln Market Cap 0.12 *** 0.26 *** 0.26 *** 0.24 *** 0.22 *** 0.20 *** -0.20 *** -0.12 *** -0.16 *** -0.20 ***
(23.39) (59.16) (59.15) (52.56) (46.46) (42.14) (-21.02) (-13.41) (-19.03) (-21.81)
Ln Price -0.09 *** 0.02 *** -0.03 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.01 * 0.05 *** -0.02 *** -0.01
(-24.28) (6.40) (-10.81) (-11.04) (-11.83) (-12.59) (-1.94) (7.66) (-3.81) (-1.14)
Ln SD -0.46 *** -0.45 *** -0.48 *** -0.49 *** -0.49 *** -0.49 *** 0.26 *** 0.48 *** 0.07 *** 0.14 ***
(-132.35) (-155.76) (-165.61) (-164.08) (-160.76) (-157.16) (35.15) (71.44) (11.32) (19.46)
Ln Total Volume 0.18 *** 0.30 *** 0.27 *** 0.26 *** 0.25 *** 0.24 *** -0.23 *** -0.14 *** 0.18 *** 0.20 ***
(35.75) (71.12) (63.80) (58.75) (54.90) (52.63) (-23.29) (-14.94) (20.22) (21.04)
Proportion Dark -0.01 ** -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 0.19 *** 0.11 *** -0.07 *** -0.09 ***
(-2.55) (-11.05) (-8.81) (-9.03) (-8.14) (-7.37) (20.71) (13.42) (-8.21) (-10.03)
Dark_Fragmentation 0.03 *** -0.02 *** 0.00 -0.01 ** 0.00 0.01 * 0.05 *** 0.13 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 ***
(5.84) (-5.34) (-1.17) (-2.23) (-0.14) (1.76) (4.97) (15.37) (-11.93) (-10.66)
Lit_Fragmentation -0.01 ** 0.29 *** 0.36 *** 0.37 *** 0.36 *** 0.34 *** -0.49 *** 0.10 *** -0.57 *** -0.49 ***
(-2.22) (78.08) (97.46) (98.68) (91.74) (84.94) (-53.29) (12.04) (-69.57) (-55.37)
Adjusted R2 0.260       0.481       0.484       0.460       0.430       0.406       0.337       0.435       0.475          0.391          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
#Observations 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803
Upper Index Firms: Companies with Market Cap. > £10b
Ln Market Cap 0.11 *** 0.23 *** 0.22 *** 0.20 *** 0.18 *** 0.18 *** -0.37 *** -0.21 *** -0.19 *** -0.21 ***
(15.31) (34.76) (32.74) (28.81) (26.68) (25.18) (-33.39) (-21.01) (-19.29) (-20.04)
Ln Price -0.15 *** -0.03 *** -0.06 *** -0.08 *** -0.10 *** -0.11 *** -0.06 *** 0.06 *** -0.08 *** -0.07 ***
(-27.76) (-6.85) (-12.28) (-15.77) (-18.41) (-20.46) (-5.73) (6.01) (-8.18) (-7.04)
Ln SD -0.44 *** -0.50 *** -0.50 *** -0.50 *** -0.49 *** -0.48 *** 0.21 *** 0.51 *** 0.02 ** 0.09 ***
(-81.32) (-103.52) (-100.67) (-98.46) (-95.62) (-93.25) (21.98) (58.27) (2.56) (9.59)
Ln Total Volume 0.06 *** 0.19 *** 0.15 *** 0.13 *** 0.12 *** 0.11 *** -0.19 *** -0.16 *** 0.14 *** 0.16 ***
(8.67) (29.97) (23.91) (20.48) (18.12) (16.86) (-16.12) (-14.32) (13.51) (14.25)
Proportion Dark 0.05 *** 0.06 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.19 *** 0.15 *** -0.10 *** -0.13 ***
(8.18) (10.61) (9.55) (9.21) (8.99) (8.71) (14.52) (12.83) (-8.16) (-10.18)
Dark_Fragmentation 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.04 *** -0.02 0.08 *** -0.09 *** -0.10 ***
(7.22) (8.21) (6.20) (4.84) (5.40) (5.66) (-1.22) (6.56) (-7.88) (-8.16)
Lit_Fragmentation -0.06 *** 0.20 *** 0.23 *** 0.22 *** 0.20 *** 0.18 *** -0.49 *** 0.13 *** -0.58 *** -0.51 ***
(-8.44) (32.66) (36.30) (34.71) (31.05) (28.25) (-38.10) (11.21) (-51.17) (-41.95)
Adjusted R2 0.247       0.397       0.370       0.343       0.323       0.308       0.372       0.485       0.505          0.437          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
#Observations 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024
Lower Index Firms: Companies with Market Cap. < £10b
Ln Market Cap 0.21 *** 0.31 *** 0.30 *** 0.29 *** 0.27 *** 0.26 *** -0.14 *** -0.15 *** -0.04 *** -0.08 ***
(45.45) (77.84) (92.38) (94.38) (86.41) (80.24) (-12.03) (-14.33) (-3.44) (-7.02)
Ln Price 0.05 *** 0.13 *** 0.04 *** 0.07 *** 0.08 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.06 *** 0.08 *** 0.10 ***
(13.28) (36.55) (15.76) (25.26) (29.45) (32.39) (7.95) (6.38) (8.64) (9.45)
Ln SD -0.41 *** -0.34 *** -0.39 *** -0.39 *** -0.40 *** -0.40 *** 0.30 *** 0.43 *** 0.16 *** 0.21 ***
(-93.42) (-91.07) (-130.08) (-133.21) (-134.58) (-132.47) (26.67) (41.64) (16.46) (19.87)
Ln Total Volume 0.32 *** 0.34 *** 0.35 *** 0.34 *** 0.34 *** 0.34 *** -0.24 *** -0.11 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 ***
(67.07) (83.77) (107.62) (107.87) (105.15) (102.27) (-20.63) (-10.32) (14.66) (14.77)
Proportion Dark -0.11 *** -0.14 *** -0.15 *** -0.15 *** -0.14 *** -0.13 *** 0.23 *** 0.15 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 ***
(-21.28) (-32.61) (-42.24) (-43.76) (-41.22) (-38.40) (16.96) (11.72) (-6.60) (-6.46)
Dark_Fragmentation -0.08 *** -0.12 *** -0.11 *** -0.11 *** -0.11 *** -0.10 *** 0.09 *** 0.23 *** -0.17 *** -0.15 ***
(-14.32) (-23.55) (-27.49) (-30.02) (-27.64) (-24.06) (6.48) (17.26) (-13.65) (-11.16)
Lit_Fragmentation 0.07 *** 0.42 *** 0.64 *** 0.67 *** 0.67 *** 0.65 *** -0.57 *** 0.01 -0.54 *** -0.45 ***
(12.99) (89.53) (171.84) (186.97) (182.09) (172.09) (-40.97) (0.76) (-44.85) (-34.36)
Adjusted R2 0.407       0.555       0.713       0.733       0.722       0.706       0.308       0.417       0.482          0.381          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
#Observations 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779
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Table 7 (continued) 
Panel B: Local Order Book 
 
9.1 Lit Fragmentation 
In this section we present our findings regarding the market quality implications of the 
fragmentation of orders within the lit order book market.  We find that fragmentation in the lit order 
book market improves quality in the overall market, with the effects being greater, as indicated by a 
larger absolute coefficient, within the global visible order book compared to the local visible order 
book.  As a result, lit order book fragmentation is beneficial to both institutional investors who can 
simultaneously access multiple markets using SORT and retail investors who do not have access to 
liquidity sourcing technology.  However, the global order book experiences greater improvements as 
predicted in hypothesis 1. 
LN Quoted 
Depth
LN 
Depth10
LN 
Depth20
LN 
Depth30
LN 
Depth40
LN 
Depth50
LN 
Quoted 
Spread
LN Price 
Impact
LN Realised 
Spread
LN Effective 
Spread
All Companies
Ln Market Cap 0.31 *** 0.45 *** 0.48 *** 0.46 *** 0.44 *** 0.42 *** -0.18 *** -0.14 *** -0.19 *** -0.23 ***
(73.87) (110.82) (120.77) (112.97) (105.55) (99.62) (-17.65) (-15.39) (-20.95) (-24.17)
Ln Price -0.09 *** 0.01 *** 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 *** 0.04 *** -0.05 *** -0.02 ***
(-29.03) (3.86) (-1.77) (-0.33) (-0.69) (-1.54) (-3.75) (6.19) (-6.90) (-3.34)
Ln SD -0.19 *** -0.17 *** -0.20 *** -0.24 *** -0.26 *** -0.27 *** 0.32 *** 0.45 *** 0.08 *** 0.08 ***
(-68.37) (-61.74) (-79.55) (-91.81) (-95.98) (-96.33) (43.27) (68.41) (11.40) (10.57)
Ln Total Volume 0.26 *** 0.33 *** 0.31 *** 0.30 *** 0.30 *** 0.30 *** -0.29 *** -0.13 *** 0.21 *** 0.23 ***
(64.58) (83.54) (82.78) (77.84) (75.57) (74.63) (-28.35) (-14.48) (23.32) (23.22)
Proportion Dark -0.08 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** 0.19 *** 0.11 *** -0.10 *** -0.11 ***
(-25.86) (-22.62) (-24.17) (-22.77) (-22.00) (-22.21) (19.93) (13.10) (-11.88) (-12.62)
Dark_Fragmentation -0.14 *** -0.18 *** -0.20 *** -0.20 *** -0.19 *** -0.18 *** 0.01 0.12 *** -0.13 *** -0.12 ***
(-39.59) (-51.57) (-59.76) (-59.11) (-54.69) (-50.45) (1.19) (14.36) (-14.41) (-13.31)
Lit_Fragmentation -0.33 *** 0.06 *** 0.17 *** 0.20 *** 0.19 *** 0.17 *** -0.28 *** 0.16 *** -0.51 *** -0.42 ***
(-94.79) (17.72) (53.13) (59.25) (54.26) (48.30) (-29.08) (19.13) (-59.58) (-45.51)
Adjusted R2 0.531       0.561       0.589       0.567       0.544       0.525       0.301       0.449       0.444          0.356          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
#Observations 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803
Upper Index Firms: Companies with Market Cap. > £10b
Ln Market Cap 0.23 *** 0.43 *** 0.43 *** 0.41 *** 0.39 *** 0.38 *** -0.28 *** -0.21 *** -0.18 *** -0.21 ***
(37.49) (71.33) (67.96) (62.36) (59.07) (56.54) (-24.40) (-21.18) (-17.68) (-19.59)
Ln Price -0.27 *** -0.09 *** -0.12 *** -0.15 *** -0.17 *** -0.19 *** -0.05 *** 0.07 *** -0.11 *** -0.11 ***
(-60.43) (-20.33) (-26.23) (-29.71) (-33.71) (-37.57) (-4.58) (7.14) (-10.56) (-10.32)
Ln SD -0.12 *** -0.09 *** -0.14 *** -0.18 *** -0.20 *** -0.20 *** 0.33 *** 0.50 *** 0.04 *** 0.03 ***
(-27.52) (-20.00) (-29.00) (-37.81) (-40.20) (-40.31) (32.19) (57.07) (4.36) (2.86)
Ln Total Volume 0.19 *** 0.33 *** 0.29 *** 0.27 *** 0.25 *** 0.24 *** -0.27 *** -0.15 *** 0.15 *** 0.17 ***
(33.42) (57.30) (47.30) (42.48) (39.67) (37.96) (-21.24) (-14.20) (13.33) (14.20)
Proportion Dark -0.08 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 0.23 *** 0.17 *** -0.12 *** -0.15 ***
(-15.26) (-6.94) (-6.76) (-4.88) (-4.58) (-5.58) (16.72) (14.21) (-9.46) (-11.67)
Dark_Fragmentation -0.17 *** -0.21 *** -0.24 *** -0.25 *** -0.24 *** -0.23 *** -0.06 *** 0.05 *** -0.12 *** -0.13 ***
(-31.70) (-39.10) (-42.20) (-42.44) (-39.65) (-37.69) (-4.26) (4.54) (-9.61) (-10.13)
Lit_Fragmentation -0.37 *** 0.06 *** 0.15 *** 0.14 *** 0.11 *** 0.09 *** -0.33 *** 0.17 *** -0.52 *** -0.44 ***
(-65.87) (9.94) (25.40) (23.76) (18.61) (14.98) (-24.06) (14.52) (-43.84) (-35.23)
Adjusted R2 0.475       0.476       0.424       0.392       0.371       0.356       0.305       0.490       0.461          0.407          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
#Observations 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024
Lower Index Firms: Companies with Market Cap. < £10b
Ln Market Cap 0.20 *** 0.30 *** 0.34 *** 0.34 *** 0.32 *** 0.30 *** -0.20 *** -0.20 *** -0.07 *** -0.11 ***
(50.99) (72.84) (88.94) (90.50) (84.52) (79.86) (-16.03) (-18.53) (-6.91) (-9.29)
Ln Price 0.04 *** 0.07 *** 0.06 *** 0.08 *** 0.10 *** 0.11 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 ** 0.07 *** 0.11 ***
(13.29) (19.04) (17.97) (25.84) (29.73) (33.08) (3.24) (2.07) (6.87) (10.24)
Ln SD -0.35 *** -0.41 *** -0.45 *** -0.45 *** -0.47 *** -0.47 *** 0.31 *** 0.38 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 ***
(-96.77) (-101.99) (-125.22) (-129.27) (-132.80) (-133.10) (26.79) (37.19) (14.60) (14.28)
Ln Total Volume 0.26 *** 0.33 *** 0.34 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** -0.28 *** -0.11 *** 0.19 *** 0.20 ***
(66.43) (77.23) (86.61) (85.41) (85.04) (85.18) (-22.76) (-10.09) (18.84) (17.47)
Proportion Dark -0.08 *** -0.12 *** -0.12 *** -0.12 *** -0.11 *** -0.11 *** 0.22 *** 0.15 *** -0.12 *** -0.12 ***
(-19.52) (-26.01) (-28.95) (-28.73) (-27.49) (-26.50) (15.31) (11.88) (-9.65) (-8.86)
Dark_Fragmentation -0.08 *** -0.11 *** -0.13 *** -0.14 *** -0.13 *** -0.11 *** 0.09 *** 0.26 *** -0.20 *** -0.20 ***
(-17.64) (-21.17) (-28.77) (-29.59) (-27.21) (-23.95) (5.93) (19.92) (-15.28) (-14.05)
Lit_Fragmentation -0.39 *** 0.04 *** 0.20 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.22 *** -0.30 *** 0.07 *** -0.47 *** -0.36 ***
(-86.18) (8.59) (44.99) (56.53) (55.36) (50.68) (-20.68) (5.97) (-37.95) (-26.62)
Adjusted R2 0.586       0.507       0.601       0.613       0.608       0.600       0.253       0.445       0.461          0.348          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
#Observations 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779
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Table 8, Panels A and B, contain the unstandardised coefficients for global and local order books, 
respectively.  We refer to unstandardised coefficients as they are easier to interpret.  However, we 
do also include standardised residuals in Table 7 in order to better gauge which independent 
measure has a greater impact on our dependent variables.  Please note that all figures referenced 
from Table 8 are significant at the 1% level. 
As indicated in Panels A and B of Table 8, we find that lit order book fragmentation has a significant 
effect on quoted spreads.  Global order book spreads are more than halved, indicated by a 
coefficient of -0.55, when we move from a completely consolidated market with a lit fragmentation 
measure of 0 (i.e. 1 lit venue) to a completely fragmented market with a lit fragmentation measure 
of 1 (i.e. numerous competing lit venues).  Another way that this can be stated is that for every 
increase in fragmentation of 0.01 global quoted spreads decrease by 0.55%.  Local order book 
spreads decrease by 33% when we move from a perfectly consolidated to a perfectly fragmented 
market, as indicated in Table 5 Panel B. This supports hypothesis 1 in that we anticipate that the 
local order book will not be able to compete with the price savings of their newly formed 
competitors.  The improved effects of competition are also observed by the decrease in both global 
and local realised and effective spreads. These findings contradict those made by Bennet and Wei 
(2006), Gajewski and Gresse (2007), Madhavan (1995), Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996), 
Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), and Zhu (2012) but are consistent with studies across both 
upper and lower index firms and with theory presented by Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2011), 
Gresse (2012), Fong, Madhavan, and Swan (2004), and Foucault and Menkveld (2008)  who argue 
that both global and local spreads tighten with increased lit order book fragmentation, meaning that 
the local exchange is able to respond to increased competition by matching any price reductions 
available at competing venues.   
A transition from perfect consolidation to perfect fragmentation reduces global realised and 
effective spreads by 128% and 93%, respectively, and local realised and effective spreads by 103% 
and 73%, respectively.  This indicates an improvement in transaction costs which also supports our 
first hypothesis. 
 Global and local depth decreases at the best price level as indicated by their coefficients of –0.04 
and   -0.95, respectively.  As expected, quoted depth was reduced by a larger extent in the local 
order book.  This is to be expected as smaller liquidity suppliers are not able to match the rebate 
induced savings afforded to their larger, more competitive, counterparts.  This also helps explain 
why depth decreases at the best price level but increases deeper within the order book.  Panels A 
and B in Table 8 show that depth increases by 149% and 25% for global and local order books, 
respectively, when we include stocks offered at prices up to 10 basis points away from the midpoint 
of the best available bid/ask spread (Depth(10)).  Therefore, while not all liquidity suppliers are 
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equally competitive, rebates and discounts allow for increased share offerings closer to the best 
price level.   
Table (8) Global and Local Unstandardised Regression Results 
The table contains information on the results of our regression analysis.  Panel A contains Global order 
book data while Panel B contains local order book data.  Quoted depth is measured as the value of 
stocks (£) at the best price level at the primary exchange (London Stock Exchange).  Depth(X) is the 
value of stocks (£) at various distances, in basis points, from the local quoted depth.  All depths were 
transformed with the Ln function due to the skewness of the data. Quoted spread, price impact, 
realised spread, and effective spread were measured in basis points prior to the Ln transformation 
required due to the skewness of the data. Market Cap, Price, SD, and Total Volume are the control 
variables.  Dark volume is a measure of the total daily value (£) of dark order transactions.  Proportion 
dark is the percentage of total orders executed in the dark.  HHI Lit is the measure of lit order book 
fragmentation as measured by 1- ‘Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’.  HHI Dark (Consolidated) is the 
measure of dark order book fragmentation as measured by 1- ‘Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’ when 
implicit order book consolidation through liquidity sharing is considered, while HHI Dark 
(Unconsolidated) does not consider implicit consolidation.  Coefficients are presented first with the 
corresponding T-stats presented in parenthesis below.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1,5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Global Order Book 
 
LN Quoted 
Depth
LN 
Depth10
LN 
Depth20
LN 
Depth30
LN 
Depth40
LN 
Depth50
LN 
Quoted 
Spread
LN Price 
Impact
LN 
Realised 
Spread
LN 
Effective 
Spread
All Companies
Ln Market Cap 0.13 *** 0.35 *** 0.31 *** 0.27 *** 0.25 *** 0.22 *** -0.08 *** -0.07 *** -0.13 *** -0.14 ***
(35.75) (71.12) (63.80) (58.75) (54.90) (52.63) (-23.29) (-14.94) (20.22) (21.04)
Ln Price -0.13 *** 0.04 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.01 * 0.03 *** -0.02 *** -0.01
(-2.55) (-11.05) (-8.81) (-9.03) (-8.14) (-7.37) (20.71) (13.42) (-8.21) (-10.03)
Ln SD -0.53 *** -0.66 *** -0.61 *** -0.60 *** -0.60 *** -0.59 *** 0.14 *** 0.39 *** 0.08 *** 0.13 ***
(5.84) (-5.34) (-1.17) (-2.23) (-0.14) (1.76) (4.97) (15.37) (-11.93) (-10.66)
Ln Total Volume 0.22 *** 0.45 *** 0.36 *** 0.33 *** 0.31 *** 0.30 *** -0.08 *** -0.07 *** 0.13 *** 0.12 ***
(-2.22) (78.08) (97.46) (98.68) (91.74) (84.94) (-53.29) (12.04) (-69.57) (-55.37)
Proportion Dark -0.08 ** -0.34 *** -0.24 *** -0.25 *** -0.23 *** -0.21 *** 0.35 *** 0.31 *** -0.25 *** -0.28 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dark_Fragmentation 0.09 *** -0.09 *** -0.02 -0.03 ** 0.00 0.03 * 0.04 *** 0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.15 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lit_Fragmentation -0.04 ** 1.49 *** 1.66 *** 1.68 *** 1.58 *** 1.47 *** -0.55 *** 0.17 *** -1.28 *** -0.93 ***
(0.37) (0.55) (0.49) (0.47) (0.46) (0.45) (0.47) (1.07) (1.25) (1.32)
Adjusted R2 0.260         0.481       0.484       0.460       0.430       0.406       0.337       0.435       0.475       0.391       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
#Observations 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803
Upper Index Firms: Companies with Market Cap. > £10b
Ln Market Cap 0.22 *** 0.46 *** 0.44 *** 0.39 *** 0.36 *** 0.35 *** -0.28 *** -0.25 *** -0.32 *** -0.30 ***
(15.31) (34.76) (32.74) (28.81) (26.68) (25.18) (-33.39) (-21.01) (-19.29) (-20.04)
Ln Price -0.33 *** -0.07 *** -0.13 *** -0.17 *** -0.20 *** -0.23 *** -0.02 *** 0.04 *** -0.07 *** -0.05 ***
(-27.76) (-6.85) (-12.28) (-15.77) (-18.41) (-20.46) (-5.73) (6.01) (-8.18) (-7.04)
Ln SD -0.53 *** -0.63 *** -0.60 *** -0.59 *** -0.58 *** -0.57 *** 0.12 *** 0.46 *** 0.03 ** 0.09 ***
(-81.32) (-103.52) (-100.67) (-98.46) (-95.62) (-93.25) (21.98) (58.27) (2.56) (9.59)
Ln Total Volume 0.11 *** 0.35 *** 0.29 *** 0.25 *** 0.22 *** 0.21 *** -0.08 *** -0.10 *** 0.13 *** 0.12 ***
(8.67) (29.97) (23.91) (20.48) (18.12) (16.86) (-16.12) (-14.32) (13.51) (14.25)
Proportion Dark 0.51 *** 0.60 *** 0.55 *** 0.53 *** 0.53 *** 0.52 *** 0.32 *** 0.41 *** -0.36 *** -0.41 ***
(8.18) (10.61) (9.55) (9.21) (8.99) (8.71) (14.52) (12.83) (-8.16) (-10.18)
Dark_Fragmentation 0.23 *** 0.24 *** 0.18 *** 0.14 *** 0.16 *** 0.17 *** -0.01 0.11 *** -0.18 *** -0.17 ***
(7.22) (8.21) (6.20) (4.84) (5.40) (5.66) (-1.22) (6.56) (-7.88) (-8.16)
Lit_Fragmentation -0.33 *** 1.15 *** 1.29 *** 1.24 *** 1.13 *** 1.04 *** -0.50 *** 0.21 *** -1.34 *** -0.99 ***
(-8.44) (32.66) (36.30) (34.71) (31.05) (28.25) (-38.10) (11.21) (-51.17) (-41.95)
Adjusted R2 0.247         0.397       0.370       0.343       0.323       0.308       0.372       0.485       0.505       0.437       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
#Observations 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024
Lower Index Firms: Companies with Market Cap. < £10b
Ln Market Cap 0.21 *** 0.56 *** 0.39 *** 0.38 *** 0.34 *** 0.31 *** -0.09 *** -0.15 *** -0.04 *** -0.08 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln Price 0.05 *** 0.20 *** 0.05 *** 0.08 *** 0.09 *** 0.10 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.08 *** 0.08 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln SD -0.40 *** -0.59 *** -0.50 *** -0.49 *** -0.49 *** -0.47 *** 0.15 *** 0.32 *** 0.15 *** 0.17 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln Total Volume 0.28 *** 0.53 *** 0.40 *** 0.38 *** 0.37 *** 0.35 *** -0.10 *** -0.07 *** 0.12 *** 0.11 ***
(45.45) (77.84) (92.38) (94.38) (86.41) (80.24) (-12.03) (-14.33) (-3.44) (-7.02)
Proportion Dark -0.42 *** -0.99 *** -0.76 *** -0.75 *** -0.69 *** -0.64 *** 0.43 *** 0.40 *** -0.28 *** -0.25 ***
(13.28) (36.55) (15.76) (25.26) (29.45) (32.39) (7.95) (6.38) (8.64) (9.45)
Dark_Fragmentation -0.15 *** -0.39 *** -0.27 *** -0.28 *** -0.25 *** -0.22 *** 0.09 *** 0.31 *** -0.30 *** -0.23 ***
(-93.42) (-91.07) (-130.08) (-133.21) (-134.58) (-132.47) (26.67) (41.64) (16.46) (19.87)
Lit_Fragmentation 0.16 *** 1.68 *** 1.91 *** 1.98 *** 1.90 *** 1.78 *** -0.64 *** 0.02 -1.17 *** -0.83 ***
(67.07) (83.77) (107.62) (107.87) (105.15) (102.27) (-20.63) (-10.32) (14.66) (14.77)
Adjusted R2 0.407 0.555 0.713 0.733 0.722 0.706 0.308 0.417 0.482 0.381
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
#Observations 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Panel B: Local Order Book 
 
A visual representation of the above effect on depth can be seen in Figures 10 and 11.   In Figure 10, 
we can see that after the introduction of MiFID and the resulting fragmentation beginning on 
November 1 2007, depth deeper in the order book reaches levels higher than those prior to the 
introduction of MiFID, while depth at the quoted level remains fairly constant.  On the contrary, 
Figure 11 shows that after the introduction of MiFID local order book depth at the best price level 
was not able to recover to the levels it reached previously.  
LN Quoted 
Depth
LN 
Depth10
LN 
Depth20
LN 
Depth30
LN 
Depth40
LN 
Depth50
LN 
Quoted 
Spread
LN Price 
Impact
LN 
Realised 
Spread
LN 
Effective 
Spread
All Companies
Ln Market Cap 0.23 *** 0.45 *** 0.42 *** 0.39 *** 0.36 *** 0.33 *** -0.07 *** -0.08 *** -0.13 *** -0.14 ***
(64.58) (83.54) (82.78) (77.84) (75.57) (74.63) (-28.35) (-14.48) (23.32) (23.22)
Ln Price -0.08 *** 0.01 *** -0.01 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.03 *** -0.04 *** -0.02 ***
(-25.86) (-22.62) (-24.17) (-22.77) (-22.00) (-22.21) (19.93) (13.10) (-11.88) (-12.62)
Ln SD -0.13 *** -0.15 *** -0.17 *** -0.20 *** -0.20 *** -0.20 *** 0.19 *** 0.37 *** 0.08 *** 0.07 ***
(-39.59) (-51.57) (-59.76) (-59.11) (-54.69) (-50.45) (1.19) (14.36) (-14.41) (-13.31)
Ln Total Volume 0.22 *** 0.37 *** 0.32 *** 0.29 *** 0.28 *** 0.27 *** -0.11 *** -0.07 *** 0.14 *** 0.13 ***
(-94.79) (17.72) (53.13) (59.25) (54.26) (48.30) (-29.08) (19.13) (-59.58) (-45.51)
Proportion Dark -0.42 *** -0.48 *** -0.45 *** -0.42 *** -0.40 *** -0.39 *** 0.37 *** 0.30 *** -0.34 *** -0.33 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dark_Fragmentation -0.33 *** -0.57 *** -0.57 *** -0.56 *** -0.51 *** -0.46 *** 0.01 0.17 *** -0.21 *** -0.18 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lit_Fragmentation -0.95 *** 0.23 *** 0.61 *** 0.67 *** 0.60 *** 0.53 *** -0.33 *** 0.27 *** -1.03 *** -0.73 ***
(0.22) (0.28) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (1.03) (1.01) (1.31) (1.37)
Adjusted R2 0.531         0.561       0.589       0.567       0.544       0.525       0.301       0.449       0.444       0.356       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
#Observations 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803 92803
Upper Index Firms: Companies with Market Cap. > £10b
Ln Market Cap 0.23 *** 0.46 *** 0.46 *** 0.42 *** 0.39 *** 0.37 *** -0.24 *** -0.25 *** -0.28 *** -0.28 ***
(37.49) (71.33) (67.96) (62.36) (59.07) (56.54) (-24.40) (-21.18) (-17.68) (-19.59)
Ln Price -0.30 *** -0.11 *** -0.14 *** -0.16 *** -0.18 *** -0.20 *** -0.02 *** 0.04 *** -0.08 *** -0.07 ***
(-60.43) (-20.33) (-26.23) (-29.71) (-33.71) (-37.57) (-4.58) (7.14) (-10.56) (-10.32)
Ln SD -0.07 *** -0.05 *** -0.08 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** 0.21 *** 0.45 *** 0.05 *** 0.03 ***
(-27.52) (-20.00) (-29.00) (-37.81) (-40.20) (-40.31) (32.19) (57.07) (4.36) (2.86)
Ln Total Volume 0.18 *** 0.33 *** 0.28 *** 0.25 *** 0.24 *** 0.22 *** -0.12 *** -0.10 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 ***
(33.42) (57.30) (47.30) (42.48) (39.67) (37.96) (-21.24) (-14.20) (13.33) (14.20)
Proportion Dark -0.40 *** -0.19 *** -0.20 *** -0.14 *** -0.13 *** -0.16 *** 0.44 *** 0.46 *** -0.40 *** -0.45 ***
(-15.26) (-6.94) (-6.76) (-4.88) (-4.58) (-5.58) (16.72) (14.21) (-9.46) (-11.67)
Dark_Fragmentation -0.42 *** -0.55 *** -0.62 *** -0.62 *** -0.58 *** -0.54 *** -0.06 *** 0.07 *** -0.21 *** -0.20 ***
(-31.70) (-39.10) (-42.20) (-42.44) (-39.65) (-37.69) (-4.26) (4.54) (-9.61) (-10.13)
Lit_Fragmentation -1.08 *** 0.17 *** 0.46 *** 0.42 *** 0.33 *** 0.26 *** -0.37 *** 0.28 *** -1.09 *** -0.79 ***
(-65.87) (9.94) (25.40) (23.76) (18.61) (14.98) (-24.06) (14.52) (-43.84) (-35.23)
Adjusted R2 0.223         0.476       0.424       0.392       0.371       0.356       0.305       0.490       0.461       0.407       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
#Observations 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024 42024
Lower Index Firms: Companies with Market Cap. < £10b
Ln Market Cap 0.21 *** 0.48 *** 0.44 *** 0.43 *** 0.39 *** 0.36 *** -0.13 *** -0.19 *** -0.08 *** -0.11 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln Price 0.04 *** 0.10 *** 0.07 *** 0.09 *** 0.10 *** 0.11 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ** 0.06 *** 0.09 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln SD -0.37 *** -0.61 *** -0.56 *** -0.57 *** -0.56 *** -0.54 *** 0.16 *** 0.27 *** 0.13 *** 0.12 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln Total Volume 0.25 *** 0.45 *** 0.38 *** 0.36 *** 0.35 *** 0.34 *** -0.12 *** -0.06 *** 0.14 *** 0.13 ***
(50.99) (72.84) (88.94) (90.50) (84.52) (79.86) (-16.03) (-18.53) (-6.91) (-9.29)
Proportion Dark -0.35 *** -0.73 *** -0.61 *** -0.59 *** -0.54 *** -0.50 *** 0.42 *** 0.39 *** -0.38 *** -0.33 ***
(13.29) (19.04) (17.97) (25.84) (29.73) (33.08) (3.24) (2.07) (6.87) (10.24)
Dark_Fragmentation -0.17 *** -0.32 *** -0.33 *** -0.33 *** -0.29 *** -0.25 *** 0.09 *** 0.35 *** -0.32 *** -0.28 ***
(-96.77) (-101.99) (-125.22) (-129.27) (-132.80) (-133.10) (26.79) (37.19) (14.60) (14.28)
Lit_Fragmentation -0.96 *** 0.15 *** 0.58 *** 0.71 *** 0.67 *** 0.60 *** -0.35 *** 0.12 *** -0.92 *** -0.61 ***
(66.43) (77.23) (86.61) (85.41) (85.04) (85.18) (-22.76) (-10.09) (18.84) (17.47)
Adjusted R2 0.445 0.507 0.601 0.613 0.608 0.600 0.253 0.445 0.461 0.348
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
#Observations 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779 50779
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Figure (10) Average Global Depth for all FTSE-100 stocks 
The figure shows the daily average depth(£) at various levels for all FTSE-100 stocks in the study 
for the consolidated global order book.  We begin with quoted at the best price level and move 
to depth at various distances away from the midpoint of the best bid-ask spread.  The legend 
displays labels for lines in the order in which they appear in the graph, with quoted depth being 
the lowest line and depth at 50 basis points above and below the midpoints of the quoted depth 
at the top.  
We propose that improved liquidity in the global order book is due to the effects of increased 
competition in the lit order book market.  New exchanges have attracted liquidity, by offering 
reductions in transaction costs for those supplying liquidity to the market.  This results in the 
migration of market makers to the newly formed regulated markets where they can offer better 
prices, in the form of tighter spreads, due to the cost savings offered to them by the exchange for 
supplying liquidity.  Our findings on spreads and transaction costs support the findings by Degryse, 
de Jong, and van Kervel (2011) and Gresse (2012) who argue that the local exchange adapts and 
offers a reduction in spreads in order to remain competitive.  As a result, and in accordance with the 
aforementioned studies, we find that visible order book fragmentation improves the market for 
retail and institutional investors alike in terms of pricing and transaction costs. 
In summary, we conclude that market quality improves as a result of increased lit order book 
fragmentation.  However, retail investors will not experience benefits to the same extent as 
institutional investors.  
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Figure (11) Average Local Depth for all FTSE-100 stocks 
The figure shows the daily average depth(£) at various levels for all FTSE-100 stocks in the study 
for the local order book of the primary exchange (London Stock Exchange).  We begin with quoted 
at the best price level and move to depth at various distances away from the midpoint of the best 
bid-ask spread.  The legend displays labels for lines in the order in which they appear in the graph, 
with quoted depth being the lowest line and depth at 50 basis points above and below the 
midpoints of the quoted depth at the top. 
9.2 Dark Market Share  
In this section we present our findings regarding the market quality implications of an increased 
market share for dark liquidity.  Increases in the market share of dark liquidity (Proportion_Dark) 
imply a migration of orders from lit to dark exchanges. We continue to refer to Panels A and B of 
Table 8 when discussing global and local order book results, respectively. In existing studies, dark 
market share is the measure used to represent dark fragmentation.  Please note that all coefficients 
in this section are significant at the 1% level.  For findings regarding the effects of actual dark order 
book fragmentation, as opposed to dark order book market share, please refer to the following 
section, Section 9.3. 
In Table 8 Panel A, we observe that the global quoted spreads widen by 35% when the market 
moves from using no dark liquidity to only dark liquidity.  Upper and lower firms experience a 
widening of spreads to the extent of 32% and 43%, respectively.  In Table 8 Panel B we observe that 
local quoted spreads widen by 37% with upper and lower firms’ spreads widening by 44% and 42%, 
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respectively, when the market moves from using no dark liquidity to only dark liquidity.  In other 
words, when fragmentation increases by 0.01, or 1%, as measured by 1-HHI , global and local quoted 
spreads widen by 0.35% and 0.37% respectively.  
Global spread results support our second hypothesis that trades for lower market capitalisation 
firms, who are less liquid, are more informative and their resulting impact on spreads is greater than 
the migration of less informative upper index share trades. 
Our findings partly contradict the theoretical predictions and empirical results made by Buti, Rindi, 
and Werner (2010) and (2011), respectively, as well as the findings by O’Hara and Ye (2011).  They 
argue that global market quality improves while local market quality worsens as orders migrate from 
lit to dark. We argue that increased migration, represented by a higher dark order book market 
share, has a negative effect on both global and local order books.   
Our findings partly contradict the theoretical predictions and empirical results made by Buti, Rindi, 
and Werner (2010) and (2011), respectively, as well as the findings by O’Hara and Ye (2011).  They 
argue that global market quality improves while local market quality worsens as orders migrate from 
lit to dark. We argue that increased migration, represented by a higher dark order book market 
share, has a negative effect on both global and local order books.   
Globally and locally, any use of dark liquidity has a negative effect on price efficiency as indicated by 
price impact coefficients of 0.3 and 0.31 respectively.  This implies that moving from a market that 
uses no dark liquidity to one that uses dark liquidity exclusively increases the price impact of a trade 
by roughly 30%.   
Our results regarding price efficiency support the empirical findings of Weaver (2011), Nimalendran 
and Ray (2011), and Forde and Putnins (2012).  The findings of the aforementioned studies support 
our second hypothesis in that the increase in price impact and the widening of quoted spreads 
results from greater information asymmetry caused by the migration of informative trades from the 
lit to the dark order book.  Our results regarding price efficiency also support the findings of Zhu 
(2012) who argues the results are consistent with the concept of cream-skimming.  However, while 
we agree with Weaver (2011) and Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2011) who conclude that overall 
market quality is reduced when faced with increased dark liquidity trading, we disagree with the 
idea that global liquidity is improved at the expense of local liquidity.  We argue that both global and 
local liquidity is made worse off by the increased migrations of orders to the dark order book.  
As trades migrate from the lit order book to the dark order book, the resulting effects on depth are 
negative.  Global and local quoted depths decrease by 0.08% and 0.42% for every increase in dark 
market share of 1%.  As we move slightly deeper into the order book, 10 basis points from the 
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midpoint of the best bid/ask price, we find that global and local depth decreases by 0.34% and 
0.48% for every increase in dark market share of 1%.  This is expected as we mention previously in 
this section that the migration of informed orders to the dark market reduces investor confidence in 
advertised prices.  This results in more investors moving away from posting quotes near the best 
price level as they are no longer confident in the price and prefer to protect their positions by 
offering less competitive prices. 
In summary, we find that market quality suffers as trades migrate from lit to dark order book 
markets due to increased information asymmetry resulting from the loss of informed trades in the 
visible order book. 
9.3 Dark Fragmentation  
In this section we focus on the effect of dark order book fragmentation on market quality.  As we are 
the first study to explicitly measure dark order book fragmentation, and all previous empirical and 
theoretical papers focus on order flow migration as in Section 9.2, we do not have any previous 
studies to which we can directly compare our results.   
We find that, contrary to our hypothesis, increased fragmentation in the dark order book results in 
wider spreads in the global order book, with a coefficient of 0.04, while the effect on the local order 
book is insignificant.  This implies that when we move from a perfectly consolidated to a perfectly 
fragmented dark order book market, global spreads only widen by 4%.  This effect is quite small, 
implying that the effects of dark order book fragmentation are not nearly as influential on market 
quality as order migration to the dark order book and lit market fragmentation. Again, unless 
otherwise stated, each coefficient in this section has been found to be significant at the 1% level. 
However, the sign for the coefficient is positive which is not expected.  Upon further inspection of 
our independent variables we notice that the correlation between dark fragmentation and dark 
market share is 0.53 and the correlation between dark fragmentation and dark volume 0.49. 
Hypothesis 3 revolves around the assumption that increased fragmentation in dark order books 
leads to a decrease in dark volume and market share due to a decreased probability of execution 
resulting from the dispersion of orders across multiple exchanges.  In contrast, our correlation 
coefficients indicate that dark markets are more popular when order books are fragmented, not less 
popular.  We first consider whether this could be due to inaccuracy in the dark fragmentation 
measure prior to the introduction of MiFID, as we mention in Section 7.6 that many dark trades 
went unreported prior to the introduction of MiFID, hence the large spike in dark trading 
immediately on November 1 2007.  To check whether the pre-MiFID data is heavily influencing our 
results, we inspect the correlation between the pairs of variables during the post MiFID period.  We 
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find no major deviations from the previous pattern and observe a correlation between dark 
fragmentation and dark volume of 0.359 and dark fragmentation and dark market share of 0.301. 
The relationship between dark order book fragmentation, dark market share, dark volume and 
probability of execution must be studied further in order to understand why fragmented dark 
markets can support more trades.  We argue that this is partially due to our understanding of dark 
trading prior its increase in popularity.  When dark markets were in their infancy and supported few 
customers it is likely that it was difficult to find an opposing party to the trade.  However, since the 
introduction of MiFID dark markets have increased in popularity and now consist of 29.4% of total 
trading volume versus 8% back in pre-MiFID times, as indicated in Table 2.  This supports the idea 
that a fragmented dark order book today can support customers to the same extent as a 
consolidated dark order book prior to the introduction of MiFID and that the number of dark pools 
can fluctuate in order to serve a growing client base.  If we expand this concept to several dark order 
book markets what we are left with are multiple dark order books who, individually, can maintain a 
reasonable probability of execution and support trade execution due to the increase in orders.  In 
this case, fragmentation, to some extent, can benefit dark pool transactions as investors can break 
up large orders and not only hide them within a single dark pool, but across multiple dark pools.  
Spreading a large order across multiple venues provides greater trade anonymity since it is more 
difficult to detect large orders spread across multiple venues than across a single venue.   
This form of self-regulation is likely behind the phenomenon that while the number of 
unconsolidated dark trading venues has increased over the study period, as indicated in Figure 2, the 
number of consolidated trading venues has remained fairly constant. This indicates that while dark 
trading form in order to serve a growing client base, there is a limit to the number of dark order 
books that can operate successfully.  Dark trading venues will form liquidity partnerships as 
necessary in order to maintain a reasonable probability of execution in order to meet the needs of 
their clients. 
If we take into consideration our adjusted assumption that increased fragmentation is correlated 
with increased migration to dark markets, it follows that spreads should widen and price impact 
should increase as indicated in Section 9.2.  The results are driven by the concept of informative 
trades leaving the lit order book market and moving to the dark, leaving behind investors whose 
confidence in quoted prices decreases.  The result is a widening of global spreads by 0.04% for every 
increase in dark order book fragmentation of 0.01, or 1%, which supports our third hypothesis. 
In summary, dark order book fragmentation harms market quality by widening spreads, however the 
extent of the impact is minimal. 
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10.0 Conclusion 
Over half of the USA’s residents report that they own a stock directly or through investment vehicles 
and, according to Mary Jo White of the Consumer Federation of America, this is representative of all 
developed economies. This implies that the majority of households are directly connected to the 
securities market. Therefore, comprehensive regulatory policies may need to be adapted in order 
maintain investor confidence and support our financial markets. 
The dark order book market has significantly fragmented since the introduction of MiFID. However, 
if implicit consolidation of order books is considered, the market is only slightly more fragmented 
than its visible liquidity counterpart, as presented in Figure 4.  In fact, dark markets are able to self-
regulate the number of distinct order books that are offer dark liquidity.  This is observed in the 
consolidated measure in Figure 2 which indicates that regulation regarding the number of dark 
trading venues in operation is unwarranted and that these policies should not be enacted. 
Lit order book fragmentation has a largely positive effect on overall market quality in the form of 
tighter quoted spreads and lower realised and effective spreads resulting from increased market 
competition for liquidity.  However, effects are greater in the consolidated global order book 
compared to the primary exchange, as represented by the London Stock Exchange, implying that 
institutional investors are able to realise greater benefits than retail investors. 
Increased dark order book activity in the form of order migration from the lit to the dark market has 
a negative overall effect on both global and local order books. Dark trades are found to contain 
information and, as these trades migrate to the dark market, greater information asymmetry among 
investors leads to a reduction in market quality in the form of wider spreads and greater price 
impact. 
Dark order book fragmentation has a negative impact on market quality in the form of wider spreads 
and greater price impact. However, the effects are more than overshadowed by the effect of lit 
order book fragmentation and order migration to dark order books. 
Our research supports the discussion surrounding the market quality implications of increased 
activity in the dark order book market and provides policymakers with the necessary information to 
make informed decisions regarding the policies that govern the financial market.  We argue that 
regulators can largely ignore dark order book fragmentation but must pay special attention to the 
migration of orders to the dark market.  If dark liquidity is too widely available and its use 
encouraged, leading to a rise in dark order market share, the effect will be negative across all 
individual exchanges and across the market as a whole.  However, competition for visible liquidity 
should be encouraged. 
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11.0 Discussion 
The creation of a distinct measure of dark order market fragmentation can be applied to price 
discovery and adverse selection studies.  The concept of consolidated liquidity can also be extended 
to lit exchanges.   With the advent of SORT in lit trading venues as well as their dark counterparts, 
participants can automatically send their orders to multiple trading venues.  Therefore it will be 
beneficial to identify the implicit consolidation events in the lit markets and, in combination with 
those of the dark order market, study their effects on market quality. 
The main limitation of the study is the accuracy of the dark fragmentation measure. As mentioned in 
the introduction, 49% of dark trading activity cannot be assigned to a particular trading venue.  As a 
result, we have to evenly weigh the output across all trading venues who report to the trade 
reporting facility Markit BOAT.  An accurate proxy could not be found due to inconsistencies in trade 
reporting.   
Another limitation is the accuracy of the consolidation measures as reported by the fragmentation 
and consolidation timeline.  The timeline organises fragmentation and consolidation events in the 
dark order book market by categorizing the press releases from and articles pertaining to various 
dark order book operators.  However, there exist some gaps in the timeline.  As the contents of 
Markit BOAT’s consolidated tape must be attributed to a series of dark liquidity venues it is 
important to know exactly how many venues are reporting to Markit BOAT at any given time.  
Unfortunately, Markit BOAT’s press releases are not as frequent as those by some liquidity 
providers.  This results in gaps in the data. For example, on June 29 2010 Markit BOAT issued a press 
release regarding the inclusion of Instinet BlockMatch trades to the consolidated tape and included 
the names of several reporting venues for whom an explicit announcement was not made. The 
result was a significant spike in the number of trading venues as indicated in Figure 2. This is a 
limitation to the measure and results from imperfect reporting by the trading venues or trade 
reporting firms.   
This will result in small periods where the fragmentation is either slightly over or under reported.  
We do not, however, feel that this will cause any significant error in our findings as the difference in 
the HHI when dark trading is spread across 30 versus 35 indistinguishable venues, for example, is 
minimal. Due to the nature of the fragmentation measure we find that even when our count of 
pooled transaction reporting venues is adjusted up or down by up to eight companies the overall 
effect is minimal. 
In future versions of this study we will include the results originating from an instrumental variables 
regression.  This will help take into consideration the fact that relationships between the regressors 
and the dependent variables are not necessarily uni-directional. We can also take into consideration 
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that fragmentation, both dark and lit, may only be beneficial or harmful to a certain extent and that 
an ideal level of fragmentation may exist in the those markets. 
  
76 
 
References 
1. Achuthakumar, R. (2009). Dark Pools of Liquidity. Wipro Technolgies. 
2. Altunata S, Rakhlin D, Waelbroeck H. (2010). Adverse selection vs. opportunistic savings in 
dark aggregators. The Journal of Trading; 5(1):16-28.  
3. Bennett, P., Wei, L. (2006). Market structure, fragmentation, and market quality. Journal of 
Financial Markets, 9, pp. 49–78. 
4. Bessembinder, H., & Kaufman, H. M. (1997). A comparison of trade execution costs for NYSE 
and NASDAQ-listed stocks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32(3). 
5. Boni L, Brown D, Leach J. (2012). Dark pool exclusivity matters. Working Paper, University of 
New Mexico, University of Arizona, University of Colorado at Boulder.  
6. Brandes, Y., & Domowitz, I. (2010). Alternative Trading Systems in Europe: Trading 
Performance by European Venues Post-MiFID. The Journal of Trading, 5(3), 17-30. 
7. Buti S, Rindi B, Werner I. (2010). Dynamic dark pool trading strategies in limit order markets. 
Working Paper, Dice Centre;6.  
8. Buti S, Rindi B, Werner I. (2011). Diving into dark pools. Working Paper, Dice Centre 
9. Chowhdry, B., & Nanda, V. (1991). Multimarket trading and market liquidity. Review of 
Financial Studies, 4(3), 483-511. 
10. Conrad J, Johnson KM, Wahal S. (2003). Institutional trading and alternative trading systems.  
J Financ Econ.;70(1):99-134.  
11. Davies R. (2008). MiFID and a changing competitive landscape. Working Paper, Babson 
College 
12. Degryse, H., De Jong, F., & Van Kervel, V. (2011). The impact of dark trading and visible 
fragmentation on market quality. Centre for Economic Policy Research.  
13. Easley, D., Kiefer, N. M., & O'Hara, M. (1996). Cream-Skimming or Profit-Sharing? The 
Curious Role of Purchased Order Flow. Journal of Finance, 51(3), 811-33. 
14. Foley S, Malinova K, Park A. (2012). Dark trading on public exchanges. Working Paper, 
University of Sydney, University of Toronto  
15. Fong K, Madhavan A, Swan PL. (2004). Upstairs, downstairs: Does the upstairs market hurt 
the downstairs. Working Paper, University of New South Wales  
16. Forde C, Putnins T. (2012). Dark trading and price discovery. Working Paper, University of 
Melbourne, University of Technology - Sydney 
17. Foucault T, Menkveld AJ. (2008). Competition for order flow and smart order routing systems. 
The Journal of Finance.;63(1):119-158.  
18. Gajewski, J. F., & Gresse, C. (2007). Centralised order books versus hybrid order books: A 
paired comparison of trading costs on NSC (Euronext Paris) and SETS (London Stock 
Exchange). Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(9), 2906-2924. 
19. Gresse, C. (2006). The Effect of Crossing‐Network Trading on Dealer Market's Bid‐Ask Spreads. 
European Financial Management, 12(2), 143-160. 
20. Gresse C. (2012). Effects of the competition between multiple trading platforms on market 
liquidity: Evidence from the MiFID experience. Working Paper, Université Paris-Dauphine 
21. Hendershott, T., & Riordan, R. (2009). Algorithmic trading and information. Manuscript, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
77 
 
22. Henker, T., & Wang, J. X. (2006). On the importance of timing specifications in market 
microstructure research. Journal of Financial Markets, 9(2), 162-179. 
23. Kratz, P., & Schöneborn, T. (2013). Optimal liquidation in dark pools. EFA 2009 Bergen 
Meetings Paper. 
24. Lefebvre, J. (2010). Block trades and market liquidity on Euronext Paris. Paris December 2010 
Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI-AFFI. 
25. Madhavan, A. (1995). Consolidation, fragmentation, and the disclosure of trading information. 
Review of Financial Studies, 8(3), 579-603. 
26. Mendelson, H. (1987). Consolidation, fragmentation, and market performance. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 22(02), 189-207. 
27. Mittal H. (2008) Are you playing in a toxic dark pool? The Journal of Trading.;3(3):20-33.  
28. Naes, R., & Ødegaard, B. A. (2006). Equity trading by institutional investors: To cross or not to 
cross? Journal of Financial Markets, 9(2), 79-99. 
29. Nimalendran, M., & Ray, S. (2014). Informational linkages between dark and lit trading 
venues. Journal of Financial Markets, 17, 230-261. 
30. O'Hara M, Ye M. (2011) Is market fragmentation harming market quality? J Financ 
Econ.;100(3):459-474.  
31. Pagano, M. (1989). Trading volume and asset liquidity. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
104(2), 255-274. 
32. Ray S. (2010) A match in the dark: Understanding crossing network liquidity. Working Paper, 
University of Florida 
33. Ready M.(2009) Determinants of volume in dark pools. Working Paper, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison 
34. Riordan, R., Storkenmaier, A., & Wagener, M. (2010). Fragmentation, competition and market 
quality: A post-mifid analysis. Working Paper, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology 
35. Saraiya N, Mittal H. (2009). Understanding and avoiding adverse selection in dark pools. 
Investment Technology Group. 
36. Stoll HR. (2006). Electronic trading in stock markets. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives.;20(1):153-174.  
37. Weaver D. (2011) Internalization and market quality in a fragmented market structure. 
Working Paper, Rutgers School of Business 
38. Ye M. (2010) Non-execution and market share of crossing networks. Working Paper,  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
39. Ye M. (2011) A glimpse into the dark: Price formation, transaction cost and market share of 
the crossing network. Transaction Cost and Market Share of the Crossing Network. 
40. Zhu, H. (2013). Do dark pools harm price discovery?. Review of Financial Studies, hht078. 
 
  
78 
 
Appendix A: Supplementary Dataset Information 
This section contains various data pertaining to the dataset used for the study. 
Table (A1) Stock Selection 
The following table contains information regarding the reasons for a FTSE-100 constituent’s 
exclusion from our study.  We began with 102 stocks; greater than 100 as some stocks were late 
additions to the index and only recently replaced members who should be included in the study.  Of 
those 102 index constituents 28 were excluded for not maintaining continuous membership in the 
index throughout the study period while 20 members were excluded for falling into the category of 
‘Financial’ stocks (Excluded stock do not contain a size indicator value for Large).  The result was a 
total of 53 stocks included in the study representing 52 companies; Royal Dutch Shell has both class 
A and B stocks listed as part of the FTSE-100 index.    The remaining 53 stocks are classified as upper 
index stocks (Large = 1) if their average market cap throughout the study period exceeded £10b.  
The size classification resulted 24 ‘under index/ stocks and 29 ‘lower index’ stocks. 
 
FTSE 100 Constituents
Date Added to 
Index
Used in 
Study (1 = 
Yes, 0 = No)
Reason For Exclusion
Notes
Replaced The Following Index 
Members Large
A.b.food (ABF) 18-Dec-00 1 0
Abdn.asset.man. (ADN) 7-Mar-12 0 Fund Management
Admiral Grp (ADM) 24-Dec-07 0 Insurance
Aggreko (AGK) 1-Dec-09 0 Late Addition to Index
Amec (AMEC) 20-Dec-07 0 Late Addition to Index
Anglo American (AAL) 21-Jun-99 1 1
Antofagasta (ANTO) 8-Mar-04 1 0
Arm Hldgs. (ARM) 20-Dec-99 1 0
Astrazeneca (AZN) 6-May-99 1 1
Aviva (AV.) 0 Insurance Originally CGNU
Babcock Intl (BAB) 12-Jun-12 0 Late Addition to Index Man Group (Entered Sep 2001)
Bae Sys. (BA.) 24-Jun-05 1 0
Barclays (BARC) 0 Banking
Bg Grp. (BG.) 24-Jun-05 1 1
Bhp Billiton (BLT) 22-Sep-97 1 Originally Billiton 1
Bp (BP.) 24-Jun-05 1 1
Br.amer.tob. (BATS) 8-Sep-99 1 1
Br.land (BLND) 0 Property
Bskyb (BSY) 19-Sep-95 1 0
Bt Group (BT.A) 19-Nov-01 1 1
Bunzl (BNZL) 30-Apr-08 0 Late Addition to Index
Burberry Grp (BRBY) 1-Sep-09 0 Late Addition to Index
Cairn Energy (CNE) Pre-2007 1 1
Capita Group (CPI) 18-Jun-04 1 0
Carnival (CCL) 24-Dec-01 1 Originally P&O Cruiselines 1
Centrica (CNA) 14-Feb-97 1 0
Cocacola Hbc Ag (CCH)
11-Sep-13 0 Late Addition to Index
Serco(Entered 22 Dec 2008 - Late 
Addition to Index) 
Eurasian Natural Resource Corp 
(Entered 26 March 2008 - Late 
Addition to Index)
Wood Group(Multiple Entries)
Compass Group (CPG) 2-Feb-01 1 0
Crh (CRH) 7-Dec-11 0 Late Addition to Index Inmarsat(Entered 22 Sept 2008)
Croda Intl. (CRDA) 7-Mar-12 0 Late Addition to Index Cairn Energy (Entered 17 Sept 2004)
Diageo (DGE) 17-Dec-97 1 1
Easyjet (EZJ) 6-Mar-13 0 Late Addition to Index  Intu Properties (Financial Company)
Experian (EXPN) 11-Oct-06 1 0
Fresnillo (FRES)
22/09/2008 & 
11/03/2009 0 Multiple Entries into Index
G4s (GFS) 24-Dec-07 0 Late Addition to Index
Gkn (GKN) 29-May-02 1 0
Glaxosmithkline (GSK) 27-Dec-00 1 1
Glencore Xstra (GLEN)
25-May-11 0 Late Addition to Index
Invensys (Entered 23 June 2008 - 
Late Addition to Index)
Hammerson (HMSO) 17-Jun-05 0 Property
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Table (A1) (continued) 
 
FTSE 100 Constituents
Date Added to 
Index
Used in 
Study (1 = 
Yes, 0 = No)
Reason For Exclusion
Notes
Replaced The Following Index 
Members Large
Hargreaves Lans (HL.) 0 Finance
Hsbc Hldgs.uk (HSBA) 0 Banking
Imi (IMI) 8-Dec-10 0 Late Addition to Index
Imp.tobacco Grp (IMT) 27-Jul-00 1 1
Intercon. Hotel (IHG) 25-Jun-05 1 0
Intertek Group (ITRK) 11-Mar-09 0 Late Addition to Index
Intl Consol Air (IAG) 24-Jan-11 0 Late Addition to Index
Itv (ITV)
9-Mar-11 0 Late Addition to Index
Previously left index 
September 2008
Johnson Matthey (JMAT) 24-Jun-02 1 0
Kazakhmys (KAZ) Pre-2007 1 0
Kingfisher (KGF) Pre-2007 1 0
Land Secs. (LAND) 0 Property
Legal&gen. (LGEN) 0 Insurance
Lloyds Grp. (LLOY) 0 Banking
Man Group (EMG) 24-Sep-01 0 Investment
Meggitt (MGGT)
1-Oct-11 0 Late Addition to Index
Autonomy Corp (Entered 22 Sept 
2008 + multiple other dates)
Melrose Ind (MRO) 0 Finance
Mondi (MNDI)
10-Sep-13 0 Late Addition to Index
Entered with Coca-Cola (No 
suitable predecessors)
Morrison (Wm) (MRW) 10-Apr-01 1 0
National Grid (NG.) 11-Dec-95 1 1
Next (NXT) 18-Jun-01 1 0
Old Mutual (OML) 0 Insurance
Pearson (PSON) Original Member 1 1
Persimmon (PSN) 0 Early Exit from Index Exited March 2008
Petrofac (PFC) 23-Jun-08 0 Mutliple Entries into Index
Prudential (PRU) 0 Finance
Randgold Res. (RRS) 22-Dec-08 0 Late Addition to Index
Rds 'A' (RDSA) 15-Jul-05 1 Royal Dutch Shell A and B 1
Rds 'B' (RDSB) 15-Jul-05 1 1
Reckitt Ben. Gp (RB.) Original Member 1 1
Reed Elsevier (REL) Original Member 1 1
Resolution (RSL) 0 Investment
Rexam (REX)
Original Member 
and 23-Sept-2002 1 0
Rio Tinto (RIO) Original Member 1 1
Rolls-royce Hlg (RR.) 11-Jun-03 1 0
Royal Bank Scot (RBS) 0 Banking
Rsa Ins. (RSA) 0 Insurance
Sabmiller (SAB)
22-Mar-99 1
Originally South African 
Breweries 1
Sage Grp. (SGE) 20-Sep-99 1 0
Sainsbury(j) (SBRY) Original Member 1 0
Schroders (SDR)
0 Non-continous Membership
Left Index from 15 March 
2006 to 30 March 2007
Severn Trent (SVT) 24-Sep-01 1 0
Shire (SHP) 26-Oct-00 1 0
Smith&nephew (SN.) 12-Jul-01 1 0
Smiths Group (SMIN) 18-Dec-00 1 0
Sportsdirect (SPD)
5-Jul-05 0 Late Addition to Index
Entered with Coca-Cola (No 
suitable predecessors)
Sse (SSE) 16-Dec-98 1 1
Stand.chart. (STAN) 0 Banking
Std Life (SL.) 0 Fund Management
Tate & Lyle (TATE)
17 Dec 04 and 6 
March 08 and 22 
Dec 08 and 08 June 
11 0 Mutliple Entries into Index
Tesco (TSCO) Original Member 1 1
Travis Perkins (TPK)
13-Jun-13 0 Late Addition to Index
Evraz (Entered 07 Dec 2011 - Late 
Addition to Index)
Evraz Replaced Investec (Entered 10 
March 2010 - Late Addition to Index)
Investec Replaced Resolution 
(Entered 15 March 2006 - Early Exit 
from Index) 
Polymetal International (Entered 07 
Dec 2011 - Late Additin to Index)
Polymetal Replaced Lonmin  (Entered 
07 June 2007  - Early Exit from Index)
Tui Travel (TT.)
24 Dec 2007 and 10 
Dec 2012 0 Multiple Entries into Index
Tullow Oil (TLW) 24-Sep-07 0 Late Addition to Index
Unilever (ULVR) Original Member 1 1
Utd. Utilities (UU.) 2-Apr-90 1 Originally Northwest Water 0
Vedanta (VED) 7-Jun-06 1 0
Vodafone Grp. (VOD) Pre 2007 1 1
Weir Grp. (WEIR)
8-Sep-10 0 Early Exit from Index
Replaced by Segro (Exited in 2007  
and Entered in 2009)
Whitbread (WTB) 15-Dec-06 1 0
William Hill (WMH)
In and out (back in 
2013) 0 Multiple Entries into Index Replaced by Kazakhmys
Wolseley (WOS) 24-Sep-01 1 0
Wpp (WPP) 22-Jun-98 1 0
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Table (A2) Transaction Indicators 
This table contains information on the trade qualifiers used to identify important transactions.  Some 
qualifiers indicate dark transactions that do not originate from an exclusively dark liquidity provider.  
In some cases this is also indicated by a suffix to the firm’s RIC.  Other qualifiers indicate transactions 
that should be ignored.  
 
  
Qualifier/RIC Suffix Value Exchange Affected Description
R v All Dark Transaction
R p All Dark Transaction
Q 4 All Cancel Transaction
Q RCK All Cancel Transaction
Q XSMP All Dark Transaction (Smarpool)
Q OFF VX Dark Transaction (Off Exchange)
Q U All Uncrossing (Ignore)
Q N All Dark Transaction (Negotiated)
Q T L Dark Transaction
Q R All (Except L) Dark Transaction
Q K All Dark Tranaction
Q H All Dark Transaction (Hidden)
Q X All Dark Transaction (Crossed)
Q S All Dark Transaction (Systematic Internalizer)
Q W All Dark Transaction (VWAP)
Q P All Dark Transaction (Protected Portfolio)
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Table (A3) Fragmentation and Consolidation Event Timeline 
The timeline of fragmentation and consolidation events is built by categorizing the news events and 
press releases of the various dark liquidity providers and trade reporting facilities.  The table 
contains a list of fragmenting and consolidating events and information on other events of interest 
(e.g. Notification of a company reporting trades to Markit BOAT).  Identifiers used to classify the 
events can be found in the Subject and Event Code legend located below.  By organizing the news 
events in chronological order we construct a timeline that we use to keep track of how many distinct 
dark pools are in existence, how many firms are reporting to the consolidated tape and how many 
consolidated venues have formed as a result of liquidity sharing. 
LEGEND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject Event Code
D Dark Order Book O Opened/Created
L Lit Order Book Market C Closed
B Broker Crossing Network (BCN) MS Modified Services
S Systematic Internalizer MSE Modified Services (Additional Equities Offerings)
R Regulated Market MSA Modified Services (Aggregation)
AL Aggregator Algorithm Lit (Smart Order Routing - SOR) MC Modified Company
AD Aggregator Algorithm Dark (SOR)
ALD Aggregator Algorithm Lit and Dark (SOR)
DL Dark and Lit
OTC Over the counter
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      Table (A3) (continued) 
 
Date Subject Event Code Description Link1
2/5/2007 D MS
ITG launches POSIT NOW, continuous crossing in Europe.  
Regular Posit is Posit Match (Exact date in Notes link)
http://investor.itg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=100516&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=958312&highlight=
3/30/2007 AL MSA CA Cheuvreux SOR algos have access to Chi-x
https://www.cheuvreux.com/pdf/PR%2023%20december%202
008%20CA%20Cheuvreux%20Nasdaq%20OMX.pdf
10/24/2007 OTC MS
ITG Expands cross borders trading between US, Canada and 
Europe in Triton
http://investor.itg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=100516&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1066490&highlight=
11/1/2007  - O
BOAT Launches with ABN Amro, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Merrill Lynch, 
Morgan Stanley and UBS 
http://www.finextra.com/news/fullstory.aspx?newsitemid=173
44
11/1/2007 D O BlockMatch is registered as an MTF
http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-
resources/news/instinet-blockmatch-granted-approval-to-
reference-european-consolidated-price/
11/13/2007 AD O
ITG adds 'Active' to its European suite of algorithms.  
Access Posit dark liquidity pool. (Notes for exact date)
http://investor.itg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=100516&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1076264&highlight=
3/17/2008 D O
NYFIX launches Euro Millium European dark pool with UK 
stocks for now and more coming soon.  See link for list of 
major investment firms.
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nyfix-launches-
euro-millennium-dark-pool-56935587.html
5/2/2008 D I Liquidnet begins reporting to Markit BOAT
http://www.markit.com/en/media-centre/press-
releases/detail.page?dcr=/markit/PressRelease/data/2008/05/
2008-05-02-2
7/28/2008 D MSA
Instinet BlockMatch and CS CrossFinder share access to 
dark pools
http://www.instinet.com/includes/pdf/news/IEL_CS_Partnershi
p_.pdf
8/14/2008 OTC MSA
Instinet Europe begins trading on Turquoise (Instinet 
clients have access to trading on Turquoise book)
http://www.nomuraholdings.com/news/nr/europe/20080723/
20080723.pdf
8/14/2008 D MSA
Instinet Blockmatch clients can access Turquoise dark order 
types
http://www.nomuraholdings.com/news/nr/europe/20080723/
20080723.pdf
9/16/2008 AD O ITG launches ITG Dark algo in Europe (Exact date in Link2)
http://investor.itg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=100516&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1197632&highlight=
2/2/2009 D O
Smartpool launches with partnership from NYSE Euronext, 
BNP Paribas, HSBC and JP Morgan.  Markets phased in but 
15 total by Feb 23rd. Start with Germany, Austria, 
Netherlands, Belgium  (Smartpool info page on Thomson 
Reuters -Speed Guide)
http://www.tradeonsmartpool.com/Assets/Documents/PressFS
AApproval.pdf?1244644460
2/2/2009 D MSA Instinet to begin trading on Smartpool
http://www.nomuraholdings.com/news/nr/europe/20090202/
20090202.pdf
5/7/2009 D O
Nasdaq IMX Europe announces launch of NeuroDark.  
Trading in top 800 European Shares (Same as Nasdaq OMX 
Europe itself)
http://www.nasdaqomx.com/newsroom/pressreleases/pressrel
ease/?messageId=538539&displayLanguage=en
5/26/2009 D O
Chi-x Europe goes live with Chi-Delta Non-displayed order 
book
http://www.nomuraholdings.com/news/nr/europe/20090526/
20090526.pdf
7/1/2009 AD O
Turquoise launched TQ Lens with liquidity partners: CA 
Cheavreax, Citadel Securities, Citi, Deutsche Bank, Merrill 
Lynch International, and Nomura http://www.thetradenews.com/print.aspx?id=2920
7/13/2009 D MSA
Leading investment firms join smartpool.  Look for list in 
link 
http://www.tradeonsmartpool.com/Assets/Documents/PressR
eleaseSmartPoolnames130709.pdf?1247472289
8/7/2009 D O Bats-Europe launches dark pool
http://www.informationweek.com/bats-europe-dark-pool-
launch-set/218500874
8/19/2009 AD MSA Instinet Europe becomes latest firms to join TQ Lens
http://www.tradeturquoise.com/press/instinet_europe_joins_t
q_lens.pdf
10/8/2009 D MSA
Bats Europe providing Nomura clients with direct access to 
Bats Europe platform
http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources/press_releases/BATSEur
ope_Nomura_SponsoredAccess_FINAL.pdf
11/10/2009 D MSA
Smartpool adds BoA Merril Lynch and CA Cheuvreux  to 
dark pool community. Linking of lit order books and dark 
pools
http://www.tradeonsmartpool.com/Assets/Documents/09111
0_SmartPoolNewCustomers.pdf?1257851044
11/11/2009 S O Knight launches Knight link in Europe
http://www.informationweek.com/knight-launches-knight-link-
in-europe/221601217
11/16/2009 AD MSA CA Crossfire algo provides access to new dark pools.
https://www.cheuvreux.com/pdf/PR%2016%20november%202
009%20New%20Dark%20Pools.pdf
11/30/2009 D C/Aggregation
NYSE Technologies shuts down Euro Millenium dark pool 
following take over. Smartpool will take all Euro Millenium 
clients (Link2)
http://www.finextra.com/news/fullstory.aspx?newsitemid=208
11
12/2/2009 D MS/ MSE
Six Swiss Exchange partners with Smartpool to deliver 
Swiss Block, MYFIX Euro Millenium dropped
http://www.tradeonsmartpool.com/Assets/Documents/SmartP
oolSwissBlock21209.pdf?1259857221
1/25/2010 D O
Nomura goes live with  NX MTF, the first principal broker 
dealer established MTF dark pool. Began trading in stocks 
across 14 european markets
http://www.nomura.com/europe/resources/upload/NX_go_liv
e_-_01_February_2010.pdf
5/21/2010 D C
Nasdaq OMX Europe closes Neuro. Double check but Neuro 
dark should be closing too
http://www.nasdaqomx.com/newsroom/pressreleases/pressrel
ease/?messageId=943974&displayLanguage=en
6/29/2010 D I Instinet's BlockMatch will report all trades to Markit BOAT
http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-
resources/news/instinet-blockmatch-report-their-trades-using-
markit-boat/
11/1/2010 OTC MSA Instinet connects to equiduct systems hybrid book
http://www.nomuraholdings.com/news/nr/europe/20101101/
20101101.pdf
11/9/2010 D O UBS goes live with dark MTF called UBS MTF
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-11-09/ubs-mtf-
goes-live
1/18/2012 D MC Pipeline changes name to Aritas Securities
http://www.advancedtrading.com/crossingnetworks/following-
scandal-pipeline-switches-name/232500047
3/28/2011 D O Goldman sachs launches Sigma X
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/wall-street-
journal/goldman-plunges-into-dark-pools/story-fnay3vxj-
1226297838503
4/16/2012 D O
CA Cheuvreuz launches pan-Europen dark book, Blink MTF.  
See link for securities coverage
http://www.credit-agricole.com/en/News/Press-
releases/General-Press-Releases/CA-Cheuvreux-launches-its-
own-pan-European-MTF-BLINK
